XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA

Pocket Literal Translations of the Classics.

CLOTH BINDING. EACH, 50 CENTS.

These translations have been prepared with great care. They follow the original text literally, thus forming a valuable help to the student in his efforts to master the difficulties which beset him. Pleasing sketches of the authors appear in the form of an introduction to each of the volumes.

The books are in a convenient form, being exceptionally handy for the pocket. They are printed from clear type, and are attractively and durably bound.

Caesar's Commentaries.—Six Books.
Cicero's Defence of Roscius.
Cicero on Old Age and Friendship.
Cicero on Oratory.
Cicero's Select Orations.
Cicero's Select Letters.
Cornelius Nepos, complete.
Horace, complete.
Juvenal's Satires, complete.
Livy.—Books 1 and 2.
Livy.—Books 21 and 22.
Ovid's Metamorphoses.—Books 1–7.
Ovid's Metamorphoses.—Books 8–15.
Plautus' Captivi and Mostellaria.
Sallust's Catiline and The Jugurthine War.
Tacitus' Annals.—The First Six Books.
Tacitus' Germany and Agricola.
Virgil's Aeneid.—Six Books.
Virgil's Eclogues and Georgics.
Viri Romae.

Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound and Seven Against Thebes.
Aristophanes' Clouds, Birds, and Frogs.—In one Vol.
Demosthenes' On the Crown.
Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and Philippics.
Euripides' Alcestis and Electra.
Euripides' Medea.
Herodotus.—Books 6 and 7.
Homer's Iliad.—Nine Books.
Homer's Odyssey.—Thirteen Books.
Lysias' Select Orations.
Plato's Apology, Crito and Phaedo.
Plato's Gorgias.
Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus, Electra, and Antigone.
Xenophon's Anabasis.—Five Books.
Xenophon's Memorabilia, complete.
Goethe's Egmont.
Goethe's Faust.
Goethe's Hermann and Dorothea.
Lessing's Minna von Barnhelm.
Lessing's Nathan the Wise.
Schiller's Maid of Orleans.
Schiller's Maria Stuart.
Schiller's William Tell.

Others will be added at short intervals.

DAVID McKAY, Publisher, Philadelphia, Pa.

THE

MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES

LITERALLY TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

OF

XENOPHON

BY THE

REV. J. S. WATSON, M.A., M.R.S.L.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

EDWARD BROOKS, JR.

Property Of
L. A. Baptist
COLLEGE LIBRARY
Newhall, California

PHILADELPHIA
DAVID McKAY, PUBLISHER
1022 MARKET STREET

Copyright, 1899, by David McKay

PRESS OF
Sherman & Co., Philadelphia.

INTRODUCTION.

XENOPHON the Athenian historian and philosopher was born about 444 B. C. and is said to have lived to the age of ninety. His father, Gryllus, was an Athenian knight, a native of the Attic borough Ercheia. It is quite probable that his means and social standing were such that Xenophon was supplied with all the advantages of education and culture which could be desired.

Principal among his instructors was the sage Socrates. The meeting between the two has been described as a chance or accident. Xenophon was walking along a narrow street one day, when suddenly Socrates appeared, and blocking the way, asked the question where men were made honorable and good. Xenophon, being at a loss for an answer, the latter replied: "Follow me, and find out," and from this time on a sincere and devoted friendship sprang up between them.

Another story of their meeting is that, when about twenty years of age, Xenophon having determined upon a military career for himself, was present at the battle of Delium. In the flight which took place after the battle Xenophon is said to have fallen from his horse and been carried to a place of safety on the shoulders of Socrates.

Little is known of the early life of Xenophon. About the age of forty-three his friend Proxenus, who was then at Sardis, having raised a band of mercenaries and entered the service of Cyrus the Younger, brother of the Persian king, Artaxerxes, begged Xenophon to join him in what was supposed to be an expedition against the Psidians. Xenophon, being anxious to go, but hesitating as to the propriety of entering a foreign service, asked advice of Socrates who suggested that he had better consult an oracle. To Delphi Xenophon accordingly betook himself for advice as to the success of the expedition. Being bent on joining his friend, however, he did not ask the question directly, but merely requested to know to what gods he should sacrifice in order to insure a successful outcome. On receiving the reply of the oracle he acted in accordance therewith, performed the sacred rites and then proceeded to Sardis, where he joined Proxenus.

The real object of this expedition, which was an attack upon Artaxerxes, the Persian king, was soon revealed, but not before it was too late to turn back. So Xenophon accompanied it in its tedious march toward Babylon until within fifty miles of the Persian capital, where, in the plain of Cunaxa a fierce battle was fought, which resulted in the death of Cyrus.

The Greeks then held parley with Artaxerxes and decided, upon his promise to give them safe conduct, to return to their country. Accordingly un-

der the escort of Tissaphernes they set out for home. Upon reaching the river Zabatus, Tissaphernes, through treachery, put to death their leader Clearchus and five other generals, among whom was Proxenus, together with a number of captains. In this emergency Xenophon came forward and urged his countrymen to select other generals who might lead them home in safety. This advice was followed, Xenophon himself being chosen to fill the place of Proxenus. Not daring to return by the route they had come, they followed the course of the river Tigris and across the high lands of Armenia to Trebizond, a Greek colony on the southeast coast of the Black Sea, and thence to a place called Chrysopolis, which is opposite to what is now Constantinople. Here the Greeks found themselves in sore distress on account of lack of money and provisions. They therefore readily accepted a proposition offered them by Seuthes, king of Thrace, to assist him in fighting to regain his lost sovereignty. The Greeks performed their part of the agreement, but Seuthes failed to live up to his part, and it was with the greatest of difficulty that Xenophon finally obtained from him only a portion of the promised reward. Being still in want an expedition was planned into the plain of Caicus, where they seized the house of a wealthy Persian and obtained considerable treasure, of which Xenophon obtained a due portion.

On account of his participation in the expedition

against Artaxerxes a decree of banishment was passed by the Athenians against Xenophon. He accordingly remained in Asia Minor, and probably joined Agesilaus, King of Sparta, in his expedition into the former country. Returning with Agesilaus he took part in the battle of Chaeronea against his own countrymen. Some say it was for this offense that he was banished by the Athenians. At any rate he subsequently took up his residence at Scillus in Elis, not far from Olympia. Here he dwelt in a home given to him by the Spartans along with his wife and children, who joined him there. He spent most of his time in writing the works which have handed down his name to posterity, and for recreation indulged in hunting and entertaining his friends.

Upon the defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra and the consequent loss of their ascendency, he was driven from Scillus by the Eleans, and is supposed to have taken up his residence in Corinth, where he died sometime after 357 B. C.

Xenophon's writings may be divided into four classes : 1, Historical ; 2, Didactic ; 3, Political, and 4, Philosophical. His historical works are the Anabasis, which describes the expedition against Artaxerxes ; the Cyropaedia, a story of the early life of Cyrus ; the Hellenics, a continuation of the history of the Peloponnesian War and the Life of Agesilaus. His didactic writings consist of a treatise on Horsemanship and one on Hunting. His political

compositions are a work on the Constitution of Sparta and Athens, and a work on the Revenues of Attica. Among his philosophical works are the Memorabilia of Socrates, which is translated in the following pages. His other philosophical writings are the Apology of Socrates, which purports to contain Socrates' plea to his judges; the Symposium, an account of a festive meeting which Socrates attended; the Oeconomicus, a treatise on domestic duties, and the Hiero, a fictitious dialogue between the tyrant of Syracuse and Simonides.

The Memorabilia of Socrates, as its name indicates, consists of a series of personal recollections of Socrates. It has been called an affectionate tribute of an admiring pupil, and contains a full vindication of Socrates' life and teachings, and although it can hardly be considered a masterpiece, it is an honest piece of work, and probably faithfully describes the merits and eccentricities of the philosopher's manner of life.

XENOPHON'S

MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

The two charges on which Socrates was condemned to death by the Athenians, sect. 1. The first charge refuted by several arguments; for Socrates used to sacrifice to the gods. 2; he practiced divination, and his *dæmon* was no new god, 2-5; he recommended that the gods should be consulted by man in perplexing circumstances, 6-9; he was guilty of no impiety, he avoided vain speculations respecting the gods, and said that the business of philosophy was the study of virtue, 10-17; his life was in accordance with the precepts of morality, 18-20.

1. I HAVE often wondered by what arguments the accusers[1] of Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he deserved death from the state: for the indictment against him was to this effect: SOCRATES OFFENDS AGAINST THE LAWS IN NOT PAYING RESPECT[2] TO THOSE GODS WHOM

[1] Plato, in his Apology of Socrates, mentions his accusers by name: *Meletus*, a bad author of tragedies and songs (see Aristoph. Ran. 1302, and the Scholiast); *Anytus*, who was a tanner or currier, as appears from Xen. Apol. sect. 29, illustrated by the industry of Bornemann, p. 72, ed. 1824, and p. 350, ed. 1829; and *Lyco*, an orator, to whom allusion seems to be made in Aristoph. Vesp. 1301. *Kühner*.

[2] Οὐ νομίζων.] Νομίζειν θεοὺς is *deos more publico* (τῷ νόμῳ) *receptos colere*. . . . Hence οἱ νενομισμένοι θεοὶ are the gods publicly acknowledged and worshipped. *Kühner*.

THE CITY RESPECTS, AND INTRODUCING OTHER NEW DEITIES; HE ALSO OFFENDS AGAINST THE LAWS IN CORRUPTING THE YOUTH.

2. In the first place, *that he did not respect the gods whom the city respects*, what proof did they bring? For he was seen frequently sacrificing at home, and frequently on the public altars of the city; nor was it unknown that he used divination; as it was a common subject of talk that "Socrates used to say that the divinity instructed him;" and it was from this circumstance, indeed, that they seem chiefly to have derived the charge of introducing new deities.

3. He however introduced nothing newer than those who, practising divination, consult auguries, voices,[1] omens, and sacrifices; for they do not imagine that birds, or people who meet them, know what is advantageous for those seeking presages, but that the gods, by their means, signify what will be so; and such was the opinion that Socrates entertained.

4. Most people say that they are diverted from an object, or prompted to it, by birds, or by the people who meet them; but Socrates spoke as he thought, for he said it was the divinity that was his monitor. He also told many of his friends to do certain things, and not to do others, intimating that the divinity had forewarned him; and advantage attended those who obeyed his suggestions, but repentance those who disregarded them.

5. Yet who would not acknowledge that Socrates wished to appear to his friends neither a fool nor a boaster? But he would have seemed to be both, if, after saying that intimations were given him by a god, he had then been proved guilty of falsehood. It is manifest, therefore, that he would have uttered no predictions, if he had not trusted that they would prove true. But who, in such matters, would trust to

[1] Φήμαις.] φῆμη, an omen taken from the voices of men. See Cicero de Div. i. 45. 102; where it is said that the Pythagoreans observed not only the voices of the gods, but also those of men, and called the signs from them *omina*. See Eustath. ad, Il. κ', p. 799; Xen. Apol. 12; Bornemann ad Apol. 18, p. 51, ed. 1824; Herbst on Sympos. iv. 48, and on this passage. *Kühner.*

any one but a god? And how could he, who trusted the gods, think that there were no gods?[1]

6. He also acted toward his friends according to his convictions, for he recommended them to perform affairs of necessary consequence[2] in such a manner as he thought that they would be best managed: but concerning those of which it was doubtful how they would terminate, he sent them to take auguries whether they should be done or not.

7. Those who would govern families or cities well, he said, had need of divination; for to become skilful in architecture, or working in brass, or agriculture, or in commanding men, or to become a critic in any such arts,[3] or a good reasoner, or a skilful regulator of a household, or a well-qualified general, he considered as wholly matters of learning, and left to the choice of the human understanding.

8. But he said that the gods reserved to themselves the most important particulars attending such matters, of which nothing was apparent to men; for neither was it certain to him who had sown his field well, who should reap the fruit of it; nor certain to him who had built a house well, who should inhabit it; nor certain to him who was skilled in generalship, whether it would be for his advantage to act as a general; nor certain to him who was versed in political affairs, whether it would be for his profit to be at the head of the state; nor certain to him who had married a beautiful wife in hopes of happiness, whether he should not

[1] Πῶς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν;] Xenophon here goes out of his line of argument, and introduces a new point, which is not given in the charge against Socrates as it stands in sect. 1. He there says that Socrates was accused of introducing new gods, not of denying that there were gods. Plato, in his Apology, p. 36, C., has made a far more accurate distinction between these two points of accusation. *Kühner.* It is observable, that if εἶναι were omitted, the question would be in accordance with the accusation: "How could he, who trusted in the gods, not pay respect to the gods?"

[2] Τὰ ἀνογκαῖα.] Things of which the event is certain, because necessary, as Ernesti interprets. *Schneider.*

[3] Τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικόν.] Ἐξεταστικὸς appears to signify one who can point out the merits and defects in works, though he himself could not execute anything better than what he criticises; a man of theory, not of practice. *Weiske.*

incur misery by her means; nor certain to him who had acquired powerful connections in the state, whether he might not be banished by them.

9. And those who thought that none of these things depended on the gods, but that all were dependent on the human understanding, he pronounced to be insane; as he also pronounced those to be insane who had recourse to omens respecting matters which the gods had granted to men to discover by the exercise of their faculties; as if, for instance, a man should inquire whether it would be better to take for the driver of his chariot one who knows how to drive, or one who does not know; or whether it would be better to place over his ship one who knows how to steer it, or one who does not know; or if men should ask respecting matters which they may learn by counting, or measuring, or weighing; for those who inquired of the gods concerning such matters he thought guilty of impiety, and said that it was the duty of men to learn whatever the gods had enabled them to do by learning, and to try to ascertain from the gods by augury whatever was obscure to men; as the gods always afford information to those to whom they are rendered propitious.

10. He was constantly in public, for he went in the morning to the places for walking and the gymnasia; at the time when the market was full[1] he was to be seen there; and the rest of the day he was where he was likely to meet the greatest number of people; he was generally engaged in discourse, and all who pleased were at liberty to hear him.

11. Yet no one ever either saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or profane; for he did not dispute about the nature of things as most other philosophers disputed,[2] speculating how that

[1] Πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς.] See note on Anab. i. 8. 1.

[2] That Socrates used at times to discuss physical subjects, appears from Xenophon himself (see c. 4. and Symp. vi. 6), as well as from Plato's Apology and Phædo, c. 46. and Diog. Laert. ii. 45; but he pursued a different method from that of other philosophers in such discussions; for, abstaining from subtle and useless inquiries as to the origin of things, the courses of the heavenly bodies, and other obscure topics, he directed his inquiries to the consideration of the

which is called by sophists *the world* was produced, and by what necessary laws everything in the heavens is effected, but endeavored to show that those who chose such subjects of contemplation were foolish.

12. And used in the first place to inquire of them whether they thought that they already knew sufficient of human affairs, and therefore proceeded to such subjects of meditation, or whether, when they neglected human affairs entirely, and speculated on celestial matters, they thought that they were doing what became them.

13. He wondered, too, that it was not apparent to them that it is impossible for man to satisfy himself on such points, since even those who pride themselves most on discussing them, do not hold the same opinions one with another, but are compared with each other, like madmen.

14. For of madmen some have no fear of what is to be feared, and others fear what is not to be feared; some think it no shame to say or do anything whatever before men, and others think that they ought not to go among men at all; some pay no respect to temple, or altar, or anything dedicated to the gods, and others worship stones, and common stocks, and beasts: so of those who speculate on the nature of the universe, some imagine that all that exists is one, others that there are worlds infinite in number; some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing is ever moved; some that all things are generated and decay, and others that nothing is either generated or decays.

15. He would ask, also, concerning such philosophers, whether, as those who have learned arts practiced by men, expect that they will be able to carry into effect what they have learned, either for themselves, or for any one else whom they may wish, so those who inquire into celestial things, imagine that, when they have discovered by what laws everything is effected,

divine power, the nature of man, the connection of the human with the divine nature, and the government of the world by divine influence. *Kühner.*

they will be able to produce, whenever they please, wind, rain, changes of the seasons, and whatever else of that sort they may desire, or whether they have no such expectation, but are content merely to know how everything of that nature is generated.

16. Such were the observations which he made about those who busied themselves in such speculations; but for himself, he would hold discourse, from time to time, on what concerned mankind, considering what was pious, what impious; what was becoming, what unbecoming; what was just, what unjust; what was sanity, what insanity; what was fortitude, what cowardice; what a state was, and what the character of a statesman; what was the nature of government over men, and the qualities of one skilled in governing them; and touching on other subjects, with which he thought that those who were acquainted were men of worth and estimation, but that those who were ignorant of them might justly be deemed no better than slaves.

17. As to those matters, then, on which Socrates gave no intimation what his sentiments were, it is not at all wonderful that his judges should have decided erroneously concerning him; but is it not wonderful that they should have taken no account of such things as all men knew?

18. For when he was a member of the senate, and had taken the senator's oath, in which it was expressed that *he would vote in accordance with the laws*, he, being president in the assembly of the people when they were eager to put to death Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and all the nine generals, by a single vote contrary to the law, refused,[1] though the multitude were enraged at him, and many of those in power uttered threats against him, to put the question to the vote, but considered it of more importance to observe his oath than to gratify the people contrary to what was right, or to seek safety against those who menaced him.

19. For he thought that the gods paid regard to men, not in the way in which some people suppose, who imagine that the gods know some things and do not

[1] See Xen. Hell. i. 7, especially sect. 15.

know others, but he considered that the gods know all things, both what is said, what is done, and what is meditated in silence, and are present everywhere, and give admonitions to men concerning everything human.

20. I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates had not right sentiments concerning the gods; a man who never said or did any thing impious toward the gods, but spoke and acted in such a manner with respect to them, that any other who had spoken and acted in the same manner, would have been, and have been considered, eminently pious.

CHAPTER II.

Reply to the other charge against Socrates. He did not corrupt the youth, for his whole teaching dissuaded them from vice, and encouraged them to temperance and virtue of every kind, sect. 1–8. He exhorted them to obey the laws, 9–11. If Critias and Alcibiades, who listened to his discourses, became corrupt, the fault was not his, 12–28; he endeavored to reclaim them, till they deserted him; and others, who resigned themselves wholly to his instructions, became virtuous and honorable men, 28–48. Other frivolous assertions refuted, 49–60. His benevolence, disinterestedness, and general merits, 61–64.

1. It also seems wonderful to me, that any should have been persuaded that Socrates corrupted the youth; Socrates, who, in addition to what has been said of him, was not only the most rigid of all men in the government of his passions and appetites, but also most able to withstand cold, heat, and every kind of labor: and, besides, so inured to frugality, that, though he possessed very little, he very easily made it a sufficiency.

2. How, then, being of such a character himself, could he have rendered others impious, or lawless, or luxurious, or incontinent, or too effeminate to endure labor? On the contrary, he restrained many of them from such vices, leading them to love virtue, and giving them hopes, that if they would take care of

themselves, they would become honorable and worthy characters.

3. Not indeed that he ever professed to be an instructor in that way, but, by showing that he was himself such a character, he made those in his society hope that, by imitating him, they would become such as he was.

4. Of the body he was not neglectful, nor did he commend those who were. He did not approve that a person should eat to excess, and then use immoderate exercise, but recommended that he should work off, by a proper degree of exercise, as much as the appetite received with pleasure; for such a habit, he said, was peculiarly conducive to health, and did not prevent attention to the mind.

5. He was not, however, fine or ostentatious in his clothes or sandals, or in any of his habits of life: yet he did not make those about him lovers of money,[1] for he checked them in this as well as other passions, and asked no remuneration from those who desired his company.

6. By refraining from such demand, he thought that he consulted his liberty, and called those who took money for their discourses their own enslavers, since they must of necessity hold discussions with those from whom they received pay.

7. He expressed wonder, too, that any one who professed to teach virtue, should demand money, and not think that he gained the greatest profit in securing a good friend, but fear that he whom he had made an honorable and worthy character would not retain the greatest gratitude toward his greatest benefactor.

8. Socrates, indeed, never expressed so much to any one; yet he believed that those of his associates who imbibed what he approved, would be always good friends both to himself and to each other. How then could a man of such a character corrupt the young, unless, indeed, the study of virtue be corruption?

9. "But assuredly," said the accuser, "he caused those who conversed with him to despise the established

[1] Though he was not extravagant, he was not avaricious; nor had his conversation a tendency to make others avaricious.

laws, by saying how foolish it was to elect the magistrates of a state by beans,[1] when nobody would be willing to take a pilot elected by beans, or an architect, or a flute-player,[2] or a person in any other profession, which, if erroneously exercised, would cause far less harm than errors in the administration of a state;" and declared that "such remarks excited the young to contemn the established form of government, and disposed them to acts of violence."

10. But I think that young men who exercise their understanding, and expect to become capable of teaching their fellow-citizens what is for their interest, grow by no means addicted to violence, knowing that on violence attend enmity and danger, but that, by persuasion, the same results are attained without peril, and with goodwill; for those who are compelled by us, hate us as if despoiled of something, while those who are persuaded by us, love us as if they had received a favor. It is not the part, therefore, of those who cultivate the intellect to use violence; for to adopt such a course belongs to those who possess brute force without intellect.

11. Besides, he who would venture to use force, had need of no small number of allies, but he who can succeed with persuasion, has need of none, for, though left alone, he would think himself still able to persuade; and it by no means belongs to such men to shed blood, for who would wish to put another man to death rather than to have him as a living subject persuaded to obey?

12. "But," said the accuser, "Critias and Alcibiades, after having been associates of Socrates, inflicted a great number of evils on the state; for Critias was the most avaricious and violent of all that composed the oligarchy, and Alcibiades was the most intemperate, insolent, and turbulent of all those in the democracy."

13. For whatever evil they did the state, I shall make

[1] Ἀπὸ κυάμου.] Black and white beans were used in voting for the magistrates at Athens.

[2] Μηδ' αὐγητῇ] These words, which occur in the texts of Weiske' Schneider, and all others that I have seen, are omitted by Kühner; perhaps inadvertently.

no apology ; but as to their intimacy with Socrates, I will state how it took place.

14. These two men were by nature the most ambitious of all the Athenians, and wished that every thing should be done by their means, and that they themselves should become the most celebrated of all men. But they knew that Socrates lived with the utmost contentment on very small means, that he was most abstinent from every kind of pleasure, and that he swayed those with whom he conversed just as he pleased by his arguments.

15. And, seeing such to be the case, and being such characters as they have just been stated to be, whether will any one say that they sought his society from a desire to lead such a life as Socrates led, and to practise such temperance as he practised, or from an expectation, that if they associated with him, they would become eminently able to speak and act ?

16. I myself, indeed, am of opinion, that if a god had given them their choice, whether they would live their whole lives as they saw Socrates living, or die, they would have chosen rather to die ; and they showed this disposition by what they did ; for as soon as they considered themselves superior to their associates. they at once started away from Socrates, and engaged in political life, to qualify themselves for which they had sought the society of Socrates.

17. Perhaps some one may observe on this point, that Socrates should not have taught his followers politics before he taught them self-control. To this remark I make no reply at present ;[1] but I see that all teachers make themselves examples to their pupils how far they practise what they teach, and stimulate them by precepts.

18. And I know that Socrates made himself an example to those who associated with him as a man of honorable and excellent character, and that he discoursed admirably concerning virtue and other things that concern mankind. I know, too, that those men

[1] Xenophon leaves this point for the present, intending to reply to it in iv. 3. *Kühner.*

exercised self-control as long as they conversed with Socrates, not from fear lest they should be fined or beaten by him, but from a persuasion at the time that it was best to observe such conduct.

19. Perhaps, however, many of those who profess to be philosophers, may say that a man once just, can never become unjust, or once modest, immodest; and that, with regard to any other qualification (among such as can be taught), he who has once learned it can never become ignorant of it. But regarding such points I am not of that opinion; for I see that as those who do not exercise the body cannot perform what is proper to the body, so those who cannot exercise the mind, cannot perform what is proper to the mind; for they can neither do that which they ought to do, nor refrain from that which they ought to refrain.

20. For which reason fathers keep their sons, though they be of a virtuous disposition, from the society of bad men, in the belief that association with the good is an exercise of virtue, but that association with the bad is the destruction of it. One of the poets also bears testimony to this truth, who says,

Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσι
Συμμισγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

From good men you will learn what is good; but if you associate with the bad, you will lose the understanding which is in you.[1]

And another, who observes,

Αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τότε μὲν κακὸς ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός,

A good man is at one time good, and at another bad.

21. I also concur with them; for I see that as people forget metrical compositions when they do not practise the repetition of them, so forgetfulness of precepts of instructions is produced in those who neglect them. But where a person forgets moral admonitions, he forgets also what the mind felt when it had a desire for

[1] This distich is taken from Theognis, v. 35, 36. That Socrates was fond of quoting it, appears also from Xen. Symp. ii. 4, and Plato, Menon, p. 95, D. Whence the following verse is taken is unknown. *Kühner.*

self-government; and, when he forgets this, it is not at all wonderful that he forgets self-government also.

22. I see, too, that those who are given up to a fondness for drinking, and those who have fallen in love, are less able to attend to what they ought to do, and to refrain from what they ought not to do; for many who can be frugal in their expenses before they fall in love, are, after falling in love, unable to continue so; and, when they have exhausted their resources, they no longer abstain from means of gain from which they previously shrunk as thinking them dishonorable.

23. How is it impossible, then, that he who has once had a control over himself, may afterward cease to maintain it, and that he who was once able to observe justice, may subsequently become unable? To me everything honorable and good seems to be maintained by exercise, and self-control not the least: for sensual desires, generated in the same body with the soul, are constantly exciting it to abandon self-control, and to gratify themselves and the body as soon as possible.

24. Critias and Alcibiades, then, as long as they associated with Socrates, were able, with the assistance of his example, to maintain a mastery over their immoral inclinations; but, when they were separated from him, Critias, fleeing to Thessaly, formed connections there with men who practised dishonesty rather than justice; and Alcibiades also, being sought by many women, even of high rank, for his beauty, and being corrupted by many men, who were well able to seduce him by their flattery, on account of his influence in the city and among the allies, and being also honored by the people, and easily obtaining the pre-eminence among them, became like the wrestlers in the gymnastic games, who, when they are fairly superior to others, neglect their exercise; so he grew neglectful of self-control.

25. When such was their fortune, and when they were proud of their birth, elated with their wealth, puffed up with their power, corrupted by many associates, demoralized by all these means, and long absent from Socrates, what wonder is it if they became headstrong?

26. And then, if they did any thing wrong, does the

accuser blame Socrates for it? and does Socrates seem to the accuser deserving of no praise, for having, when they were young, and when it is likely that they were most inconsiderate and intractable, rendered them discreet?

27. Yet other affairs are not judged of in such a way; for what flute-player, or what teacher of the harp, or what other instructor, if he produces competent pupils, and if they, attaching themselves to other masters, become less skilful, is blamed for their deterioration? Or what father, if his son, while he associated with one man, should be virtuous, but afterward, on uniting himself to some other person, should become vicious, would blame the former of the two? would he not rather, the more corrupt his son became with the second, bestow the greater praise on the first? Not even parents themselves, when they have their sons in their society, are blamed if their sons do anything wrong, provided they themselves are correct in their conduct.

28. In the same manner it would be right to judge of Socrates; if he had done anything immoral, he would justly be thought to be a bad man; but if he constantly observed morality, how can he reasonably bear the blame of vice which was not in him?

29. Or even if he himself did nothing wrong, but commended others when he saw them doing wrong, he would justly be censured. When he perceived, however, that Critias was enamored of Euthydemus, and was seeking to have the enjoyment of his society, like those who abuse the persons of others for licentious purposes, he dissuaded him from his intention, by saying that it was illiberal, and unbecoming a man of honor and proper feeling, to offer supplications to the object of his affections, with whom he wished to be held in high esteem, beseeching and entreating him, like a beggar, to grant a favor, especially when such favor was for no good end.

30. But as Critias paid no regard to such remonstrances, and was not diverted from his pursuit, it is said that Socrates, in the presence of many others as well as of Euthydemus, observed that "Critias seemed

to him to have some feeling like that of a pig, as he wished to rub against Muthydemus as swine against stones."

31. Critias, in consequence, conceived such a hatred to Socrates, that when he was one of the Thirty Tyrants, and was appointed a law-maker[1] with Charicles, he remembered the circumstance to his disadvantage, and inserted in his laws that "none should teach the art of disputation," intending an insult to Socrates, yet not knowing how to affect him in particular, but laying to his charge what was imputed to the philosophers by the multitude,[2] and calumniating him to the people; at least such was my opinion; for I myself never heard this from Socrates, nor do I remember having known any one say that heard it from him.

32. But Critias showed that such was the case; for when the Thirty had put to death many of the citizens, and those not of the inferior class, and had encouraged many to acts of injustice,[3] Socrates happened to observe that "it seemed surprising to him if a man, becoming herdsman of a number of cattle, and rendering the cattle fewer and in worse condition, should not confess that he was a bad herdsman, and still more surprising if a man, becoming governor of a city, and rendering the people fewer and in worse condition, should not feel ashamed, and be conscious of being a bad governor of the city."

33. This remark being repeated to the Thirty, Critias and Charicles summoned Socrates before them, showed him the law, and forbade him to hold discourse with the youth. Socrates inquired of them if he might be permitted to ask a question as to any point in the prohibi-

[1] See Hellen. ii. 3. 2. Of the Thirty, Charicles alone is here named, besides Critias the chief of them, because, by conspiring with Critias and a few of the others, he afterward acquired great authority and power in the state. *Kühner.* The law here mentioned was abrogated after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants. See Potter's Antiquities of Greece, vol. i. c. 25.

[2] The common charge brought by the multitude against the philosophers and sophists, was that they endeavored to "make the worse appear the better reason:" τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.

[3] See Plato's Apology of Socrates, c. 20: Οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.

tions that might not be understood by him. They gave him permission.

34. "Then," said he, "I am prepared to obey the laws; but that I may not unconsciously transgress through ignorance, I wish to ascertain exactly from you, 'whether it is because you think that the art of reasoning is an auxiliary to what is rightly spoken,[2] or to what is not rightly spoken, that you give command to abstain from it: for if it be an adjunct to what is rightly spoken, it is plain that we have to abstain from speaking rightly; but if to what is not rightly spoken, it is plain that we ought to endeavor to speak rightly.'"

35. Charicles, falling into a passion with him, said, "Since, Socrates, you are ignorant of this particular, we give you an order more easily to be understood, *not to discourse at all with the young.*" "That it may not be doubtful, then," said Socrates, "whether I do anything contrary to what is enjoined, define for me till what age I must consider men to be young." "As long," replied Charicles, "as they are not allowed to fill the office of senator, as not being yet come to maturity of understanding; and do not discourse with such as are under thirty years of age."

36. "And if I wish to buy any thing," said Socrates, "and a person under thirty years of age has it for sale, may I not ask him at what price he sells it?" "Yes, such questions as these," replied Charicles, "but you are accustomed to ask most of your questions about things, when you know very well how they stand; such questions, therefore, do not ask." "If then any young man," said he, "should ask me such a question as 'where does Charicles live?' or 'where is Critias?' may I not answer him, if I know?" "Yes, you may answer such questions," said Charicles.

37. "But," added Critias, "it will be necessary for

[1] Σὺν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι.] That is, "that the art of speaking supports what is rightly said:" for σὺν τινι εἶναι signfies *alicui auxilio esse.* See my Gr. Gr. vol. ii. § 601. *Kühner.* Schneider took συν for ἐν, giving the passage the meaning of *itner illa quæ rectè dicuntur*, which is, as *Weiske* says, a forced sense of σὺν, but which, it must be confessed, suits very well with the sequel of the question put by Socrates.

you to abstain from speaking of those shoemakers,[1] and carpenters, and smiths; indeed I think that they must now be worn out from being so often in your mouth." "I must therefore," said Socrates, "abstain from the illustrations that I attach to the mention of those people, illustrations on justice, piety and other such subjects." "Yes, by Jupiter," retorted Charicles, "and you must abstain from illustrations taken from herdsmen; for, if you do not, take care lest you yourself make cattle fewer." [2]

38. Hence it was evident that they were angry with Socrates on acount of his remark about the cattle having been reported to them.

What sort of intercourse Critias had with Socrates and how they stood toward each other, has now been stated.

39. But I would say that no regular training is derived by any one from a teacher who does not please him; and Critias and Alcibiades did not associate with Socrates, while their association with him lasted, as being an instructor that pleased them, but they were, from the very first, eager to be at the head of the state, for, while they still attended Socrates, they sought to converse with none more than with those who were most engaged in affairs of government.

40. Alcibiades, it is said, before he was twenty years of age, held the following discourse with Pericles, who was his guardian, and chief ruler of the state about laws.

41. "Tell me," said he, "Pericles, can you teach me what a law is." "Certainly," replid Pericles. "Teach

[1] Ἀπέχεσθαι—τῶν σκυτέων, κ. τ. λ.] A brief mode of expression for "to abstain from drawing illustrations, from those shoemakers," etc. Socrates, in his conversation, was accustomed to illustrate or support his precepts and opinions by examples taken from fullers, leather-cutters, potters and other artizans; a mode of lecturing quite the reverse of that of the sophists, who sought to dazzle or delight the minds of their hearers, by the splendor and magnificence of their illustrations, and the grandiloquence of their speeches, and derided the method of Socrates as common, trite, and mean. See b. iv. 4. 5; Plato, Symp. p. 221, E; Gorg. 491, A. *Kühner.*

[2] By losing your own life.

me then, in the name of the gods," said Alcibiades, "for I, hearing some persons praised as being obedient to the laws, consider that no one can fairly obtain such praise who does not know what a law is."

42. "You desire no very difficult matter, Alcibiades," said Pericles, "when you wish to know what a law is; for all those regulations are laws, which the people, on meeting together and approving them, have enacted, directing what we should do and what we should not do." "And whether do they direct that we should do good things, or that we should do bad things?" "Good, by Jupiter, my child," said he, "but bad by no means."

43. "And if it should not be the whole people, but a few, as where there is an oligarchy, that should meet together, and enact what we are to do, what are such enactments!" Everything," replied Pericles, "which the supreme power in the state, on determining what the people ought to do, has enacted, is called a law." "And if a tyrant, holding rule over the state, prescribes to the citizens what they must do, is such prescription called a law." "Whatever a tyrant in authority prescribes," returned Pericles, "is also called a law."

44. "What then, Pericles," asked Alcibiades, "is force and lawlessness? Is it not when the stronger obliges the weaker, not by persuasion, but by compulsion, to do what he pleases?" "So it appears to me," replied Pericles. "Whatever then a tyrant compels the people to do, by enacting it without gaining their consent, is that an act of lawlessness?" "Yes," said Pericles, "it appears to me that it is, for I retract my admission[1] that what a tyrant prescribes to the people without persuading them, is a law."

45. "But what the few enact, not from gaining the consent of the many, but from having superior power, should we say that that is force or that it is not?" "Everything," said Pericles, "which one man obliges another to do without gaining his consent, whether he

[1] Ἀνατίθεμαι.] A metaphorical expression from the game of *μεττοὶ* or *calculi*, in which *ἀναθεῖναι πεττούς*, is to replace or re-arrange the *calculi*, after discovering that one or more of them are misplaced. *Kühner.* See Suidas sub voce *ἀναθέσθαι*.

enact it in writing or not, seems to me to be force rather than law." "Whatever, then, the whole people, when they are stronger than the wealthier class, enact without their consent, would be an act of force rather than a law?"

46. "Certainly, Alcibiades," said Pericles: "and I, when I was of your age, was very acute at such disquisitions; for we used to meditate and argue about such subjects as you now appear to meditate." "Would, therefore," said Alcibiades, "that I had conversed with you, Pericles, at the time when you were most acute in discussing such topics!"

47. When Alcibiades and Critias, therefore, began to think themselves superior to those who were then governing the state, they no longer attended Socrates (for he was not agreeable to them in other respects, and they were offended, if they went to him at all, at being reproved for any error that they had committed), but devoted themselves to political employments, with a view to which they had at first associated with Socrates.

48. But Crito was also an attendant on Socrates, as well as Chærephon, Chærecrates, Hermocrates, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædondes, who, with others that attended him, did not seek his society that they might be fitted for popular orators or forensic pleaders, but that, becoming honorable and good men, they might conduct themselves irreproachably toward their families, connections, dependents, and friends, as well as toward their country and their fellow-citizens; and no one of all these, whether in youth or at a more advanced age, either was guilty, or was accused, of any crime.

49. "But Socrates," said the accuser, "taught children to show contempt for[1] their parents, persuading his followers that he rendered them wiser than their fathers, and observing that a son was allowed by the

[1] Προπηλακίζειν.] See Apolog. sect. 20, and Atistoph. Nub. 1407, where Phidippides is introduced, as a disciple of Socrates, beating his father with his stick and proving that he was right in doing so. Προπηλακίζειν is properly *stercore aliquem inquinare*; treatment to which they were subjected who were punished with ἀτιμία: but it was at length applied to every kind of insult. See Bremi ad Demosth. de Cor. p. 229. *Kühner.*

law to confine his father on convicting him of being deranged, using that circumstance as an argument that it was lawful for the more ignorant to be confined by the wiser."

50. But what Socrates said was, that he thought he who confined another for ignorance, might justly be himself confined by those who knew what he did not know; and with a view to such cases, he used to consider in what respect ignorance differed from madness, and expressed his opinion that madmen might be confined with advantage to themselves and their friends, but that those who did not know what they ought to know, might reasonably learn from those who did know.

51. "But Socrates," proceeded the accuser, "not only caused parents, but other relations, to be held in contempt by his followers, saying that relatives, as relatives, were of no profit to people who were sick, or to people going to law, but that physicians aided the one, and lawyers the other."

52. The accuser asserted, too, that Socrates said concerning friends that "it was of no profit that they were well-disposed, unless they were able also to assist; and that he insisted that those only were deserving of honor who knew what was for the advantage of others, and could make it intelligible to them; and that by thus persuading the young that he himself was the wisest of mankind, and most capable of making others wise, he so disposed his pupils toward him, that other people were of no account with them in comparison with himself."

53. I am aware, indeed, that he did express himself concerning parents and other relatives, and concerning friends, in such a manner as this: and used to say, besides, that when the soul has departed, in which alone intelligence exists, men take away the body of their dearest friend, and put it out of sight as soon as possible.

54. He was accustomed to say, also, that every man while he is alive, removes of himself from his own body, which he loves most of all things, and allows others to

remove from it, everything that is useless and unprofitable; since men themselves take off portions of their nails, and hair, and callous parts, and resign themselves to surgeons to cut and burn them with labor and pain, and think it their duty even to pay them money for their operations; and the saliva from the mouth, he said, men spit away as far as possible, because, while it is in the mouth, it profits them nothing, but is far more likely to harm them.

55. But such observations Socrates uttered, not to teach any one of his followers to bury his father alive, or to cut himself to pieces, but, by showing that what is senseless is worthless, he exhorted each to study to become as intelligent and useful as possible, so that, whether he wished to be honored by his father, by his brother, or by any one else, he might not be neglectful of himself through trusting to his relationship, but might endeavor to be serviceable to those by whom he desired to be respected.

56. The accuser also said that Socrates, selecting the worst passages of the most celebrated poets, and using them as arguments, taught those who kept him company to be unprincipled and tyrannical. The verse of Hesiod, for example,

> Ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δὲ ὄνειδος,
> Work is no disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace,[1]

they say that he used to explain as intimating that the poet bids us abstain from no kind of work, dishonest or dishonorable, but to do such work for the sake of profit.

57. But when Socrates maintained that to be busy was useful and beneficial for a man, and that to be unemployed was noxious and ill for him, that to work was a good, and to be idle an evil, he at the same time observed that those only who do something good really work, and are useful workmen,"[2] but those who gamble

[1] Not toil, but sloth, shall ignominious be.—*Elton.*

The enemies of Socrates insinuated that he joined οὐδὲν, not with its proper substantive ὄνειδος, but with ἔργον, making the sense to be "no work is disgraceful."

[2] Compare iii. 9. 9.

or do anything bad and pernicious, he called idle; and in this view the sentiment of the poet will be unobjectionable.

Work is no disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace.

58. That passage of Homer, too, the accuser stated that he often used to quote, in which it is said that Ulysses,

Whatever king or eminent hero he found,
Stood beside him, and detained him with gentle words:
"Illustrious chief, it is not fit that you should shrink back as a coward;
Sit down yourself, and make the rest of the people sit down."
But whatever man of the people he noticed, and found clamoring,
He struck him with his staff, and rebuked him with words:
"Worthless fellow, sit down in peace, and hear the exhortations of others.
Who are much better than you; for you are unwarlike and powerless,
Neither to be numbered in the field nor in the council." [1]

59. And he said that he used to explain it as if the poet recommended that plebeians and poor people should be beaten. Socrates, however, said no such thing (for he would thus have given an opinion that he himself ought to be beaten), but what he did say was, that those who benefited others neither by word nor deed, and who were incapable of serving the army, or the state, or the common people, if they should ever be called upon to serve, should, especially if, in addition to their incapacity, they were of an insolent spirit, be curbed in every way, even though they might be ever so rich.

60. But, contrary to the charge, of the accuser, Socrates was evidently a friend to the common people,

[1] Il. ii. 188, *seqq.*

Each prince of name, or chief in arms approv'd,
He fir'd with praise, or with persuasion mov'd;
Warriors like you, with strength and wisdom blest,
By brave examples should confirm the rest,
But if a clamorous, vile plebeian rose,
Him with reproof he check'd, or tam'd with blows:
Be still, thou slave, and to thy betters yield,
Unknown alike in council and in field.—*Pope.*

and of a liberal disposition; for though he received numbers of persons desirous to hear him discourse, as well citizens as foreigners, he never required payment for his communications from any one, but imparted to every one in abundance from his stores, of which some[1] receiving fragments from him for nothing, sold them at a great price to others, and were not, like him, friends to the common people, for they declined to converse with such as had not money to give them.

61. But Socrates, in the eyes of other men, conferred glory on the city, far more than Lichas, who was celebrated in this respect, on that of the Lacedæmonians; for Lichas indeed entertained the strangers that visited Lacedæmon at the Gymnopædiæ,[2] but Socrates, through the whole course of his life freely imparted whatever he had to bestow, and thus benefited in the highest degree all who were willing to receive from him, making those who associated with him better before he let them go.

62. To me, therefore, Socrates, being a man of such a character, appeared to be worthy of honor rather than of death; and any one, considering his case according to the laws, would find such to be the fact; for, by the laws, death is the punishment for a man if he be found stealing, or stripping people of their clothes, or cutting purses, or housebreaking, or kidnapping, or sacrilege, of which crimes Socrates was the most innocent of all men.

63. Nor was he ever the cause of any war ending unfortunately for the state, or of any sedition or treachery; nor did he ever, in his private transactions, either deprive any man of what was for his good, or involve him in evil; nor did he ever lie under suspicion of any of the crimes which I have mentioned.

[1] Xenophon alludes to other hearers of Socrates, but especially to Aristippus, who was the first of the Socratic philosophers that taught for hire. *Ruhnken.* See Diog. Laert. ii. 65.

[2] A festival at Sparta, which lasted for several days during the month of Hecatombæon, and in which dances were performed by youths in honor of Apollo, Diana, and Latona. It was partly intended to celebrate the victory of the Spartans over the Argives at Thyrea. See Smith's Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Ant. art. Γυμνοπαιδία.

64. How then could he have been guilty of the charges brought against him? a man who, instead of not acknowledging the gods, as was stated in the indictment, evidently paid respect to the gods more than other men; and instead of corrupting the youth, as the accuser laid to his charge, plainly led such of his associates as had vicious inclinations, to cease from indulging them, and exhorted them to cherish a love of that most honorable and excellent virtue, by which men successfully govern states and families. How then, pursuing such a course of conduct, was he not deserving of great honor from the city?

CHAPTER III.

Confirmation of the character of Socrates given in the preceding chapters. He worshipped the gods, and exhorted others to worship them, sect. 1. His notions how the gods were to be supplicated. 2. His judgment as to what was acceptable to them in a sacrifice, 3. His regard for omens, 4. His observance of temperance, and recommendation of it to others, 5–15.

1. But to show how he appeared to improve those who associated with him, partly by showing them what his character was, and partly by his conversation, I shall record whatever I can remember of him relating to these points.

As to what had reference to the gods, then he evidently acted and spoke in conformity with the answer which the priestess of Apollo gives to those who inquire how they ought to proceed with regard to a sacrifice, to the worship of their ancestors, or to any such matter; for the priestess replies that *they will act piously, if they act in agreement with the law of their country;* and Socrates both acted in this manner himself, and exhorted others to act similarly; and such as acted in any other way he regarded as doing what was not to the purpose,[1] and guilty of folly.

2. To the gods he simply prayed that they would give

[1] Περιέργους.] Doing what was superfluous; not adhering, as they ought, to what was prescribed by law.

him good things, as believing that the gods knew best what things are good; and those who prayed for gold, or silver, or dominion, or anything of that kind, he considered to utter no other sort of requests than if they were to pray that they might play at dice, or fight, or do anything else of which it is quite uncertain what the result will be.

3. When he offered small sacrifices from his small means, he thought that he was not at all inferior in merit to those who offered numerous and great sacrifices from ample and abundant means; for he said that it would not become the gods to delight in large rather than in small sacrifices; since, if such were the case, the offerings of the bad would oftentimes be more acceptable to them than those of the good; nor would life be of any account in the eyes of men, if oblations from the bad were better received by the gods than oblations from the good; but he thought that the gods had most pleasure in the offerings of the most pious. He also used to quote, with approbation, the verse,

Κἀδ' δύναμιν δ' ἕρδειν ἱερ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι

Perform sacrifices to the gods according to your ability,

and used to say that it was a good exhortation to men, with regard to friends, and guests, and all other relations of life, *to perform according to their ability.*

4. If anything appeared to be intimated to him from the gods, he could no more have been persuaded to act contrary to such intimation, than any one could have persuaded him to take for his guide on a journey a blind man, or one who did not know the way, instead of one who could see, and did know it; and he condemned the folly of others, who act contrary to what is signified by the gods, through anxiety to avoid the ill opinion of men. As for himself, he undervalued everything human, in comparison with counsel from the gods.[1]

[1] Schneider thinks that some clause is wanting here, to connect this paragraph with what follows. Kühner supposes that Xenophon, in passing from the duties of men toward the gods to their duties toward themselves and their fellow-creatures, hardly thought any connecting observation neccessary.

5. He disciplined his mind and body by such a course of life, that he who should adopt a similar one, would, if no supernatural influence prevented, live in good spirits and uninterrupted health; nor would he ever be in want of the necessary expenses for it. So frugal was he, that I do not know whether any one could earn so little by the labor of his hands, as not to procure sufficient to have satisfied Socrates. He took only so much food as he could eat with a keen relish; and, to this end, he came to his meals[1] so disposed that the appetite for his meat was the sauce to it. Every kind of drink was agreeable to him, because he never drank unless he was thirsty.

6. If he ever complied with an invitation to go to a feast, he very easily guarded, what is extremely difficult to most men, against loading his stomach to excess. Those who were unable to do so, he advised to be cautious of taking anything that would stimulate them to eat when they were not hungry, and to drink when they were not thirsty; for he said that those were the things that disordered the stomach, the head, and the mind.

7. And he used to say, in jest, that he thought Circe transformed men into swine, by entertaining them with abundance of such luxuries, but that Ulysses, through the admonition of Mercury, and through being himself temperate, and forbearing to partake of such delicacies to excess, was in consequence not changed into a swine.

8. Such jests he would utter on these subjects, but with an earnest meaning. As to love, his counsel was to abstain rigidly from familiarity with beautiful persons; for he observed that it was not easy to be in communication with such persons, and observe continence. Hearing, on one occasion, that Critobulus, the son of Criton, had kissed the son of Alcibiades,[2] a handsome youth,

[1] Ἐπὶ τούτῳ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ἦει.] Kühner prefers ἐπὶ τοῦτο, "on this account, with this view," understanding ἐπὶ σῖτον with ἦει. Schneider has ἐπὶ τοῦτον, from a conjecture of Neiske. Ἐπὶ τούτῳ is supported by almost all the manuscripts.

[2] The various opinions of critics on this passage have been con-

he asked Xenophon, in the presence of Critobulus, saying, "Tell me, Xenophon, did you not think that Critobulus was one of the modest rather than the forward, one of the thoughtful rather than of the thoughtless and inconsiderate?"

9. "Certainly," replied Xenophon. "You must now, then, think him extremely headstrong and daring; one who would even spring upon drawn swords, and leap into the fire."

10. "And what," said Xenophon, "have you seen him doing, that you form so unfavorable an opinion of him?" "Why, has he not dared," rejoined Socrates, "to kiss the son of Alcibiades, a youth extremely handsome, and in the flower of his age?" "If such a deed," returned Xenophon, "is one of daring and peril, I think that even I could undergo such peril."

11. "Unhappy man!" exclaimed Socrates, "and what do you think that you incur by kissing a handsome person? Do you not expect to become at once a slave instead of a free-man? To spend much money upon hurtful pleasures? To have too much occupation to attend to anything honorable and profitable? And to be compelled to pursue what not even a madman would pursue?"

12. "By Hercules," said Xenophon, "what extraordinary power you represent to be in a kiss!" "Do you wonder at this?" rejoined Socrates; "are you not aware that the Tarantula,[1] an insect not as large as half

sidered by Cobet, Prosop. p. 59–69, who conjectures that we should read τὸν τοῦ Ἀξιόχου υἱόν "the son of Axiochus," named Clinias. *Kühner.*

[1] Φαλάγγια.] Insects similar in form to scorpions or spiders, of which the most venomous and destructive are found in Italy, and are called *Tarantulæ*, from Tarentum. Concerning the madness said to be caused by their bite, sensible men entertain doubts in the present day. *Weiske.* The comparison of it to the half obolus shows at once the shape and smallness of the insect. *Schneider.* Kircher, in his *Musurgia*, Sir Thomas Brown, *Vulg. Err.* b. iii. c. 28, and Boyle, in his treatise *On Languid and Unheeded Motions*, express belief in the effects ascribed to the bite of the Tarantula. Opinions unfavorable to the truth of the accounts respecting it, may be found in the *Philosophical Transactions* for 1672 and 1770, and in Swinburne's *Travels in the Two Sicilies.* The popular opinion regarding it is now generally supposed to have arisen from im-

an obolus, by just touching a part of the body with his mouth, wears men down with pain, and deprives them of their senses?" "Yes, indeed," said Xenophon, "but the Tarantula infuses something at the bitten part?"

13. "And do you not think, foolish man," rejoined Socrates, "that beautiful persons infuse something when they kiss, something which you do not see? Do you not know that the animal, which they call *a handsome and a beautiful object*, is so much more formidable than the Tarantula, as those insects instil something when they touch the body, but this creature, without even touching, but if a person only looks at it, though from a very great distance, instils something of such potency, as to drive people mad? Perhaps indeed Cupids are called archers for no other reason but because the beautiful wound from a distance. But I advise you, Xenophon, whenever you see any handsome person, to flee without looking behind you; and I recommend to you, Critobulus, to absent yourself from hence for a year, for perhaps you may in that time, though hardly indeed, be cured of your wound."

14. Thus he thought that those should act with regard to objects of love who were not secure against the attractions of such objects; objects of such a nature, that if the body did not at all desire them, the mind would not contemplate them, and which, if the body did desire them, should cause us no trouble. For himself, he was evidently so disciplined with respect to such matters, that he could more easily keep aloof from the fairest and most blooming objects than others from the most deformed and unattractive.

15. Such was the state of his feelings in regard to eating, drinking, and amorous gratification; and he believed that he himself, with self-restraint, would have no less pleasure from them, than those who took great trouble to pursue such gratifications, and that he would suffer far less anxiety.

postures of the lower class of people: no instance of any respectable person having died of the bite of the insect, or having been made to dance by it, being known.

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates not only exhorted men to practise virtue, but led them to the practise of it; his dialogue with Aristodemus, sect. 1, 2. Things formed for a purpose, must be the production, not of chance, but of reason, 3, 4. The human frame is a structure of great excellence, and admirably fitted for its purposes; and we must therefore suppose that man is the object of divine forethought, 5–7. The order of things throughout the universe shows that it is under the providence of a superior nature, 8. 9. The superiority of man over the inferior animals proves that he is more immediately under the care of the higher powers, 10–14. The gods also give instruction to man as to his conduct, 15. That they care for man both individually and collectively is evident from various considerations, 15, 16. As the mind governs the body, so the providence of the gods governs the world, 17. If men therefore worship the gods rightly, they may feel persuaded that the gods will be ready to aid them, 18, 19.

1. But if any suppose that Socrates, as some write and speak of him on conjecture,[1] was excellently qualified to exhort men to virtue, but incapable of leading them forward in it, let them consider not only what he said in refutation, by questioning, of those who thought that they knew everything (refutations intended to check the progress of those disputants),[2] but what he used to say in his daily intercourse with his associates, and then form an opinion whether he was capable of making those who conversed with him better.

2. I will first mention what I myself once heard him advance in a dialogue with Aristodemus, surnamed The Little,[3] concerning the gods; for having heard that Aristodemus neither sacrificed to the gods, nor prayed to them, nor attended to auguries, but ridiculed

[1] Τεκμαιρόμενοι.] Forming conjectures from those men, who, after being under the instruction of Socrates, fell into vice. *Weiske.*

[2] Κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα.] I have been obliged to paraphrase this expression. Κολάζω was often used in the signification of "to restrain, check, or keep within bounds," like the Latin *castigare*, as Liddell and Scott observe. "Xenophon seems to allude to the διάλογοι ἐριστικοὶ of Plato and the other disciples of Socrates, in which Socrates refutes the subtleties of the sophists." *Schneider.*

[3] An Athenian whom Plato names in his Symposium, a constant auditor of Socrates, and a man of much austerity." *Schneider.*

those who regarded such matters, he said to him, "Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any men for their genius?" "I do," replied he. "Tell us their names, then," said Socrates.

3. "In epic poetry I most admire Homer, in dithyrambic Melanippides,[1] in tragedy Sophocles, in statuary Polycletus, in painting Zeuxis."

4. "And whether do those who form images without sense and motion, or those who form animals endowed with sense and vital energy, appear to you the more worthy of admiration?" "Those who form animals, by Jupiter, for they are not produced by chance, but by understanding." "And regarding things of which it is uncertain for what purpose they exist, and those evidently existing for some useful purpose, which of the two would you say were the productions of chance, and which of intelligence?" "Doubtless those which exist for some useful purpose must be the productions of intelligence."

5. "Does not he, then," proceeded Socrates, "who made men at first, appear to you to have given them, for some useful purpose, those parts by which they perceive different objects, the eyes to see what is to be seen, the ears to hear what is to be heard? What would be the use of smells, if no nostrils had been assigned us? What perception would there have been of sweet and sour, and of all that is pleasant to the mouth, if a tongue had not been formed in it to have a sense of them."

6. In addition to these things, does it not seem to you like the work of forethought, to guard the eye, since it is tender, with eyelids, like doors, which, when it is necessary to use the sight, are set open, but in sleep are closed? To make the eyelashes grow as a screen, that winds may not injure it? To make a coping on the parts above the eyes with the eyebrows, that the perspiration from the head may not annoy them? To provide that the ears may receive all kinds

[1] He flourished about B. C. 520. Another Melanippides, his grandson, lived about sixty years later, at the court of Perdiccas II. of Macedonia.

of sounds, yet never be obstructed? and that the front teeth in all animals may be adapted to cut, and the back teeth to receive food from them and grind it? To place the mouth, through which animals take in what they desire, near the eyes and the nose? and since what passes off from the stomach is offensive, to turn the channels of it away, and remove them as far as possible from the senses?—can you doubt whether such a disposition of things, made thus apparently with attention, is the result of chance or of intelligence?"

7. "No, indeed," replied Aristodemus, "but to one who looks at those matters in this light, they appear like the work of some wise maker who studied the welfare of animals?" "And to have engendered in them a love of having offspring, and in mothers a desire to rear their progeny, and to have implanted in the young that are reared a desire of life, and the greatest dread of death?" "Assuredly these appear to be the contrivances of some one who designed that animals should continue to exist."

8. "And do you think that you yourself have any portion of intelligence?" "Question me, at least, and I will answer."[1] "And can you suppose that nothing intelligent exists anywhere else? When you know that you have in your body but a small portion of the earth, which is vast, and a small portion of the water,

[1] Ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.] These words are wanting in many editions, though found, as Kühner says, who has replaced them in all the manuscripts. "As modesty prevented Aristodemus from expressly affirming, and a regard for truth kept him from exactly denying, that he had any intelligence, he answers guardedly and ingeniously, 'Question me and I will answer;' and, when I answer, you will understand that I have in me some portion of intelligence." *Lange.* "Lange, therefore thinks that Aristodemus did not wish his possession of intelligence to be concluded from the matter of his answer or answers, but from the mere fact of his answering; intimating that he who could give an answer to a question must necessarily be possessed of intellect." *Kühner.* Zeune gives this sense to the passage: "Question me as to other things which necessarily follow from hence, and which you are accustomed to infer from premises of this kind, and you will find me prepared to answer you." The true sense, however, seems to be, "Question me, and judge from my answers whether I ought to be considered as possessed of intellect or not."

which is vast, and that your frame is constituted for you to receive only a small portion of each of other things, that are vast, do you think that you have seized for yourself, by some extraordinary good fortune, intelligence alone which exists nowhere else, and that this assemblage of vast bodies, countless in number, is maintained in order by something void of reason?"

9. "By Jupiter, *I can hardly suppose that there is any ruling intelligence among that assemblage of bodies,*[1] for I do not see the directors, as I see the agent of things which are done here." "Nor do you see your own soul, which is the director of your body; so that, by like reasoning, you may say that you yourself do nothing with understanding, but everything by chance."

10. "However, Socrates," said Aristodemus, "I do not despise the gods, but consider them as too exalted to need my attention." "But," said Socrates, "the more exalted they are, while they deign to attend to you, the more ought you to honor them."

11. "Be assured," replied Aristodemus, "that if I believe the gods took any thought for men, I would not neglect them." "Do you not, then, believe that the gods take thought for men? the gods who, in the first place, have made man alone, of all animals, upright (which uprightness enables him to look forward to a greater distance, and to contemplate better what is above, and renders those parts less liable to injury in which[2] the gods have placed the eyes, and ears and mouth); and, in the next place, have given to other animals only feet, which merely gives them the capacity of walking, while to men they have added hands, which execute most of those things through which we are better off than they.

12. "And though all animals have tongues, they have made that of man alone of such a nature, as by touch-

[1] The words in italics are supplied according to the sense given to the passage by Kühner, who observes that the expression "By Jupiter," Μὰ Δία, has reference to the first part of the question of Socrates, "can you suppose that nothing intelligent exists any where else?"

[2] This passage admitted of no satisfactory interpretation till Kühner substituted οἷς for καί.

ing sometimes one part of the mouth, and sometimes another, to express articulate sounds, and to signify everything that we wish to communicate one to another. Do you not see too, that to other animals they have so given the pleasures of sexual intercourse as to limit them to a certain season of the year, but that they allow them to us uninterruptedly till extreme old age?

13. "Nor did it satisfy the gods to take care of the body merely, but, what is most important of all, they implanted in him the soul, his most excellent part. For what other animal has a soul to understand, first of all, that the gods, who have arranged such a vast and noble order of things, exist? What other species of animal, besides man offers worship to the gods? What other animal has a mind better fitted than that of man, to guard against hunger or thirst, or cold or heat, or to relieve disease, or to acquire strength by exercise or to labor to obtain knowledge; or more capable of remembering whatever it has heard, or seen, or learned?

14. "Is it not clearly evident to you, that in comparison with other animals, men live like gods, excelling them by nature, both in body and mind? For an animal, having the body of an ox, and the understanding of a man, would be unable to execute what it might meditate; and animals which have hands,[1] but are without reason, have no advantage over others; and do you, who share both these excellent endowments, think that the gods take no thought for you? What then must they do, before you will think that they take thought for you?"[2]

15. "I will think so," observed Aristodemus, "when they send me, as you say that they send to you, monitors, to show what I ought, and what I ought not, to do." "But when they send admonitions to the Athenians, on consulting them by divination, do you not

[1] Apes have hands resembling those of men, but are not on that account equal to men in ability. *Schneider.*

[2] Ἀλλ', ὅταν τι ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτούς σοῦ φροντιζειν;] "But when they have done what, will you think that they care for you?"

think that they admonish you also? Or when they give warnings to the Greeks by sending portents, or when they give them to the whole human race, do they except you alone from the whole, and utterly neglect you?

16. "Do you suppose, too, that the gods would have engendered a persuasion in men that they are able to benefit or injure them, unless they were really able to do so, and that men, if they had been thus perpetually deluded, would not have become sensible of the delusion? Do you not see that the oldest and wisest of human communities, the oldest and wisest cities and nations, are the most respectful to the gods, and that the wisest age of man is the most observant of their worship?

17. "Consider also, my good youth," continued Socrates, "that your mind, existing within your body, directs your body as it pleases; and it becomes you therefore to believe that the intelligence pervading all things directs all things as may be agreeable to it, and not to think that while your eye can extend its sight over many furlongs, that of the divinity [1] is unable to see all things at once, or that while your mind can think of things here, or things in Egypt or Sicily, the mind of the deity is incapable of regarding everything at the same time.

18. "If, however, as you discover, by paying court to men, those who are willing to pay court to you in return, and, by doing favors to men, those who are willing to return your favors, and as, by asking counsel of men, you discover who are wise, you should, in like manner, make trial of the gods by offering worship to them, whether they will advise you concerning matters hidden from man, you will then find that the divinity is of such power, and of such a nature, as to see all things and hear all things at once, to be present every-

[1] Τοῦ θεοῦ.] Xenophon sometimes makes Socrates use the singular, ὁ θεός, in speaking of the gods, But it is not *hence* to be inferred that he insinuated that there was only one god; for the Greeks frequently used the singular when they might have been expected to use the plural. Compare iv. 3. 14.

where, and to have a care for all things at the same time."

19. By delivering such sentiments, Socrates seems to me to have led his associates to refrain from what was impious, or unjust, or dishonorable, not merely when they were seen by men, but when they were in solitude, since they would conceive that nothing that they did would escape the knowledge of the gods.

CHAPTER V.

Temperance and self-control recommended: he that is destitute of temperance can be profitable or agreeable neither to himself nor others, sect. 1-4. Without temperance nothing can be learned or done with due effect, 5. Socrates not only encouraged to temperance by precept, but by his example, 6.

1. IF temperance, moreover, be an honorable and valuable quality in a man, let us consider whether he at all promoted its observance by reflections of the following kind concerning it. "If, my friends, when a war was coming upon us, we should wish to choose a man by whose exertions we might ourselves be preserved, and might gain the mastery over our enemies, should we select one whom we knew to be unable to resist gluttony, or wine, or sensuality, or fatigue, or sleep? How could we think that such a man would either serve us, or conquer our adversaries?

2. Or if, being at the close of life, we should wish to commit to any one the guardianship of our sons, or the care of our unmarried daughters, or the preservation of our property, should we think an intemperate man worthy of confidence for such purposes? Should we intrust to an intemperate slave our herds, our granaries, or the superintendence of our agriculture? Should we be willing to accept such a slave as an agent, or purveyor, even for nothing?

3. But if we would not even accept an intemperate slave, how can it be otherwise than important for every

man to take care that he himself does not become such a character? For the intemperate man is not injurious to his neighbor and profitable to himself (like the avaricious, who, by despoiling others of their property, seem to enrich themselves), but, while he is mischievous to others, is still more mischievous to himself, for it is, indeed, mischievous in the highest degree, to ruin not only his family, but his body and mind.

4. In society, too, who could find pleasure in the company of such a man, who, he would be aware, felt more delight in eating and drinking than in intercourse with his friends, and preferred the company of harlots to that of his fellows? Is it not the duty of every man to consider that temperance is the foundation of every virtue, and to establish the observance of it in his mind before all things?

5. For who, without it, can either learn anything good, or sufficiently practise it? Who, that is a slave to pleasure, is not in an ill condition both as to his body and his mind? It appears to me, by Juno,[1] that a freeman ought to pray that he may never meet with a slave of such a character, and that he who is a slave to pleasure should pray to the gods that he may find well-disposed masters; for by such means only can a man of that sort be saved."

6. While such were the remarks that he made, he proved himself more a friend to temperance by his life than by his words; for he was not only superior to all corporeal pleasures, but also to those attendant on the acquisition of money; thinking that he who received money from any one,[2] set up a master over himself, and submitted to a slavery as disgraceful as any that could be.

[1] Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν.] This mode of swearing, which was commonly used by women, was very frequently adopted by Socrates. See below, iii. 10. 9; 11. 5; iv. 2. 9; 4. 8; Œcon. x. 1; Plato, Phædr. p. 230, B. *Kühner.*

[2] παρὰ τοῦ τυχόντος.] From any one that happened to present himself; from any one indiscriminately.

CHAPTER VI.

Three dialogues of Socrates with Antipho. I. Antipho ridicules the poverty and frugality of Socrates, and his forbearance to receive pay for his instructions, sect. 1-3; Socrates replies that, by not receiving remuneration, he is more at liberty to choose his audience, 4, 5; that there are various advantages attendant on plainness of diet and dress, 6, 7; that the frugal man has the advantage over the man of pleasure in facilities for self-improvement, for doing his duty to his country, and for securing general happiness, 8-10. II. Antipho asserts that Socrates might be a just man, but was by no means wise, in accepting no payment, 11, 12; Socrates replies that to sell wisdom is to degrade it, and that more good is gained by the acquisition of friends than of money, 13, 14. III. Antipho asks Socrates why, when he trained others to manage public affairs, he took no part in public affairs himself; Socrates replies that he was of more service to his country by training many to govern it, than he could have been by giving his single aid in the government of it, 15.

1. It is due to Socrates, also, not to omit the dialogues which he held with Antipho the sophist. Antipho, on one occasion, wishing to draw away his associates from him, came up to Socrates when they were present, and said,

2. "I thought, Socrates, that those who studied philosophy were to become happier than other men; but you seem to have reaped from philosophy fruits of an opposite kind; at least you live in a way in which no slave would continue to live with his master; you eat food, and drink drink, of the worst kind; you wear a dress, not only bad, but the same both summer and winter, and you continue shoeless and coatless.[1]

3. Money, which cheers men when they receive it, and enables those who possess it to live more generously

[1] Ἀνυπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων.] On the ἀνυποδησία of Socrates, see Forster on Plato Phædon, p. 64, D.; and the commentators on Aristoph. Nub. 103, 362, and on Plato Phædr. p. 229, A. *Kühner.* By ἀχίτων is not to be understood that Socrates had covered his bare body only with his cloak, but that he wore only the inner tunic, ὑπενδυτης, not having the upper, ἐπενδύτης, which they called the tunic κατ' ἐξοχήν, terming those who were without it ἀχίτωνας, as Salmasius has fully shown, and Tertullian, de Pallio, p. 70, *seq.* and 400, *seq.* *Ernesti.*

and pleasantly, you do not take; and if, therefore, as teachers in other professions make their pupils imitate themselves, you also shall produce a similar effect on your followers, you must consider yourself but a teacher of wretchedness."

4. Socrates, in reply to these remarks, said, "You seem to me, Antipho, to have conceived a notion that I live so wretchedly, that I feel persuaded you yourself would rather choose to die than pass your life as I pass mine. Let us then consider what it is that you find disagreeable in my mode of life.

5. "Is it that while others, who receive money, must perform the service for which they receive it, while I, who receive none, am under no necessity to discourse with any one that I do not like? Or do you despise my way of living, on the supposition that I eat less wholesome or less strengthening food than yourself? Or is it that my diet is more difficult to procure than yours, as being more rare and expensive? Or is it that what you procure for yourself is more agreeable to you than what I provide for myself is to me? Do you not know that he who eats with the most pleasure is he who less requires sauce, and that he who drinks with the greatest pleasure is he who least desires other drink than that which he has?

6. "You know that those who change their clothes, change them because of cold and heat, and that men put on sandals that they may not be prevented from walking through annoyances to the feet; but have you ever observed me remaining at home, on account of cold, more than any other man, or fighting with any one for shade because of heat, or not walking wherever I please because my feet suffer?

7. "Do you not know that those who are by nature the weakest, become, by exercising their bodies, stronger in those things in which they exercise them, than those who neglect them, and bear the fatigue of exercise with greater ease? And do you not think that I, who am constantly preparing my body by exercise to endure whatever may happen to it, bear everything more easily than you who take no exercise?

8. "And to prevent me from being a slave to gluttony, or sleep, or other animal gratifications, can you imagine any cause more efficient than having other objects of attention more attractive than they, which not only afford pleasure in the moment of enjoying them, but give hopes that they will benefit me perpetually? You are aware of this also, that those who think themselves successful in nothing, are far from being cheerful, but that those who regard their agriculture, their seamanship, or whatever other occupation they pursue as going on favorably for them, are delighted as with present success?

9. "But do you think that from all these gratifications so much pleasure can arise as from the consciousness that you are growing better yourself, and are acquiring more valuable friends? Such is the consciousness, then, which I continue to enjoy.

"But if there should be occasion to assist our friends or our country, which of the two would have most leisure to attend to such objects, he who lives as I live now, or he who lives, as you think, in happiness? Which of the two would most readily seek the field of battle, he who cannot exist without expensive dishes, or he who is content with whatever comes before him? Which of the two would sooner be reduced by a siege, he who requires what is most difficult to be found, or he who is fully content with what is easiest to be met with?

10. "You, Antipho, seem to think that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance; but I think that to want nothing is to resemble the gods, and that to want as little as possible is to make the nearest approach to the gods; that the Divine nature is perfection, and that to be nearest to the Divine nature is to be nearest to perfection."

11. "On another occasion, Antipho, in a conversation with Socrates, said, 'I consider you indeed to be a just man, Socrates, but by no means a wise one; and you appear to me yourself to be conscious of this; for you ask money from no one for the privilege of associating with you; although, if you considered a garment of

yours, or a house, or any other thing that you possess, to be worth money, you would not only not give it to anybody for nothing, but you would not take less than its full value for it.

12. "It is evident, therefore, that if you thought your conversation to be worth anything, you would demand for it no less remuneration than it is worth. You may, accordingly, be a just man, because you deceive nobody from covetousness, but wise you cannot be, as you have no knowledge that is of any value."

13. "Socrates, in reply said, "it is believed among us, Antipho, that it is possible to dispose of beauty, or of wisdom, alike honorably or dishonorably ; [1] for if a person sells his beauty for money to any one that wishes to purchase, men call him a male prostitute ; but if any one makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be an honorable and worthy admirer, we regard him as prudent : and, in like manner, those who sell their wisdom for money, to any that will buy, men call sophists, or, as it were, prostituters of wisdom ; but whoever makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be deserving, by teaching him all the good that he knows, we consider him to act the part which becomes an honorable and good citizen.

14. As any other man, therefore, Antipho, takes delight in a good horse, or dog, or bird, so I, to a still greater degree, take delight in valuable friends ; and, if I know anything good, I communicate it to them, and recommend them, also, to any other teachers by whom I conceive that they will be at all advanced in virtue. The treasures, too, of the wise men of old, which they have left written in books, I turn over and peruse in company with my friends, and if we find any-

[1] Νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι.] The sense seems to be, that it is alike honorable or dishonorable to dispose of beauty (in a certain way) and to dispose of wisdom (in a certain way) : *i. e.* that there is a certain way of disposing of beauty honorably, and a certain way of disposing of it dishonorably, and that the same is the case with regard to wisdom, or talent. My translation is much the same as the Latin of Schneider. *Apud nos existimatur eodem modo posse aliquem et formâ et sapientiâ vel honestè vel turpiter uti.*

thing good in them, we remark it, and think it a great gain, if we thus become more attached [1] to one another." To me, who heard him utter these sentiments, Socrates appeared to be both happy himself, and to lead those that listened to him to honor and virtue.

15. Again, when Antipho asked him how he imagined that he could make men skilful statesmen, when he himself took no part in state affairs, if indeed he knew anything of them, "In which of the two ways," said he, "Antipho, should I better promote the management of affairs; if I myself engage in them alone, or if I make it my care that as many as possible may be qualified to engage in them?"

CHAPTER VII.

Dissuasions from ostentation. He that desires to be distinguished, should endeavor to be what he would wish to seem. He that pretends to be what he is not, exposes himself to great inconvenience and ridicule, and may bring disgrace and detriment on his country.

1. Let us consider also, whether, by dissuading his followers from ostentation he excited them to pursue virtue. He always used to say that there was no better road to honorable distinction, than that by which a person should become excellent in that in which he wished to appear excellent.

2. That he said what was just, he used to prove by the following arguments. "Let us consider," he would say, "what a person must do, if, not being a good flute-player, he should wish to appear so? Must he not imitate good flute-players in the adjuncts of their art? In the first place, as flute-players procure fine dresses, and go about with a great number of attendants, he must

[1] Φίλοι γιγνώμεθα.] For φίλοι Ernesti substituted from one manuscript ὠφέλιμοι, which Kühner stigmatizes as "apertum glossema," and restores the old φίγοι, with the comment, "Si nos jam antea amicitiæ vinculis constricti, etiam horum studiorum communione cari ac dilecti fiamus." I have rendered φίλοι by the comparative degree, but think Ernesti's correction far more eligible.

act in a similar manner; and as many people applaud them, he must get many to applaud him; yet he must never attempt to play, or he will at once be shown to be ridiculous, and not only a bad flute-player, but a vain boaster. Thus, after having been at great expense without the least benefit, and having, in addition, incurred evil repute, how will he live otherwise than in uneasiness, unprofitableness, and derision?

3. "In like manner, if any one should wish to be thought a good general, or a good steersman of a ship, without being so, let us reflect what would be his success. If, when he longed to seem capable of performing the duties of those characters, he should be unable to persuade others of his capability, would not this be a trouble to him? and, if he should persuade them of it, would it not be still more unfortunate for him? For it is evident that he who is appointed to steer a vessel, or to lead an army, without having the necessary knowledge, would be likely to destroy those[1] whom he would not wish to destroy, and would come off himself with disgrace and suffering."

4. By similar examples he showed that it was of no profit for a man to appear rich, or valiant, or strong, without being so; for he said that demands were made upon such persons too great for their ability, and that, not being able to comply with them, when they seemed to be able, they met with no indulgence.

5. He called him, also, no small impostor, who, obtaining money or furniture from his neighbor by persuasion, should defraud him; but pronounced him the greatest of all impostors, who, possessed of no valuable qualifications, should deceive men by representing himself capable of governing his country. To me he appeared, by discoursing in this manner, to deter his associates from vain boasting.

[1] His friends, and such as he would wish to applaud him.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates, suspecting that Aristippus, a man of pleasure, was aspiring to a place in the government, admonishes him that temperance is an essential qualification in a statesman, sect. 1-7. But as Aristippus says that he looked only to a life of leisure and tranquil enjoyment, Socrates introduces the question, whether those who govern, or those who are governed, live the happier life, 8-10. Aristippus signifies that he wished neither to govern nor to be governed, but to enjoy liberty; and Socrates shows that such liberty as he desired is inconsistent with the nature of human society, 11-13. Aristippus still adhering to his own views, and declaring his intention not to remain in any one country, but to visit and sojourn in many, Socrates shows him the dangers of such a mode of life, 14-16. But as Aristippus proceeds to accuse those of folly who prefer a life of toil in the affairs of government to a life of ease, Socrates shows the difference between those who labor voluntarily, and those who labor from compulsion, and observes that nothing good is given to mortals without labor, 17-20; in illustration of which remark he relates the fable of Prodicus, THE CHOICE OF HERCULES, 21-34.

1. HE appeared also to me, by such discourses as the following, to exhort his hearers to practise temperance in their desires for food, drink, sensual gratification, and sleep, and endurance of cold, heat, and labor. But finding that one of his associates was too intemperately disposed with regard to such matters, he said to him, "Tell me, Aristippus,[1] if it were required of you to take two of our youths and educate them, the one in such a manner that he would be qualified to govern, and the other in such a manner that he would never seek to govern, how would you train them respectively? Will you allow us to consider the matter by commencing with their food, as with the first principles?" "Food, indeed," replied Aristippus, "appears to me one of the

[1] Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaic sect of philosophers, who thought pleasure the greatest good, and pain the greatest evil. See b. iii. ch. 8.

first principles; for a person could not even live if he were not to take food."

2. "It will be natural for them both, then," said Socrates, "to desire to partake of food when a certain hour comes." "It will be natural." said Aristippus. "And which of the two, then," said Socrates, "should we accustom to prefer the discharge of any urgent business to the gratification of his appetite?" "The one, undoubtedly," rejoined Aristippus, "who is trained to rule, that the business of the state may not be neglected during his administration." "And on the same person," continued Socrates, "we must, when they desire to drink, impose the duty of being able to endure thirst?" "Assuredly," replied Aristippus.

3. "And on which of the two should we lay the necessity of being temperate in sleep, so as to be able to go to rest late, to rise early, or to remain awake if it should be necessary?" "Upon the same, doubtless." "And on which of the two should we impose the obligation to control his sensual appetites, that he may not be hindered by their influence from discharging whatever duty may be required of him?" "Upon the same." "And on which of the two should we enjoin the duty of not shrinking from labor, but willingly submitting to it?" "This also, is to be enjoined on him who is trained to rule." "And to which of the two would it more properly belong to acquire whatever knowledge would assist him to secure the mastery over his rivals?" "Far more, doubtless, to him who is trained to govern, for without such sort of acquirements there would be no profit in any of his other qualifications."

4. "A man, then, who is thus instructed, would appear to you less liable to be surprised by his enemies, than other animals, of which some, we know, are caught by their greediness; and others, though very shy, are yet attracted to the bait by their desire to swallow it, and consequently taken; while others also are entrapped by drink." "Indisputably," replied Aristippus. "Are not others, too, caught through their salaciousness, as quails and partridges, which, being attracted to the call of the female by desire and

hope of enjoyment, and losing all consideration of danger, fall into traps?" To this Aristippus expressed his assent.

5. "Does it not then," proceeded Socrates, "appear to you shameful for a man to yield to the same influence as the most senseless of animals; as adulterers, for instance, knowing that the adulterer is in danger of suffering what the law threatens, and of being watched, and disgraced if caught, yet enter into closets; and, though there are such dangers and dishonors hanging over the intriguer, and so many occupations that will free him from the desire of sensual gratification, does it not seem to you the part of one tormented with an evil genius, to run, nevertheless, into imminent peril?" "It does not seem so to me," said Aristippus.

6. "And since the greater part of the most necessary employments of life, such as those of war and agriculture, and not a few others, are to be carried on in the open air, does it not appear to you to show great negligence, that the majority of mankind should be wholly unexercised to bear cold and heat?" Aristippus replied in the affirmative. "Does it not then appear to you that we ought to train him who is intended to rule, to bear these inconveniences also without difficulty?" "Doubtless," answered Aristippus.

7. "If, therefore, we class those capable of enduring these things among those who are qualified to govern, shall we not class such as are incapable of enduring them among those who will not even aspire to govern?" Aristippus expressed his assent. "In conclusion, then, since you know the position of each of these classes of men, have you ever considered in which of them you can reasonably place yourself?"

8. "I have indeed," said Aristippus, "And I by no means place myself in the class of those desiring to rule; for it appears to me that, when it is a task of great difficulty to procure necessaries for one's self, it is the mark of a very foolish man not to be satisfied with that occupation,[1] but to add to it the labor of pro-

[1] Μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο.] That is, τούτου μὴ ἀρκεῖν αὐτῷ, "that that occupation should not be sufficient for him;" should not content him.

curing for his fellow-countrymen whatever they need. And is it not the greatest folly in him, that while many things which he desires are out of his reach, he should, by setting himself at the head of the state, subject himself, if he does not accomplish all that the people desire, to be punished for his failure?

9. For the people think it right to use their governors as I use my slaves; for I require my slaves to supply me with the necessaries of life in abundance, but to take no part of them themselves; and the people think it the duty of their governors to supply them with as many enjoyments as possible, but themselves to abstain from all of them. Those, therefore, who wish to have much trouble themselves, and to give trouble to others,[1] I would train in this manner, and rank among those qualified to govern; but myself I would number with those who wish to pass their lives in the greatest possible ease and pleasure."

10. Socrates then said, "Will you allow us to consider this point also, whether the governors or the governed live with the greater pleasure?" "By all means," said Aristippus. "In the first place, then, of the nations of which we have any knowledge, the Persians bear rule in Asia, and the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians are under subjection; the Scythians govern in Europe, and the Mæotians[2] are held in subjection; the Carthaginians rule in Africa, and the Libyans are under subjection. Which of these do you regard as living with the greater pleasure? Or among the Greeks, of whom you yourself are, which of the two appear to you to live more happily, those who rule, or those who are in subjection?"

[1] He that holds the reins of government, must not only undergo much toil and trouble himself, but must also enjoin many tasks and duties on others, and incite them to exertion and industry. . . . With this passage of Xenophon may aptly be compared what the Corinthians say of the Athenians in Thucydides, i. 70: "If any one should say, in a word, that they are formed by nature neither to enjoy quiet themselves, nor to suffer others to enjoy it, he would speak of them rightly." *Kühner.*

[2] The people bordering on the lake Mæotis, which was in Sarmatia Europæa, and is now called the Sea of Azov. *Kühner.*

11. "Yet, on the other hand,"[1] said Aristippus, "I do not consign myself to slavery; but there appears to me to be a certain middle path between the two, in which I endeavor to proceed, and which leads, not through slavery, but through liberty, a path that most surely conducts to happiness."

12. "If this path of yours, indeed," said Socrates, "as it lies neither through sovereignty nor servitude, did not also lie through human society, what you say would perhaps be worth consideration; but if, while living among mankind, you shall neither think proper to rule nor to be ruled, and shall not willingly pay respect to those in power, I think that you will see that the stronger know how to treat the weaker as slaves, making them to lament both publicly and privately.

13. Do those escape your knowledge who fell and destroy the corn and trees of others that have sown and planted them, and who assail in every way such as are inferior to them, and are unwilling to flatter them, until they prevail on them to prefer slavery to carrying on war against their superiors? In private life, too, do you not see that the spirited and strong enslave the timorous and weak, and enjoy the fruits of their labors?" "But for my part," answered Aristippus, "in order that I may not suffer such treatment, I shall not shut myself up in any one state, but shall be a traveller everywhere."

14. "Doubtless," rejoined Socrates, "this is an admirable plan that you propose; for since Sinnis, and Sciron, and Procrustes[2] were killed, nobody injures travelers. Yet those who manage the government in their several countries, even now make laws, in order that they may not be injured, and attach to themselves, in addition to such as are called their necessary connections, other supporters; they also surround their

[1] Αὖ.] Compare sect. 8, where Aristippus says that he does not rank himself among those who wish to rule; here he states that, *on the other hand*, he does not wish to be a slave.

[2] Celebrated robbers, put to death by Theseus. This is a pleasant irony, says Weiske, in the remark of Socrates: though Sinnis, Sciron, and Procrustes no longer rob on the highways, yet there is no lack of successors to them.

cities with ramparts, and procure weapons with which they may repel aggressors, securing, besides all these means of defence, other allies from abroad; and yet those who have provided themselves with all these bulwarks, nevertheless suffer injury.

15. And do you, having no protection of the sort, spending a long time on roads on which a very great number are outraged, weaker than all the inhabitants of whatever city you may arrive at, and being such a character[1] as those who are eager to commit violence most readily attack, think, nevertheless, that you will not be wronged because you are a stranger? Or are you without fear, because these cities proclaim safety to any one arriving or departing? Or because you think that you would prove a slave of such a character as would profit no master, for who, you perhaps ask yourself, would wish to keep in his house a man not at all disposed to labor, and delighting in the most expensive fare?

16. But let us consider how masters treat slaves of such a sort. Do they not tame down their fondness for dainties by hunger? Do they not hinder them from stealing by excluding them from every place from whence they may take anything? Do they not prevent them from running away by putting fetters on them? Do they not overcome their laziness with stripes? Or how do you yourself act, when you find any one of your slaves to be of such a disposition?"

17. "I chastise him," said Aristippus, "with every kind of punishment, until I compel him to serve me. But how do those, Socrates, who are trained to the art of ruling, which you seem to me to consider as happiness, differ from those who undergo hardships from necessity, since they will have (though it be with their own consent) to endure hunger, and thirst, and cold, and want of sleep, and suffer all other inconveniences of the same kind?

18. For I, for my own part, do not know what differ-

[1] A person without any settled abode, without friends or supporters; not under the protection of any particular state, but wandering from one state to another. *Kühner.*

ence it makes to a man who is scourged on the same skin, whether it be voluntarily or involuntarily, or, in short, to one who suffers with the same body in all such points, whether he suffer with his consent or against it, except that folly is to be attributed to him who endures troubles voluntarily." "What then, Aristippus," said Socrates, "do not voluntary endurances of this kind seem to you to differ from the involuntary, inasmuch as he who is hungry from choice may eat when he pleases, and he who is thirsty from choice may drink when he pleases, the same being the case with regard to other voluntary sufferings, while he who endures such hardships from necessity has no liberty to relieve himself from them when he wishes? Besides, he who undergoes trouble willingly, is cheered in undergoing it with some expectation of good, as the hunters of wild animals bear fatigue with pleasure in the hope of capturing them.

19. And such rewards of toil are indeed but of small worth; but as for those who toil that they may acquire valuable friends, or that they may subdue their enemies, or they may, by becoming vigorous in body and mind, manage their own household judiciously, and be of service to their friends and of advantage to their country, how can you think that they labor for such objects otherwise than cheerfully, or that they do not live in happiness, esteeming themselves, and being praised and envied by others?

20. But indolence, moreover, and pleasures enjoyed at the moment of desire,[1] are neither capable of producing a good constitution of body, as the teachers of gymnastic exercises say, nor do they bring to the mind any knowledge worthy of consideration;[2] but exercises pur-

[1] Ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναί.] The interpretation of this phrase gvien in the text is that which is adopted by Kühner: *Voluptates ejusmodi, quas, ubi concupiveris, statim, utpote sine ullo labora parabiles, percipere liceat;* an interpretation taken from Ernesti. But the expression often seems to signify nothing more than what we mean by "present pleasures; as in Cyrop. i. 5. 9; ii. 2. 24; so Schneider understands *eas voluptates quæ statim percipiuntur, et quarum usus breve tempus durat*, with Heindorf, and Plat. Protag. p. 353.

[2] Ἐπιστήμην ἀξιόλογον οὐδεμίαν.] Ἀξιόλογον is very properly added;

sued with persevering labor lead men to the attainment of honorable and valuable objects, as worthy men inform us ; and Hesiod somewhere says,

Vice it is possible to find in abundance and with ease ; for the way to it is smooth, and lies very near. But before the temple of Virtue the immortal gods have placed labor, and the way to it is long and steep, and at the commencement rough ; but when the traveller has arrived at the summit, it then becomes easy, however difficult it was at first.[1]

A sentiment to which Epicharmus gives his testimony in this verse,

The gods for labor sell us all good things ;

and in another place he says,

O wretched mortal, desire not what is soft, lest you find what is hard.

21. Prodicus the sophist,[2] also, in his narrative concerning Hercules,[3] which indeed he declaims to most people as a specimen of his ability, expresses a similar notion respecting virtue, speaking, as far as I remember, to the following effect : For he says that Hercules, when he was advancing from boyhood to manhood, a period at which the young, becoming their own masters,

for it cannot be said that *αἱ παραυτίκα ἡδοναὶ* convey *no knowledge* to the mind : for who can deny that from listening to music contemplating pictures, and other pleasures of that kind, *some knowledge* may be gained ? *Kühner.*

[1] Choose Sin, by troops she shall beside thee stand ;
Smooth is the track, her mansion is at hand :
Where Virtue dwells the gods have placed before
The dropping sweat that springs from every pore ;
And ere the foot can reach her high abode,
Long, rugged, steep th' ascent, and rough the road.
The ridge once gain'd, the path so hard of late.
Runs easy on, and level to the gate. *Elton.*

[2] Ὁ *σοφός.*] Sturz and others consider *σοφος*, in this passage, to be the same as *σοφιστης* but there seems no particular reason why it should not be rendered *the wise.* " On Prodicus, the famous sophist of Ceos, there is an excellent note of Beierus ad Cic. Off. i. 32. See Cobet, Prosop. Xen. p. 35. C. Fr. Hermann, in his *Disp. de Socr Magistris*, Marb. 1837, p. 49, *seq.*, judiciously shows that those are mistaken who think that Prodicus was a teacher of Socrates." *Kühner.*

[3] There is an allusion to this fable in Cic. de Off. i. 32. It has been versified in English, with much elegance, though rather verbosely, by Bishop Lowth.

begin to give intimations whether they will enter on life by the path of virtue or that of vice, went forth into a solitary place, and sat down perplexed as to which of these two paths he should pursue.

22. And that two female figures, of lofty stature, seemed to advance towards him, the one of an engaging and graceful mien, gifted by nature with elegance of form, modesty of look, and sobriety of demeanor,[1] and clad in a white robe; the other fed to plumpness and softness, but assisted by art both in her complexion, so as to seem fairer and rosier than she really was, and in her gesture so as to seem taller than her natural height; she had her eyes wide open,[2] and a robe through which her beauty would readily show itself; she frequently contemplated her figure, and looked about to see if any one else was observing her; and she frequently glanced back at her own shadow.

23. As they approached nearer to Hercules, she, whom I first described, came forward at the same pace, but the other, eager to get before her, ran up to Hercules, and exclaimed, "I see that you are hesitating, Hercules, by what path you shall enter upon life; if then you make a friend of me, I will conduct you by the most delightful and easy road, and you shall taste of every species of pleasure, and lead a life free from every sort of trouble.

24. In the first place, you shall take no thought of wars or state affairs, but shall pass your time considering what meat or drink you may find to gratify your appetite, what you may delight yourself by seeing or hearing, what you may be pleased with smelling or touching, with what objects of affection you may have most pleasure in associating, how you may sleep most softly, and how you may secure all these enjoyments with the least degree of trouble.

[1] Κεκοσμημένην τὸμὲνσῶμα καθαριότητι, κ. τ. λ.] "Adorned as to her person with elegance, as to her eyes with modesty, and as to her gesture with sobriety." The reading καθαριότητι is properly preferred by Kühner.to καθαρότητι, the first meaning *elegance* or *gracefulness*, the second *purity*.

[2] Ἀναπεπταμένα.] "Wide open," says Kühner, is equivalent to "looking or staring boldly," in opposition to "modestly cast down."

25. If an apprehension of want of means, by which such delights may be obtained, should ever arise in you, there is no fear that I shall urge you to procure them by toil or suffering, either of body or mind; but you shall enjoy what others acquire by labor, abstaining from nothing by which it may be possible to profit, for I give my followers liberty to benefit themselves from any source whatever."

26. Hercules, on hearing this address, said, "And what, O, woman, is your name?" "My friends," she replied, "call me Happiness, but those who hate me, give me, to my disparagement, the name of Vice."

27. In the mean time the other female approached, and said, "I also am come to address you, Hercules, because I know your parents, and have observed your disposition in the training of your childhood, from which I entertain hopes, that if you direct your steps along the path that leads to my dwelling, you will become an excellent performer of whatever is honorable and noble, and that I shall appear more honorable and attractive through your illustrious deeds. I will not deceive you, however, with promises of pleasure, but will set before you things as they really are, and as the gods have appointed them.

28. For of what is valuable and excellent, the gods grant nothing to mankind without labor and care; and if you wish the gods, therefore, to be propitious to you, you must worship the gods; if you seek to be beloved by your friends, you must serve your friends; if you desire to be honored by any city, you must benefit that city; if you long to be admired by all Greece for your merit, you must endeavor to be of advantage to all Greece; if you are anxious that the earth should yield you abundance of fruit, you must cultivate the earth; if you think that you should enrich yourself from herds of cattle, you must bestow care upon herds of cattle; if you are eager to increase your means by war, and to secure freedom to your friends and subdue your enemies, you must learn the arts of war, and learn them from such as understand them, and practise how to use them with advantage; or if you wish to be

vigorous in body, you must accustom your body to obey your mind, and exercise it with toil and exertion."

29. Here Vice, interrupting her speech said, (as Prodicus relates), "Do you see, Hercules, by how difficult and tedious a road this woman conducts you to gratification, while I shall lead you, by an easy and short path, to perfect happiness?"

30. "Wretched being," rejoined Virtue, "of what good are you in possession? Or what real pleasure do you experience, when you are unwilling to do any thing for the attainment of it? You, who do not even wait for the natural desire of gratification, but fill yourself with all manner of dainties before you have an appetite for them, eating before you are hungry, drinking before you are thirsty, procuring cooks that you may eat with pleasure, buying costly wines that you may drink with pleasure, and running about seeking for snow[1] in summer; while, in order to sleep with pleasure, you prepare not only soft beds,[2] but couches, and rockers under your couches, for you do not desire sleep in consequence of labor, but in consequence of having nothing to do; you force the sensual inclinations before they require gratification, using every species of contrivance for the purpose, and abusing male and female; for thus it is that you treat your friends, insulting their modesty at night, and making them sleep away the most useful part of their day.

[1] "To cool wine; for they deposited snow and ice in pits for such purposes. See notes on Athen. iii. p. 124; Plin. H. N. ix. 4; Aul. Gell. xix. 5; Macrob. Sat. vii. 12." *Schneider.* See Wyttenbach ad Plutarch. Præcept. Sanit. p. 809. *Bornemann.*

[2] Στρωμνάς.] Properly, couches or beds spread on the ground. With these the luxurious were not content, but prepared for themselves κλῖναι, or couches with legs, to which they afterward added ὑποβαθρα, rockers or rollers. "Commentators used to interpret ὑποβαθρα, *carpets spread under the feet of couches*, referring to Cyrop. viii. 8. 16; but the true signification of the word has been very learnedly made clear by Schneider from three passages of Antyllus in Fragm. Medicorum, ed. Oribas. ed. Matthæi, p. 114, 170, 172; from which it appears that the ὑποβαθρα were *fulcra diagonalia*, diagonal props, put under the feet of couches, in order that a σεισμος or rocking might be produced. The effect, as he observes, would be the same as that of suspended cradles. *Kühner.*

31. Though you are one of the immortal, you are cast out from the society of the gods, and despised by the good among mankind; the sweetest of all sounds, the praises of yourself,[1] you have never heard, nor have you ever seen the most pleasing of all sights, for you have never beheld one meritorious work of your own hand. Who would believe you when you give your word for anything? Or who would assist you when in need of anything? Or who, that has proper feeling, would venture to join your company of revellers? for while they are young they grow impotent in body, and when they are older they are impotent in mind; they live without labor, and in fatness, through their youth, and pass laboriously, and in wretchedness, through old age; ashamed of what they have done, oppressed with what they have to do, having run through their pleasures in early years, and laid up afflictions for the close of life.

32. But I am the companion of the gods; I associate with virtuous men; no honorable deed, divine or human, is done without me; I am honored, most of all, by the deities, and by those among men to whom it belongs to honor me, being a welcome co-operator with artisans, a faithful household guardian to masters, a benevolent assistant to servants, a benign promoter of the labors of peace, a constant auxiliary to the efforts of war, an excellent sharer in friendship.

33. My friends have a sweet and untroubled enjoyment of meat and drink, for they refrain from them till they feel an appetite. They have also sweeter sleep than the idle; and are neither annoyed if they lose a portion of it, nor neglect to do their duties for the sake of it. The young are pleased with praises from the old; the old are delighted with honors from the young. They remember their former acts with pleasure, and rejoice to perform their present occupations with success; being, through my influence, dear to the gods, beloved by their friends, and honored by their country.

[1] "It is said that Themistocles, when he was asked what *acroama*, or whose voice, he would hear with most pleasure, replied, 'The voice of him by whom his merits would be best set forth.'" Cicero Pro Archiæ, c. 9.

And when the destined end of life comes, they do not lie in oblivion and dishonor, but, celebrated with songs of praise, flourish forever in the memory of mankind. By such a course of conduct, O Hercules, son of noble parents, you may secure the most exalted happiness."

34. Nearly thus it was that Prodicus related the instruction of Hercules by Virtue; adorning the sentiments, however, with far more magnificent language than that in which I now give them. It becomes you, therefore, Aristippus, reflecting on these admonitions, to endeavor to think of what concerns the future period of your life.

CHAPTER II.

A dialogue between Socrates and his son Lamprocles, who had expressed resentment against his mother, on the duty of children to their parents. The ungrateful are to be deemed unjust, sect. 1, 2. The greater benefits a person has received, the more unjust is he if he is ungrateful; and there are no greater benefits than those which children experience from their parents, 3-6. Hence it follows that a son ought to reverence his mother, though she be severe, when he knows that her severity proceeds from kind motives, 7-12. How great a crime the neglect of filial duty is, appears from the fact that it is punished by the laws and execrated by mankind, 13, 14.

1. HAVING learned, one day, that Lamprocles, the eldest[1] of his sons, had exhibited anger against his mother, "Tell me, my son," said he, "do you know that certain persons are called ungrateful?" "Certainly," replied the youth. "And do you understand how it is they act that men give them this appellation?" "I do," said Lamprocles, "for it is those that have received a kindness, and that do not make a return when they are able to make one, whom they call ungrateful." "They then appear to you to class the ungrateful with the unjust?" "I think so."

2. "And have you ever considered whether, as it is thought unjust to make slaves of our friends, but just to make slaves of our enemies, so it is unjust to be un-

[1] Socrates had three sons, Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, and Menexenus. See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 57. *Kühner.*

grateful toward our friends, but just to be so toward our enemies?" "I certainly have," answered Lamprocles, "and from whomsoever a man receives a favor, whether friend or enemy, and does not endeavor to make a return for it, he is in my opinion unjust."

3. "If such, then, be the case," pursued Socrates, "ingratitude must be manifest injustice?" Lamprocles expressed his assent. "The greater benefits, therefore, a person has received, and makes no return, the more unjust he must be." He assented to this position also. "Whom, then," asked Socrates, "can we find receiving greater benefits from any persons than children receive from their parents? children whom their parents have brought from non-existence into existence, to view so many beautiful objects, and to share in so many blessings, as the gods grant to men; blessings which appear to us so inestimable, that we shrink, in the highest degree, from relinquishing them; and governments have made death the penalty for the most heinous crimes, in the supposition that they could not suppress injustice by the terror of any greater evil.

4. You do not, surely, suppose that men beget children merely to gratify their passions, since the streets are full, as well as the brothels, of means to allay desire; but what we evidently consider, is, from what sort of women the finest[1] children may be born to us, and, uniting with them, we beget children.

5. The man maintains her who joins with him to produce offspring, and provides, for the children that are likely to be born to him, whatever he thinks will conduce to their support, in as great abundance as he can; while the woman receives and bears the burden, oppressed and endangering her life, and imparting a portion of the nutriment with which she herself is supported; and, at length, after bearing it the full time, and bringing it forth with great pain, she suckles and cherishes it, though she has received no previous benefit from it, nor does the infant know by whom it is

[1] Βέλτιστα.] Kühner interprets this word *robustissima;* but it is better to understand it as meaning good in every way; excellent in shape, vigor, health, and understanding.

tended, nor is it able to signify what it wants, but she, conjecturing what will nourish and please it, tries to satisfy his calls, and feeds it for a long time, both night and day, submitting to the trouble and not knowing what return she will receive for it.

6. Nor does it satisfy the parents merely to feed their offspring, but as soon as the children appear capable of learning anything, they teach them whatever they know that may be of use for their conduct in life; and whatever they consider another more capable of communicating than themselves, they send their sons to him at their own expense, and take care to adopt every course that their children may be as much improved as possible."

7. Upon this the young man said, "But, even if she has done all this, and many times more than this, no one, assuredly, could endure her ill-humor." "And which do you think," asked Socrates, "more difficult to be endured, the ill-humor of a wild beast, or that of a mother?" "I think," replied Lamprocles, "that of a mother, at least of such a mother as mine is." "Has she ever then inflicted any hurt upon you, by biting or kicking you, as many have often suffered from wild beasts?"

8. "No; but, by Jupiter, she says such things as no one would endure to hear for the value of all that he possesses." "And do you reflect," returned Socrates, "how much grievous trouble you have given her by your peevishness, by voice and by action, in the day and in the night, and how much anxiety you have caused her when you were ill?" "But I have never said or done anything to her," replied Lamprocles, "at which she could feel ashamed."

9. "Do you think it, then," inquired Socrates, "a more difficult thing for you to listen to what she says, than for actors to listen when they utter the bitterest reproaches against one another in tragedies?" "But actors, I imagine, endure such reproaches easily, because they do not think that, of the speakers, the one who utters reproaches, utters them with intent to do harm, or that the one who utters threats, utters them with

any evil purpose." "Yet you are displeased at your mother, although you will know that whatever she says, she not only says nothing with intent to do you harm, but that she wishes you more good than any other human being. Or do you suppose that your mother meditates evil toward you?" "No, indeed," said Lamprocles, "that I do not imagine."

10. "Do you then say that this mother," rejoined Socrates, "who is so benevolent to you, who, when you are ill, takes care of you, to the utmost of her power, that you may recover your health, and that you may want nothing that is necessary for you, and who, besides, entreats the gods for many blessings on your head, and pays vows for you, is a harsh mother? For my part, I think that if you can not endure such a mother, you can not endure any thing that is good?

11. But tell me," continued he, "whether you think that you ought to pay respect to any other human being, or whether you are resolved to try to please nobody, and to follow or obey neither a general nor any other commander?" "No, indeed," replied Lamprocles, "I have formed no such resolutions."

12. "Are you then willing," inquired Socrates, "to cultivate the good-will of your neighbor, that he may kindle a fire for you when you want it, or aid you in obtaining some good, or, if you happen to meet with any misfortune, may assist you with willing and ready help?" "I am," replied he. "Or would it make no difference," rejoined Socrates, "whether a fellow-traveller, or a fellow-voyager, or any other person that you met with, should be your friend or enemy? Or do you think that you ought to cultivate their good-will?" "I think that I ought," replied Lamprocles.

13. "You are then prepared," returned Socrates, "to pay attention to such persons; and do you think that you ought to pay no respect to your mother, who loves you more than any one else? Do you not know that the state takes no account of any other species of ingratitude, nor allows any action at law for it, overlooking such as receive a favor and make no return for it, but that if a person does not pay due regard to his

parents, it imposes a punishment on him,[1] rejects his services, and does not allow him to hold the archonship, considering that such a person cannot piously perform the sacrifices offered for the country, or discharge any other duty with propriety and justice. Indeed, if any one does not keep up the sepulchers of his dead parents, the state inquires into it in the examinations of candidates for office.

14. You therefore, my son, if you are wise, will entreat the gods to pardon you if you have been wanting in respect toward your mother, lest, regarding you as an ungrateful person, they should be disinclined to do you good; and you will have regard, also, to the opinion of men, lest, observing you to be neglectful of your parents, they should all condemn you, and you should then be found destitute of friends; for if men surmise that you are ungrateful toward your parents, no one will believe that if he does you a kindness he will meet with gratitude in return.

CHAPTER III.

Socrates, hearing that two brothers, Chærephon and Chærecrates, had quarrelled, recommends brotherly love to Chærecrates by the following arguments. A brother ought to be regarded as a friend, and esteemed more than wealth, sect. 1; for wealth is an uncertain possession, if the possessor of it is destitute of friends, 2, 3. Fraternal love, an appointment of Nature; and men who have brothers are more respected than those who have none, 4. Even though a brother should conceive ill feelings toward us, we should still endeavor to conciliate him, 5–9. How such conciliation may be effected, 10–14. The endeavor to conciliate is still more the duty of a younger than of an elder brother, and the more noble the disposition of a brother is, the more easy will it be to conciliate him, 15–17. Brothers should act in unison with one another, like different members of the same body, 18, 19.

1. SOCRATES, having observed that Chærephon and Chærecrates, two brothers well known to him, were at

[1] Concerning the law against disrespect to parents, or ill treatment of them, see Meier and Schoemann, Att Proc. iii. 1, p. 288, and C. F. Hermann, Gr. Staats-alterthümer, sect. 133, 11, p. 254. *Kühner.*

variance with each other, and having met with Chærecrates, said, "Tell me, Chærecrates, you surely are not one of those men, are you, who think wealth more valuable than brothers, when wealth is but a senseless thing, and a brother endowed with reason, when wealth needs protection, while a brother can afford protection, and when wealth, besides, is plentiful, and a brother but one?[1]

2. It is wonderful, too, that a man should consider brothers to be a detriment to him, because he does not possess his brothers' fortunes, while he does not consider his fellow-citizens to be a detriment, because he does not possess their fortunes; but, in the latter case, he can reason with himself, that it is better for him, living in society with many, to enjoy a competency in security, than, living alone, to possess all the property of his fellow-citizens in fear of danger, while, with regard to brothers, he knows not how to apply such reasoning.

3. Those who are able, too, purchase slaves that they may have helpers in their work, and procure friends, as being in need of supporters, while they neglect their brothers, as if friends could be made of fellow-citizens, but could not be made of brothers.

4. Yet it surely conduces greatly to friendship to have been born of the same parents, and to have been brought up together, since, even among brutes, a certain affection springs up between those that are reared together. In addition to these considerations, men pay more respect to those who have brothers than to those who have none, and are less forward to commit aggression on them."

5. To this Chærecrates made answer, "If, indeed, Socrates, the dissension between us were not great, it might perhaps be my duty to bear with my brother, and not shun his society for slight causes; for a brother, as you say, is a valuable possession, if he be such as he ought to be; but when he is nothing of the sort, and is indeed quite the reverse of what he should be, why should I attempt impossibilities?"

[1] "After all, there is more money than brothers." *Bysshe's Translation.*

6. "Whether, then, Chærecrates," rejoined Socrates, "is Chærephon unable to please any body, as he is unable to please you, or are there some whom he certainly can please?" "Yes," replied Chærecrates, "for it is for this very reason that I justly hate him, that he can please others, while to me he is on all occasions, whenever he comes in contact with me, a harm rather than a good, both in word and deed."

7. "Is the case then thus," said Socrates, "that as a horse is a harm to him who knows not how to manage him, and yet tries to do so, so a brother is a harm, when a person tries to manage him without knowing how to do it?"

8. "But how can I be ignorant," replied Chærecrates, "How to manage my brother, when I know how to speak well of him who speaks well of me, and to do well to him who does well to me? As to one, however, who seeks to vex me both by word and deed, I should not be able either to speak well of him, or to act well toward him, nor will I try."

9. "You speak strangely, Chærecrates," rejoined Socrates, "for if a dog of yours were of service to watch your sheep, and fawned upon your shepherds, but snarled when you approached him, you would forbear to show any ill feeling toward him, but would endeavor to tame him by kindness; but as for your brother, though you admit that he would be a great good to you if he were such as he ought to be, and though you confess that you know how to act and speak well with respect to him, you do not even attempt to make him of such service to you as he might be."[1]

10. "I fear, Socrates," replied Chærecrates, "that I have not wisdom enough to render Chærephon such as he ought to be toward me." "Yet there is no need to contrive anything artful or novel to act upon him," said Socrates, "as it appears to me; for I think that he may be gained over by means which you already know, and may conceive a high esteem for you."

[1] Kühner, differing from other editors, puts a note of interrogation at the end of this sentence. It seems better not to take it interrogatively.

11. "Tell me first," said the other, "whether you have observed that I possess any love-charm, which I was not aware that I knew?" "Answer me this question," said Socrates: "If you wished to induce any one of your acquaintance, when he offered sacrifice, to invite you to his feast, what would you do?" "I should doubtless begin by inviting him when I offered sacrifice."

12. "And if you wished to prevail on any of your friends to take care of your property, when you went from home, what would you do?" "I should certainly first offer to take care of his property, when he went from home."

13. "And if you wished to induce an acquaintance in a foreign land to receive you hospitably when you visited his country, what would you do?" "I should unquestionably be the first to receive him hospitably when he came to Athens; and if I wished him to be desirous to effect for me the objects for which I went thither, it is clear that I must first confer a similar service on him."

14. "Have you not long been unawares acquainted, then, with all the love-charms that exist among mankind? Or are you afraid," continued Socrates, "to make the first advances, lest you should seem to degrade yourself, if you should be the first to propitiate your brother? Yet he is thought to be a man deserving of great praise, who is the first to do harm to the enemy, and to do good to his friends. If, then, Chærephon had appeared to me more likely to bring you to this frame of mind, I would have endeavored to persuade him first to try to make you his friend; but, as things stand, you seem more likely, if you take the lead, to effect the desired object."

15. "You speak unreasonably, Socrates," rejoined Chærecrates, "and not as might be expected from you, when you desire me, who am the younger, to take the lead; for the established practice among all men is quite the reverse, being that the elder should always be first, both to act and speak."

16. "How," said Socrates; "is it not the custom every where that the younger should yield the path to

the elder when he meets him, rise from his seat before him, honor him with the softest couch, and give place to him in conversation? Do not therefore hesitate, my good young friend, but endeavor to conciliate your brother, and he will very soon listen to you. Do you not see how fond of honor, and how liberal-minded he is? Mean-minded persons you can not attract more effectually than by giving them something: but honorable and good men you may best gain by treating them in a friendly spirit."

17. "But what if he should become no kinder," said Chærecrates, "after I have done what you advise?" "It will be of no consequence," replied Socrates, "for what other risk will you run but that of showing that you are kind and full of brotherly affection, and that he is mean-spirited and unworthy of any kindness? But I apprehend no such result; for I conceive that when he finds you challenging him to such a contest, he will be extremely emulous to excel you in doing kindnesses both by word and deed.

18. At present, you are in the same case as if the two hands, which the gods have made to assist each other, should neglect this duty, and begin to impede each other; or as if the two feet, formed by divine providence to co-operate with one another, should give up this office, and obstruct one another.

19. Would it not be a great folly and misfortune to use for our hurt what was formed for our benefit? And indeed, as it appears to me, the gods have designed brothers to be of greater mutual service than the hands, or feet, or eyes, or other members which they have made in pairs for men; for the hands, if required to do things, at the same time, at greater distance than a fathom, would be unable to do them; the feet can not reach two objects, at the same time, that are distant even a fathom; and the eyes, which seem to reach to the greatest distance, can not, of objects that are much nearer, see at the same time those that are before and behind them; but brothers, if they are in friendship, can, even at the greatest distance, act in concert and for mutual benefit."

CHAPTER IV.

On the value of friendship. Many are more desirous to acquire property than friends, sect. 1–4. But no species of property is more valuable, lasting, and useful than a good friend: his qualities enumerated, 5–7.

1. I HEARD him, also, on one occasion, holding a discourse concerning friends,[1] by which, as it seems to me, a person might be greatly benefited, both as to the acquisition and use of friends; for he said that he had heard many people observe that a true and honest friend was the most valuable of all possessions, but that he saw the greater part of mankind attending to any thing rather than securing friends.

2. He observed them, he added, industriously endeavoring to procure houses and lands, slaves, cattle, and furniture; but as for a friend, whom they called the greatest of blessings, he saw the majority considering neither how to procure one, nor how those whom they had might be retained.

3. Even when friends and slaves were sick, he said that he noticed people calling in physicians to their slaves, and carefully providing other means for their recovery, but paying no attention to their friends; and that if both died, they grieved for their slaves, and thought that they had suffered a loss, but considered that they lost nothing in losing friends. Of their other possessions they left nothing untended or unheeded, but when their friends required attention, they utterly neglected them.

4. In addition to these remarks he observed that he saw the greater part of mankind acquainted with the number of their other possessions, although they might be very numerous, but of their friends, though but few, they were not only ignorant of the number, but even when they attempted to reckon it to such as asked

[1] The sentiments of Plato's Socrates concerning friendship are given in his Lysis; but Stallbaum, in a note on it, p. 89, has justly observed that that subject is much more acutely and copiously discussed in the Symposium and Phædrus. *Kühner.*

them, they set aside again[1] some that they had previously counted among their friends; so little did they allow their friends to occupy their thoughts.

5. Yet in comparison with what possession, of all others, would not a good friend appear far more valuable? What sort of horse, or yoke of oxen, is so useful as a truly good friend? What slave is so well-disposed or so attached, or what other acquisition so beneficial?

6. For a good friend is ready to supply whatever is wanting on the part of his friend, whether in his private affairs, or for the public interests; if he is required to do a service to any one, he assists him with the means; if any apprehension alarms him, he lends him his aid, sometimes sharing expenditure with him, sometimes co-operating with him, sometimes joining with him to persuade others, sometimes using force toward others; frequently cheering him when he is successful, and frequently supporting him when he is in danger of falling.

7. What the hands do, what the eyes foresee, what the ears hear, what the feet accomplish, for each individual, his friend, of all such services, fails to perform no one; and oftentimes, what a person has not effected for himself, or has not seen, or has not heard, or has not accomplished, a friend has succeeded in executing for his friend; and yet, while people try to foster trees for the sake of their fruit, the greater portion of mankind are heedless and neglectful[2] of that most productive possession which is called a friend.

CHAPTER V.

On the different estimation in which different friends are to be held. We ought to examine ourselves, and ascertain at what value we may expect our friends to hold us.

1. I HEARD one day another dissertation of his, which seemed to me to exhort the hearer to examine himself,

[1] See note on i. 2. 44.

[2] Ἀργῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως ἐπιμέλονται.] "Idly and negligently attend to—."

and ascertain of how much value he was to his friends. Finding that one of his followers was neglectful of a friend who was oppressed with poverty, he asked Antisthenes, in the presence of the man that neglected his friend, and of several others, saying, "Are there certain settled values for friends, Antisthenes, as there are for slaves?

2. For, of slaves, one, perhaps, is worth two minæ, another not even half a mina, another five minæ, another ten. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is said to have bought an overseer for his silver mines[1] at the price of a whole talent. I am therefore considering whether, as there are certain values for slaves, there are also certain values for friends."

3. "There are, undoubtedly," replied Antisthenes; "at least I, for my part, should wish one man to be my friend rather than have two minæ; another I should not value at even half a mina; another I should prefer to ten minæ; and another I would buy for my friend at the sacrifice of all the money and revenues in the world."[2]

4. "If such be the case, therefore," said Socrates, "it would be well for each of us to examine himself, to consider of what value he is in the estimation of his friends; and to try to be of as much value to them as possible, in order that his friends may be less likely to desert him: for I often hear one man saying that his friend has abandoned him, and another, that a person whom he thought to be his friend has preferred a mina to him.

5. I am considering, accordingly, whether, as one

[1] Τἀργυρεῖα.] Kühner reads τἀργύρια, "money," but without giving any reason for his preference of that reading. I have thought it better to follow the generality of editors.

[2] Πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόρων.] Πόρων is the conjecture of Portus or Leunclavius, which many editors have adopted instead of the old πόνων, which Kühner retains, supposing that it means *what is gained by labor*, agreeably to the saying in ii. 1. 20, "the gods sell us all good things for labor;" and that πρὸ παντων χρημάνων καὶ πόεων may be a proverbial expression. But this sense of μόνων is so forced, and so destitute of support, that I have preferred the emendation, especially as it is effected with the change of one letter.

sells a bad slave, and parts with him for whatever he will fetch, so it may be advisable to give up a worthless friend, when there is an opportunity of receiving more than he is worth. Good slaves I do not often see sold at all, or good friends abandoned."

CHAPTER VI.

What sort of persons we should choose for our friends, sect. 1-5. How we may ascertain the characters of men, before we form a friendship with them, 6, 7. How we may attach men to us as friends, 8-13. Friendship can exist only between the good and honorable, 14-19; between whom it will continue to subsist in spite of differences of opinion, 19-28. Deductions from the preceding remarks, 29-39.

1. He appeared to me, also, to make his followers wise in examining what sort of persons it was right to attach to themselves as friends, by such conversations as the following: "Tell me, Critobulus," said he, "if we were in need of a good friend, how should we proceed to look for one? Should we not, in the first place, seek for a person who can govern his appetite, his inclination to wine or sensuality, and abstain from immoderate sleep and idleness? for one who is overcome by such propensities would be unable to do his duty either to himself or his friend." "Assuredly he would not," said Critobulus. "It appears then to you that we must avoid one who is at the mercy of such inclinations?" "Undoubtedly," replied Critobulus.

2. "Besides," continued Socrates, "does not a man who is extravagant and yet unable to support himself, but is always in want of assistance from his neighbor, a man who, when he borrows, cannot pay, and when he cannot borrow, hates him who will not lend, appear to you to be a dangerous friend?" "Assuredly," replied Critobulus. "We must therefore avoid such a character?" "We must indeed."

3. "Again: what sort of friend would he be who has the means of getting money, and covets great wealth, and who, on this account, is a driver of hard bargains,

and delights to receive, but is unwilling to pay?" "Such a person appears to me," said Critobulus, "to be a still worse character than the former."

4. "What then do you think of him, who, from love of getting money, allows himself no time for thinking of anything else but whence he may obtain it?" "We must avoid him, as it seems to me; for he would be useless to any one that should make an associate of him." "And what do you think of him who is quarrelsome, and likely to raise up many enemies against his friends?" "We must avoid him also, by Jupiter." "But if a man have none of these bad qualities, but is content to receive obligations, taking no thought of returning them?" "He also would be useless as a friend. But what sort of person, then, Socrates, should we endeavor to make our friend?"

5. "A person, I think, who, being the reverse of all this, is proof against the seductions of bodily pleasures, is upright and fair in his dealings, and emulous not to be outdone in serving those who serve him, so that he is of advantage to those who associate with him."

6. "How then shall we find proof of these qualities in him, Socrates, before we associate with him?" "We make proof of statuaries," rejoined Socrates, "not by forming opinions from their words, but whomsoever we observe to have executed his previous statues skillfully, we trust that he will execute others well."

7. "You mean, then, that the man who is known to have served his former friends, will doubtless be likely to serve such as may be his friends hereafter?" "Yes; for whomsoever I know to have previously managed horses with skill, I expect to manage other horses with skill."

8. "Be it so," said Critobulus; "but by what means must we make a friend of him who appears to us worthy of our friendship?" "In the first place," answered Socrates, "We must consult the gods, whether they recommend us to make him our friend." "Can you tell me, then," said Critobulus, "how he, who appears eligible to us, and whom the gods do not disapprove, is to be secured?"

9. "Assuredly," returned Socrates, "he is not to be caught by tracking him like the hare, or by wiles, like birds, or by making him prisoner by force, like enemies; for it would be an arduous task to make a man your friend against his will, or to hold him fast if you were to bind him like a slave; for those who suffer such treatment are rendered enemies rather than friends."

10. "How then are men made friends?" inquired Critobulus. "They say that there are certain incantations, which those who know them, chant to whomsoever they please, and thus make them their friends; and that there are also love-potions, which those who know them, administer to whomsoever they will, and are in consequence beloved by them."

11. "And how can we discover these charms?" "You have heard from Homer the song which the Sirens sung to Ulysses, the commencement of which runs thus:

'Come hither, much-extolled Ulysses, great glory of the Greeks.'"

"Did the Sirens then, by singing this same song to other men also, detain them so that they were charmed and could not depart from them?" "No; but they sang thus to those who were desirous of being honored for virtue."

12. "You seem to mean that we ought to apply as charms to any person, such commendations as, when he hears them, he will not suspect that his eulogist utters to ridicule him; for, if he conceived such a suspicion, he would rather be rendered an enemy, and would repel men from him; as, for instance, if a person were to praise as beautiful, and tall, and strong, one who is conscious that he is short, and deformed, and weak.

But," added Critobulus, "do you know any other charms?"

13. "No," said Socrates, "but I have heard that Pericles knew many, which he used to chant to the city, and make it love him." "And how did Themistocles make the city love him?" "Not, by Jupiter, by

uttering charms to it, but by conferring[1] on it some advantage."

14. "You appear to me to mean, Socrates, that if we would attach to us any good person as a friend, we ourselves should be good both in speaking and acting."[2] "And did you think it possible," said Socrates, "for a bad person to attach to himself good men as his friends?"

15. "I have seen," rejoined Critobulus, "bad orators become friends to good orators, and men bad at commanding an army becoming friends to men eminently good in the military art."

16. "Do you then," said Socrates, "regarding the subject of which we are speaking,[3] know any persons, who, being themselves useless, can make useful persons their friends?" "No, by Jupiter," replied Critobulus; "but if it is impossible for a worthless person to attach to himself good and honorable friends, it becomes now an object of consideration with me, whether it is possible for one who is himself honorable and good, to become, with ease, a friend to the honorable and good."

17. "What perplexes you, Critobulus, is, that you often see men who are honorable in their conduct, and who refrain from every thing disgraceful, involved, instead of being friends, in dissensions with one another, and showing more severity toward each other than the worthless part of mankind."

18. "Nor is it only private persons," rejoined Critobulus, "that act in this manner, but even whole communities, which have the greatest regard for what is honorable, and are least inclined to any thing disgraceful, are often hostilely disposed toward one another.

[1] Περιάψας.] An expression borrowed from witchcraft or sorcery, when an amulet, or any thing supposed to have a fascinating power, is applied or attached to the person, and termed, in consequence, περίαπτον and περίαμμα, as is justly observed by Ernesti. *Schneider.*

[2] Ἀγαθοὺς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν.] Referring, as Coray and Herbst think, to the eloquence of Pericles, and the exploits of Themistocles.

[3] Περὶ οὐ διαλεγόμεθα.] Socrates wishes to recall the attention of Critobulus to the subject immediately under discussion. *Kühner.*

19. When I reflect on these differences," continued Critobulus, "I am quite in despair about the acquisition of friends, for I see that the bad cannot be friends with one another; for how can the ungrateful, or careless, or avaricious, or faithless, or intemperate, be friends to each other? indeed the bad appear to me to be altogether disposed by nature to be mutual enemies rather than friends.

20. Again, the bad, as you observe, can never harmonize in friendship with the good; for how can those who commit bad actions be friends with those who abhor such actions? And yet, if those also who practice virtue fall into dissensions with one another about pre-eminence in their respective communities, and even hate each other through envy, who will ever be friends, or among what class of mankind shall affection and attachment be found?"

21. "But these affections act in various ways," rejoined Socrates, "for men have by nature inclinations to attachment, since they stand in need of each other, and feel compassion for each other, and co-operate for mutual benefit, and, being conscious that such is the case, have a sense of gratitude toward one another; but they have also propensities to enmity, for such as think the same objects honorable and desirable, engage in contention for them, and, divided in feelings, become enemies. Disputations and anger lead to war; the desire of aggrandizement excites ill-will; and envy is followed by hatred.

22. But, nevertheless, friendship, insinuating itself through all these hinderances, unites together the honorable and good; for such characters, through affection for virtue, prefer the enjoyment of a moderate competency without strife, to the attainment of unlimited power by means of war; they can endure hunger and thirst without discontent, and take only a fair share of meat and drink, and, though delighted with the attractions of youthful beauty, they can control themselves, so as to forbear from offending those whom they ought not to offend.

23. By laying aside all avaricious feelings too, they

can not only be satisfied with their lawful share of the common property, but can even assist one another. They can settle their differences, not only without mutual offense, but even to their mutual benefit. They can prevent their anger from going so far as to cause them repentance; and envy they entirely banish, by sharing their own property with their friends, and considering that of their friends as their own.

24. How, then, can it be otherwise than natural, that the honorable and good should be sharers in political distinctions, not only without detriment, but even with advantage to each other? Those indeed who covet honor and power in states, merely that they may be able to embezzle money, to do violence to others, and to live a life of luxury, must be regarded as unprincipled and abandoned characters, and incapable of harmonious union with other men.

25. But when a person wishes to attain honors in a community, in order, not merely that he may not suffer wrong himself, but that he may assist his friends, as far as is lawful, and may endeavor, in his term of office, to do some service to his country, why should he not, being of such a character, form a close union with another of similar character? Will he be less able to benefit his friends if he unite himself with the honorable and good, or will he be less able to serve his country if he have the honorable and good for his colleagues?

26. In the public games, indeed, it is plain, that if the strongest were allowed to unite and attack the weaker, they would conquer in all the contests, and carry off all the prizes; and accordingly people do not permit them, in those competitions, to act in such a manner; but since, in political affairs,[1] in which honorable and good men rule, no one hinders another from serving his country in concert with whomsoever he pleases. how can it be otherwise than profitable for him to conduct affairs with the best men as his friends, having these

[1] Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἐῶσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, κ. τ. λ.] "Since, accordingly, they do not permit to act so there (*i. e.*, in the public games), but in political affairs," etc.

as colleagues and co-operators, rather than antagonists, in his proceedings?

27. It is evident, too, that if one man commences hostilities against another, he will need allies, and will need a great number of them, if he oppose the honorable and good; and those who consent to be his allies must be well treated by him, that they may be zealous in his interest; and it is much better for him to serve the best characters, who are the fewer, than the inferior, who are more numerous; for the bad require far more favors than the good.

28. "But strive with good courage, Critobulus," he continued, "to be good yourself, and, having become so, endeavor to gain the friendship of men of honor and virtue. Perhaps I myself also may be able to assist you in this pursuit of the honorable and virtuous, from being naturally disposed to love, for, for whatever persons I conceive a liking, I devote myself with ardor, and with my whole mind, to love them, and be loved in return by them, regretting their absence to have mine regretted by them, and longing for their society while they on the other hand long for mine.

29. I know that you also must cultivate such feelings, whenever you desire to form a friendship with any person. Do not conceal from my knowledge, therefore, the persons to whom you may wish to become a friend; for, from my carefulness to please those who please me, I do not think that I am unskilled in the art of gaining men's affections."

30. "Indeed, Socrates," replied Critobulus, "I have long desired to receive such instructions as yours, especially if the same knowledge will have effect at once on those who are amiable in mind, and handsome in person."

31. "But, Critobulus," replied Socrates, "there is nothing in the knowledge that I communicate to make those who are handsome in person endure him who lays hands upon them; for I am persuaded that men shrunk from Scylla because she offered to put her hands on them; while every one, they say, was ready to listen to the Sirens, and were enchanted as they listened, because

they laid hands on no one, but sang to all men from a distance."

32. "On the understanding, then, that I shall lay my hands on no one," said Critobulus, "tell me if you know any effectual means for securing friends." "But will you never," asked Socrates, "apply your lips to theirs?" "Be of good courage, Socrates," said Critobulus, "for I will never apply my lips to those of any person, unless that person be beautiful." "You have now said," rejoined Socrates, "the exact contrary to what will promote your object; for the beautiful[1] will not allow such liberties, though the deformed receive them with pleasure, thinking that they are accounted beautiful for their mental qualities."

33. "As I shall caress the beautiful, then," said Critobulus, "and caress the good with the utmost ardor, teach me, with confidence, the art of attaching my friends to me." "When, therefore, Critobulus," said Socrates, "you wish to become a friend to any one, will you permit me to say to him concerning you, that you admire him, and desire to be his friend?" "You may say so," answered Critobulus, "for I have never known any one dislike those who praised him."

34. "But if I say of you, in addition, that, because you admire him, you feel kindly disposed toward him, will you not think that false information is given of you by me?" "No: for a kind feeling springs up in myself also toward those whom I regard as kindly disposed toward me."

35. "Such information, then," continued Socrates, "I may communicate regarding you to such as you may wish to make your friends; but if you enable me also to say concerning you, that you are attentive to your friends; that you delight in nothing so much as in the possession of good friends; that you pride yourself on the honorable conduct of your friends not less than on your own; that you rejoice at the good fortune of your friends not less than at your own; that you are

[1] Καλοί.] Socrates plays on the word καλοί, which referred, as Bornemann observes, both to beauty of person and beauty of mind.

never weary of contriving means by which good fortune may come to your friends; and that you think it the great virtue of a man to surpass his friends in doing them good and his enemies in doing them harm, I think that I shall be a very useful assistant to you in gaining the affections of worthy friends."

36. "But why," said Critobulus, "do you say this to me, as if you were not at liberty to say of me any thing you please?" "No, by Jupiter," replied Socrates; "I have no such liberty, according to a remark that I once heard from Aspasia; for she said that skilful match-makers, by reporting with truth good points of character, had great influence in leading people to form unions, but that those who said what was false, did no good by their praises, for that such as were deceived hated each other and the match-maker alike: and as I am persuaded that this opinion is correct, I think that I ought not to say, when I praise you, any thing that I cannot utter with truth."

37. "You are, therefore," returned Critobulus, "a friend of such a kind to me, Socrates, as to assist me, if I have myself any qualities adapted to gain friends; but if not, you would not be willing to invent any thing to serve me." "And whether, Critobulus," said Socrates, "should I appear to serve you more by extolling you with false praises, or by persuading you to endeavor to become a truly deserving man?

38. If this point is not clear to you, consider it with the following illustrations: If, wishing to make the owner of a ship your friend, I should praise you falsely to him, pronouncing you a skilful pilot, and he, believing me, should intrust his ship to you to steer when you are incapable of steering it, would you have any expectation that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship? Or if, by false representations, I should persuade the state, publicly, to intrust itself to you as a man skilled in military tactics, in judicial proceedings, or in political affairs, what do you think that yourself and the state would suffer at your hands? Or if, in private intercourse, I should induce any of the citizens, by unfounded statements, to commit their

property to your care, as being a good and diligent manager, would you not, when you came to give proof of your abilities, be convicted of dishonesty, and make yourself appear ridiculous?

39. But the shortest, and safest, and best way, Critobulus, is to strive to be really good in that in which you wish to be thought good. Whatever are called virtues among mankind, you will find, on consideration, capable of being increased by study and exercise. I am of opinion, that it is in accordance with these sentiments, that we ought to endeavor to acquire friends; if you know any other way, make me acquainted with it." "I should be indeed ashamed," replied Critobulus, "to say any thing in opposition to such an opinion; for I should say what was neither honorable nor true."

CHAPTER VII.

Socrates endeavored to alleviate the necessities of his friends by his instructions, and by exhorting them to assist each other. In this chapter it is particularly shown that any person of liberal education may, when oppressed by poverty, honorably use his talents and accomplishments for his support.

1. SUCH difficulties of his friends as arose from ignorance, he endeavored to remedy by his counsel; such as sprung from poverty, by admonishing them to assist each other according to their means. With reference to this point, I will relate what I know of him from having been an ear-witness of what he said.

Observing Aristarchus,[1] on one occasion looking gloomily, "You seem," said he, "Aristarchus, to be taking something to heart; but you ought to impart the cause of your uneasiness to your friends; for perhaps we may by some means lighten it."

2. "I am, indeed, Socrates," replied Aristarchus, "in great perplexity; for since the city has been disturbed,[2]

[1] Nothing more is known of him than is here mentioned. *Kühner.*

[2] When Lysander had taken the city, and established the Thirty Tyrants, those who sought to restore the democracy and regain

and many of our people have fled to the Piræeus, my surviving sisters, and nieces, and cousins have gathered about me in such numbers, that there are now in my house fourteen freeborn persons.[1] At the same time we receive no profit from our lands, for the enemy are in possession of them; nor any rent from our houses, for but few inhabitants are left in the city; no one will buy our furniture, nor is it possible to borrow money from any quarter; a person, indeed, as it seems to me, would sooner find money by seeking it on the road, than get it by borrowing it. It is a grievous thing to me, therefore, to leave my relations to perish; and it is impossible for me to support such a number under such circumstances."

3. Socrates, on hearing this, replied, "And how is it that Ceramon,[2] yonder, though maintaining a great number of people, is not only able to procure what is necessary for himself and them, but gains so much more, also, as to be positively rich, while you, having many to support, are afraid lest you should all perish for want of necessaries?" "Because, assuredly," replied Aristarchus, "he maintains slaves, while I have to support free-born persons."

4. "And which of the two," inquired Socrates, "do you consider to be the better, the free-born persons that are with you, or the slaves that are with Ceramon?" "I consider the free persons with me as the better." "Is it not then a disgrace that he should gain abundance by means of the inferior sort, and that you should be in difficulties while having with you those of the better class?" "Such certainly is the case; but it is not at all wonderful; for[3] he supports artisans; but I, persons of liberal education."

their ancient liberty, occupied the Piræeus under the leadership of Thrasybulus, and began to make war on the supporters of the oligarchy. See Xen. Hellen. ii. 4. *Schneider.*

[1] Τοὺς ἐλευθέρους.] Observe the force of the article: "Fourteen, and those free persons, to say nothing of slaves." *Ernesti.*

[2] Ὁ Κεράμων.] He is nowhere else mentioned. The article is here used δεικτικῶς, *Ceramon ille. Kühner.*

[3] Νῃ Δί', ἔχῃ, κ. τ. λ.] I have been obliged to supply some words here, which it is absolutely necessary to understand, if we adhere, with Kühner, to the reading Νῃ Δί'. "Profecto ille in abundantiâ

5. "Artisans then," asked Socrates, "are persons that know how to make something useful?" "Unquestionably," replied Aristarchus. "Is barley-meal, then, useful?" "Very." "Is bread?" "Not less so." "And are men's and women's garments, coats, cloaks, and mantles, useful?" "They are all extremely useful." "And do those who are residing with you then, not know how to make any of these things?" "They know how to make them all, as I believe."

6. "And are you not aware that from the manufacture of one of these articles, that of barley-meal, Nausicydes[1] supports not only himself and his household, but a great number of swine and oxen besides, and gains, indeed, so much more than he wants, that he often even assists the government with his money? Are you not aware that Cyrebus, by making bread, maintains his whole household, and lives luxuriously; that Demea, of Collytus,[2] supports himself by making cloaks, Menon by making woolen cloaks, and that most of the Megarians live by making mantles?" "Certainly they do," said Aristarchus; "for they purchase barbarian slaves and keep them, in order to force them to do what they please; but I have with me free-born persons and relatives."

7. "Then," added Socrates, "because they are free and related to you, do you think that they ought to do nothing else but eat and sleep? Among other free persons, do you see that those who live thus spend their time more pleasantly, and do you consider them happier, than those who practice the arts which they know, and which are useful to support life? Do you find that idleness and carelessness are serviceable to mankind, either for learning what it becomes them to know, or for remembering what they have learned, or for maintaining the health and strength of their bodies, or for

vivit, ego in egestate; neque id mirum est, nam," etc. *Finck* apud *Kühner*. Zeune and Schneider would read negatively μὰ Δί'. "No, indeed, it is not at all disgraceful, for," etc.; a change which I cannot but think would much improve the passage.

[1] By the Scholiast on Aristoph. Eccl. 426, he is called ἀγφιταμοιλός. *Sturz, Lex. Xen.*

[2] One of the boroughs or districts into which Attica was divided.

acquiring and preserving what is useful for the support of life, and that industry and diligence are of no service at all.

8. And as to the arts which you say they know, whether did they learn them as being useless to maintain life, and with the intention of never practicing any of them, or, on the contrary, with a view to occupy themselves about them, and to reap profit from them? In which condition will men be more temperate, living in idleness, or attending to useful employments? In which condition will they be more honest, if they work, or if they sit in idleness meditating how to procure necessaries?

9. Under present circumstances, as I should suppose, you neither feel attached to your relatives, nor they to you, for you find them burdensome to you, and they see that you are annoyed with their company. For such feelings there is danger that dislike may grow stronger and stronger, and that previous friendly inclination may be diminished. But if you take them under your direction, so that they may be employed, you will love them, when you see that they are serviceable to you, and they will grow attached to you, when they find that you feel satisfaction in their society; and remembering past services with greater pleasure, you will increase the friendly feeling resulting from them, and consequently grow more attached and better disposed toward each other.

10. If, indeed, they were going to employ themselves in any thing dishonorable, death would be preferable to it; but the accomplishments which they know, are, as it appears, such as are most honorable and becoming to women; and all people execute what they know with the greatest ease and expedition, and with the utmost credit and pleasure. Do not hesitate, therefore," concluded Socrates, "to recommend to them this line of conduct, which will benefit both you and them; and they, as it is probable, will cheerfully comply with your wishes."

11. "By the gods," exclaimed Aristarchus, "you seem to me to give such excellent advice, Socrates,

that though hitherto I did not like to borrow money, knowing that when I had spent what I got, I should have no means of repaying it, I now think that I can endure to do so, in order to gain the necessary means of commencing work."

12. The necessary means were accordingly provided; wool was bought; and the women took their dinners as they continued at work, and supped when they had finished their tasks; they became cheerful instead of gloomy in countenance, and instead of regarding each other with dislike, met the looks of one another with pleasure: they loved Aristarchus as their protector, and he loved them as being of use to him. At last he came to Socrates, and told him with delight of the state of things in his house; adding that "the women complained of him as being the only person in the house that ate the bread of idleness."

13. "And do you not tell them," said Socrates, "the fable of the dog? For they say that when beasts had the faculty of speech, the sheep said to her master, 'you act strangely, in granting nothing to us who supply you with wool, and lambs, and cheese, except what we get from the ground; while to the dog, who brings you no such profits, you give a share of the food which you take yourself.'

14. The dog, hearing these remarks, said, 'And not indeed without reason; for I am he that protects even yourselves, so that you are neither stolen by men, or carried off by wolves; while, if I were not to guard you, you would be unable even to feed, for fear lest you should be destroyed.' In consequence it is said that the sheep agreed that the dog should have the superior honor. You, accordingly, tell your relations that you are, in the place of the dog, their guardian and protector, and that, by your means, they work and live in security and pleasure, without suffering injury from any one."

CHAPTER VIII.

Socrates persuades Eutherus, who was working for hire, to seek some more eligible employment, as his present occupation was not suited for old age, and recommends to him the post of steward to some rich man. An objection on the part of Eutherus, that he should dislike to have to render an account to a master, Socrates opposes with the remark that there is no office in the world free from responsibility.

1. SEEING an old friend one day, after a considerable interval of time, he said, "Whence do you come, Eutherus?" "I am returned, Socrates," replied Eutherus, "from my retirement abroad at the conclusion of the war;[1] and I come now from the immediate neighborhood; for since we were robbed of all our possessions beyond the borders, and my father left me nothing in Attica, I am obliged to live in the city and work with my own hands to procure the necessaries of life; but this seems to me better than to ask aid of any body, especially as I have nothing on which I could borrow."

2. "And how long," said Socrates, "do you think that your bodily labor will serve to earn what you require?" "Not very long, by Jupiter," replied Eutherus. "Then," said Socrates, "when you grow older, you will doubtless be in want of money, and no one will be willing to give you wages for your bodily labor." "What you say is true," rejoined Eutherus.

3. "It will be better for you, therefore," continued Socrates, "to apply yourself immediately to some employment which will maintain you when you are old, and, attaching yourself to some one of those that have larger fortunes (who requires a person to assist him), and, superintending his works, helping to gather in his fruits, and preserve his property, to benefit him, and to be benefited by him in return."

[1] There is no doubt that the allusion here is to the peace of Theramenes, by which every thing that the Athenians possessed beyond the limits of Attica was taken from them. See Plutarch Lys. 14. Andoc. de Pace, 12. *Krüger.*

4. "I should with great reluctance, Socrates," said he, "submit to slavery." "Yet those who have the superintendence in states, and who take care of the public interests, are not the more like slaves on that account, but are thought to have more of the freeman."

5. "In a word, however," rejoined Eutherus, "I am not at all willing to make myself liable to any one's censure." "But assuredly, Eutherus," said Socrates, "it is not very easy to find an employment in which a person would not be exposed to censure; for it is difficult to do any thing so as to commit no error; and it is difficult, even if you have done it without error, to meet with a considerate judge; for even in the occupation in which you are now engaged I should wonder if it be easy for you to go through it without blame.

6. But you must endeavor to avoid such employers as are given to censure, and seek such as are candid; to undertake such duties as you are able to do, and to decline such as you can not fulfill; and to execute whatever you take upon you in the best manner and with the utmost zeal; for I think that, by such conduct, you will be least exposed to censure, you will most readily find assistance in time of need, and you will live with the greatest ease and freedom from danger, and with the best provision for old age.

CHAPTER IX.

Crito, a rich man, complaining that he is harassed by informers, Socrates recommends him to secure the services of Archedemus, a poor man well skilled in the law, to defend him against them; a plan by which both are benefited. Archedemus also assists others, and gains both reputation and emolument.

1. I KNOW that he also heard Crito once observe, how difficult it was for a man who wished to mind his own business to live at Athens.[1] "For at this very time,"

[1] To live at Athens is said to have been troublesome on account of the *sycophantæ*, or informers, whom the populace allowed to harass and annoy the richer class, in the belief that such liberty helped to support the democracy. *Schneider.*

added he, "there are people bringing actions against me, not because they have suffered any wrong from me, but because they think that I would rather pay them a sum of money than have the trouble of law proceedings."

2. "Tell me, Crito," said Socrates, "do you not keep dogs, that they may drive away the wolves from your sheep?" "Certainly," answered Crito, "for it is more profitable to me to keep them than not." "Would you not then be inclined to keep a man also, who would be willing and able to drive away from you those that try to molest you?" "I would with pleasure," returned Crito, "if I were not afraid that he would turn against me."

3. "But do you not see," said Socrates, "that it would be much more pleasant for him to serve himself by gratifying such a man as you than by incurring your enmity. And be assured that there are such characters here, who would be extremely ambitious to have you for a friend."

4. In consequence of this conversation, they fixed upon Archedemus, a man of great ability both in speaking and acting, but poor; for he was not of a character to make money by every means, but was a lover of honesty, and a person of superior mind, so that he could draw money from the informers.[1] Crito, therefore, whenever he gathered in his corn, or oil, or wine, or wool, or anything else that grew on his land, used to select a portion of it, and give it to Archedemus; and used to invite him whenever he sacrificed,[2] and paid him attention in every similar way.

5. Archedemus, accordingly, thinking that Crito's house would be a place of refuge for him, showed him

[1] Φιλόχρηστός τε καὶ εὐφυέστερος ὤν, ἀπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν λαμβάνειν.] Understand ὥστε, "so that he could get the better of the sycophants, and draw money from them, instead of allowing them to practice on Crito." This is the reading of Kühner; most editions have ἔφη ῥᾷστον εἶναι, "he said that it was very easy to get money from the sycophants."

[2] When the sacrifice was ended, an entertainment followed, to which it was usual to invite kinsmen and friends, as a mark of respect. See Bachius ad Hieron. viii. 3. *Kühner.*

much respect, and quickly discovered, on the part of Crito's accusers, many illegal acts, and many persons who were enemies to those accusers, one of whom he summoned to a public trial, in which it would be settled what he should suffer or pay.[1]

6. This person, being conscious of many crimes, tried every means to get out of the hands of Archedemus; but Archedemus would not let him off, until he ceased to molest Crito, and gave himself a sum of money besides.

7. When Archedemus had succeeded in this and some other similar proceedings, then, as when any shepherd has a good dog, other shepherds wish to station their flocks near him, in order to have the benefit of his dog, so likewise many of the friends of Crito begged him to lend them the services of Archedemus as a protector.

8. Archedemus willingly gratified Crito in this respect, and thus not only Crito himself was left at peace, but his friends. And if any of those with whom he was at variance taunted him with receiving favors from Crito, and paying court to him, Archedemus would ask, "whether is it disgraceful to be benefited by honest men, and to make them your friends by serving them in return, and to be at variance with the unprincipled, or to make the honorable and good your enemies by trying to wrong them, and to make the bad your friends by co-operating with them, and associate with the vicious instead of the virtuous?" From this time Archedemus was one of Crito's friends, and was honored by the other friends of Crito.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates exhorts Diodorus, a rich man, to aid his friend Hermogenes, who is in extreme poverty. A man endeavors to preserve the life of a slave, and ought surely to use greater exertions to save a friend, who will well repay our kindness.

1. I AM aware that he also held a conversation with Diodorus, one of his followers, to the following effect.

[1] Ὅ τι δεῖ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι.] A legal expression, παθεῖν referring to corporal punishment, ἀποτίσαι to a pecuniary fine.

"Tell me, Diodorus," said he, "if one of your slaves runs away, do you use any care to recover him?"

2. "Yes, indeed," answered he, "and I call others to my aid, by offering rewards for capturing him." "And if any of your slaves falls ill," continued Socrates, "do you pay any attention to him, and call in medical men, that he may not die?" "Certainly," replied the other. "And if any one of your friends, who is far more valuable to you than all your slaves, is in danger of perishing of want, do you not think that it becomes you to take care of him, that his life may be saved?

3. But you are not ignorant that Hermogenes is not ungrateful, and would be ashamed, if, after being assisted by you, he were not to serve you in return; and indeed to secure such a supporter as he, willing, well-disposed, steady, and not only able to do what he is directed, but capable of being useful of himself, and of taking forethought, and forming plans for you, I consider equivalent to the value of many slaves.

4. Good economists say that you ought to buy, when you can purchase for a little what is worth much; but now, in consequence of the troubled state of affairs, it is possible to obtain good friends at a very easy rate."

5. "You say well, Socrates," rejoined Diodorus; "and therefore tell Hermogenes to come to me." "No, by Jupiter," said Socrates, "I shall not; for I think it not so honorable for you to send for him as to go yourself to him; nor do I consider it a greater benefit to him than to you that this intercourse should take place."

6. Diodorus accordingly went to Hermogenes, and secured, at no great expense, a friend who made it his business to consider by what words or deeds he could profit or please Diodorus.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates used to exhort those who aspired to public offices to learn the duties that would be required in them. The duties of a military commander, and his responsibilities, sect. 1–5. He must know many things besides military tactics, 6–11.

1. I WILL now show that Socrates was of great service to those who aspired to posts of honor,[1] by rendering them attentive to the duties of the offices which they sought.

Having heard that Dionysodorus[2] had arrived at the city, offering to teach the art of a general, he said to one of those who were with him, whom he observed to be desirous of obtaining that honor in the state.

2. "It is indeed unbecoming, young man, that he who wishes to be commander of an army in his country should neglect to learn the duties of that office when he has an opportunity of learning them; and such a person would be far more justly punished by his country than one who should contract to make statues for it, when he had not learned to make them.

3. For as the whole state, in the perils of war, is intrusted to the care of the general, it is likely that great advantages will occur if he act well, and great evils if he fall into error. How, then, would not he, who neglects to learn the duties of the office, while he is eager to be elected to it, be deservedly punished?" By making such observations, he induced the young man to go and learn.

[1] Τῶν καλῶν.] Τὰ καλὰ are here *munera publica, honores.* See Weiske ad h. l., and Haas. ad lib. de Rep. Lac. p. 95, seq. *Kühner.*

[2] A native of Chios, and brother of Euthydemus. He first taught the military art at Athens, and then devoted himself to the profession of the Sophists. See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 38. *Kühner.*

4. When, after having learned, he returned to Socrates again, he began to joke upon him, saying, "Since Homer, my friends, has represented Agamemnon as dignified,[1] does not this young man, after learning to be a general, seem to you to look more dignified than before? For as he who has learned to play the lyre is a lyrist, though he may not use the instrument, and he who has learned the art of healing is a physician, though he may not practice his art, so this youth will from henceforth be a general, though no one may elect him to command; but he who wants the proper knowledge is neither general nor physician, even though he be chosen to act as such by all the people in the world.

5. "But," he continued, "in order that we may have a better knowledge of the military art, in case any one of us should have to command a troop or company under you, tell us how he began to teach you generalship?" "He began," replied the youth, "with the same thing with which he ended; for he taught me *tactics*, and nothing else."

6. "But," said Socrates, "how small a part of the qualifications of a general is this! For a general must be skillful in preparing what is necessary for war, able[2] in securing provisions for his troops, a man of great contrivance and activity, careful, persevering, and sagacious; kind, and yet severe; open, yet crafty; careful of his own, yet ready to steal from others; profuse, yet rapacious; lavish of presents, yet eager to acquire money; cautious, yet enterprising; and many other qualities there are, both natural and acquired, which he, who would fill the office of general with ability, must possess.

7. It is good, indeed, to be skilled in tactics; for a well-arranged army is very different from a disorderly one; as stones and bricks, wood and tiles, if thrown together in confusion, are of no use whatever; but when the stones and tiles, materials not likely to rot or decay, are placed at the bottom and the top, and the bricks and wood are arranged in the middle (as in

[1] Γεραρόν. Il. iii. 171. [2] Compare Cyrop. i. 6, 12, *seqq.*

building), a house, which is a valuable piece of property, is formed."[1]

8. "What you have said, Socrates," rejoined the youth, "is an exact illustration of our practice; for in the field of battle we must place the bravest troops in the front and rear, and the cowardly in the middle, that they may be led on by those before them, and pushed forward by those behind."[2]

9. "If indeed he has taught you to distinguish the brave and cowardly," rejoined Socrates, "that rule may be of use; but if not, what profit is there in what you have learned? for if he ordered you, in arranging a number of coins, to lay the best first and last, and the worst in the middle, and gave you no instructions how to distinguish the good and bad, his orders to you would be to no purpose." "But indeed," he replied, "he did not teach me this; so that we must distinguish the brave from the cowardly ourselves."[3]

10. "Why should we not consider then," said Socrates, "how we may avoid mistakes as to that matter?" "I am willing," returned the young man. "If then we had to capture a sum of money, and were to place the most covetous men in front, should we not arrange them properly?" "It appears so to me." "And what must generals do when entering on a perilous enterprise? Must they not place the most ambitious in front?" "They at least," said the young man, "are those who are ready to brave danger for the sake of praise; and they are by no means difficult to discover, but will be every where conspicuous and easy to be selected."[4]

[1] Compare Cyrop. vi. 3, 25.

[2] See Cyrop. vii. 5. 5. As Homer, Il. iv. 297, says of Nestor,

> The horse and chariots to the front assign'd,
> The foot (the strength of war) he rang'd behind;
> The middle space suspected troops supply.
> Inclos'd by both, nor left the power to fly. *Pope.*

[3] So that if we have to decide which are good, and which bad, we must make the decision for ourselves. *Kühner.*

[4] These remarks on the easiness of discovering the ambitious, are given to the young man by Schneider, Kühner, and, I believe, all other editors; but it might be inquired whether they are not more suitable to the character of Socrates, to whom Sarah Fielding has taken the liberty of giving them.

11. "But did your instructor," inquired Socrates, "teach you to arrange an army, merely, or did he tell you for what purpose, and in what manner, you must employ each division of your forces?" "Not at all," replied he. "Yet there are many occasions, on which it is not proper to draw up an army, or to conduct it, in the same way." "But, by Jupiter, he gave me no explanation as to such occasions." "Go, again, then, by all means," said Socrates, "and question him; for if he knows, and is not quite shameless, he will blush, after taking your money, to send you away in ignorance."

CHAPTER II.

A good general ought to take measures for the safety, maintenance, and success of his troops; and not to study his own honor alone, but that of his whole army.

1. HAVING met, on some occasion, a person who had been elected general, Socrates said to him, "Why is it, do you think, that Homer has styled Agamemnon 'Shepherd of the people?' Is it not for this reason, that as a shepherd must be careful that his sheep be safe, and have food, and the object may be effected for which they are kept, so a general must take care that his soldiers be safe, and have provisions, and that the object be effected for which they serve? and they serve, no doubt, that they may increase their gratifications by conquering the enemy.

2. Or why has he praised Agamemnon in the following manner, saying that he was

> Both characters, a good king, and an efficient warrior?[1]

Does he not mean that he would not have been "an efficient warrior" if he had fought courageously alone against the enemy, and if he had not been the cause of courage to his whole army; and that he would not have been "a good king," if he had attended to his own

[1] Il. iii. 179.

subsistence only, and had not been the cause of comfort to those over whom he ruled?

3. For a man is chosen king, not that he may take good care of himself, but that those who have chosen him may prosper by his means; and all men, when they take the field, take it that their lives may be rendered as happy as possible, and choose generals that they may conduct them to the accomplishment of that object.

4. It is incumbent on the leader of an army, therefore, to carry into execution the views of those who have chosen him their leader. Nor is it easy to find anything more honorable than such exertion, or more disgraceful than an opposite course of conduct."

Thus considering what was the merit of a good leader, he omitted other points in his character, and left only this, *that he should render those whom he commanded happy.*

CHAPTER III.

The duty of a commander of cavalry is twofold, to improve the condition both of his men and his horses; and not to leave the care of the horses to the troops, sect. 1-4. How he should train his men, and how he should be himself qualified to do so, 5-10. He should acquire oratorial power, that he may incite his men to exertion, and fire them with the desire of glory, 11-15.

1. I REMEMBER that he held a dialogue with a person who had been chosen Hipparch,[1] to the following purport: "Could you tell me, young man," said he, "with what object you desired to be a Hipparch? It certainly was not for the sake of riding first among the cavalry; for the horse-archers are honored with that dignity, as they ride even before the Hipparchs." "You say the truth," said the youth. "Nor was it surely for the sake of being noticed, for even madmen are noticed

[1] There were at Athens two ἵππαρχοι, or commanders of the horse, who had supreme authority over the cavalry, but were subject to the orders of the ten στράτηγοι, or commanders of the infantry. The duties of a Hipparch, Xenophon has described in his treatise entitled Ἱππαρχικός. *Kühner.*

by everybody." "You say the truth in that respect also."

2. "But was it, then, that you expect to render the cavalry better, and present them in that condition to your country, and that, if there should be need for the services of cavalry, you hope, as their leader, to be the author of some advantage to the state?" "I do hope so, certainly." "And it will be truly honorable to you," continued Socrates, "if you are able to effect that object. But the office, to which you have been chosen, takes charge of both the horses and riders?" "It does so," said the young man.

3. "Come then, tell me this first of all, how you propose to render the horses better?" "That," replied the other, "I do not consider to be my business; for I think that each man, individually, must take care of his own horse."

4. "If, then," said Socrates, "some of the men should present their horses before you so diseased in the feet, so weak in the legs, or so feeble in body, and others, theirs so ill-fed, that they could not follow you; others, theirs so unmanageable, that they would not remain where you posted them; others, theirs so vicious that it would not be possible to post them at all; what would be the use of such cavalry to you? Or how would you be able, at the head of them, to be of any service to your country?" "You admonish me well," said the youth, "and I will try to look to the horses as far as may be in my power."

5. "And will you not also endeavor," asked Socrates, "to make the riders better?" "I will," said he. "You will first of all, then, make them more expert in mounting their horses." "I ought to do so; for if any of them should fall off, they would thus be better prepared to recover themselves."

6. "If, then," said Socrates, "you should be obliged to hazard an engagement, whether will you order your men to bring the enemy down to the level sand[1] on

[1] The cavalry were exercised on level ground strewed with sand; hence such places were called ἀμμόδρομοι. See Lexic. apud Ruhnk. ad Timæum, p. 23, ed. ii. *Schneider*. See also Hipparch. i. 5, and Schneider ad Hipparch. iii. 10.

which you have been accustomed to ride, or will you try to exercise them on such ground as that on which the enemy may show themselves?" "The latter method will be the better," said the young man.

7. "Will you also take any care that the greatest possible number of your men may be able to hurl the dart on horseback?" "That will be better, too," replied he. "And have you considered how to whet the courage of your cavalry, since you intend to make them more courageous, and animate them against the enemy?" "If I have not yet considered," said he, "I will now try to do so."

8. "And have you at all considered how your cavalry may be induced to obey you? For without obedience you will have no profit either from horses or horsemen, spirited and valiant as they may be." "You say the truth, Socrates, said he; "but by what means can a leader most effectually induce them to obedience?"

9. "You are doubtless aware that in all circumstances men most willingly obey those whom they consider most able to direct; for in sickness patients obey him whom they think the best physician; on shipboard, the passengers obey him whom they think the best pilot, and in agriculture, people obey him whom they deem the best husbandman." "Unquestionably," said the young man. "Is it not then likely," said Socrates, "that in horsemanship also, others will be most willing to obey him who appears to know best what he ought to do?"

10. "If, therefore, Socrates, I should myself appear the best horseman among them, will that circumstance be sufficient to induce them to obey me?" "If you convince them in addition," said Socrates, "that it is better and safer for them to obey you." "How, then shall I convince them of that?" "With much more ease," replied Socrates, "than if you had to convince them that bad things are better and more profitable than good."

"11. "You mean," said the young man, "that a commander of cavalry, in addition to his other qual-

ifications, should study to acquire some ability in speaking." "And did you think," asked Socrates, "that you would command cavalry by silence? Have you not reflected, that whatever excellent principles we have learned according to law,[1] principles by which we know how to live, we learned all through the medium of speech; and that whatever other valuable instruction any person acquires, he acquires it by means of speech likewise? Do not those who teach best, use speech most; and those who know the most important truths, discuss them with the greatest eloquence?

12. Or have you not observed,[2] that when a band of dancers and musicians is formed from this city, as that, for instance, which is sent to Delos,[3] no one from any other quarter can compete with it; and that in no other city is manly grace[4] shown by numbers of people like that which is seen here?" "What you say is true," said he.

13. "But it is not so much in sweetness of voice, or in size and strength of body, that the Athenians excel other people, as in ambition, which is the greatest incitement to whatever is honorable and noble." "This also is true," said he.

14. "Do you not think, then," said Socrates, "that if any one should study to improve the cavalry here, the Athenians would excel other people in that department also (as well in the decoration of their arms and horses as in the good order of the men, and in boldly

[1] Νόμις.] That is, *more et institutis civitatis.* Ernesti.

[2] The idea is, that though the Athenians excel other people in many respects, they excel them in nothing more than in their love of praise. If, therefore, you wish to improve the cavalry, you must bestow praise and honors upon them as often as they do their duty well. *Lange.*

[3] The Athenians sent a chorus to Delos every year, and a sacred deputation, in which there was also a chorus, every fifth year, to celebrate games in honor of Apollo. It is of this deputation that the passage in iv. 8. 2 is to be understood. *Weiske.*

[4] He refers to the custom of selecting the best-looking men, both young and old, to walk as *Thallophori* at the Panathenæa, or feast of Minerva. See Harpocration sub h. v. ibique Valesius, p. 34. Old men are mentioned as *Thallophori* by Xen. Sympos. iv. 17. See Athenæus, lib. xiii. p. 565. *Schneider.*

defying danger to encounter the enemy,) if they thought that by such means they would acquire praise and honor?" "It is probable," said the young man. "Do not delay, therefore," added Socrates, "but try to excite your men to those exertions by which you will both be benefited yourself, and your countrymen through your means." "I will assuredly try," replied he.

CHAPTER IV.

Nicomachides complaining that the Athenians had not chosen him general, though he was experienced in war, but Antisthenes, who had seen no military service, Socrates proceeds to show that Antisthenes, although he had never filled the office of commander, might have qualities to indicate that he would fill it with success.

1. SEEING Nicomachides,[1] one day, coming from the assembly for the election of magistrates, he asked him, "Who have been chosen generals, Nicomachides?" "Are not the Athenians the same as ever, Socrates?" he replied: "for they have not chosen me, who am worn out with serving on the list,[2] both as captain and centurion,[3] and with having received so many wounds from the enemy (he then drew aside his robe, and showed the scars of the wounds), but have elected Antisthenes, who has never served in the heavy-armed infantry, nor done anything remarkable in the cavalry, and who indeed knows nothing, but how to get money."

2. "Is it not good, however, to know this," said Socrates, "since he will then be able to get necessaries for the troops?" "But merchants," replied Nicomachides, "are able to collect money: and yet would not on that account, be capable of leading an army."

[1] Nothing is said of him elsewhere. *Kühner.*

[2] Ἐκ καταλόγου.] *E delectu militans.* * * * Significatur *ratio quâ ad militares expeditiones venit.* Kühner: who also refers to Thucyd. viii. 24; Aristot. Polit. v. 2; and Suidas, v. κατάλογος.

[3] Λοχαγῶν καὶ ταξιαρχῶν.] Serving as λοχαγὸς, captain of twenty-five, and ταξιαρχὸς, captain of a hundred.

3. "Anthisthenes, however," continued Socrates, "is given to emulation, a quality necessary in a general. Do you not know that whenever he has been chorus-manager [1] he has gained the superiority in all his choruses?" "But, by Jupiter," rejoined Nicomachides, "there is nothing similar in managing a chorus and an army."

4. "Yet Antisthenes," said Socrates, "though neither skilled in music nor in teaching a chorus,[2] was able to find out the best masters in these departments." "In the army, accordingly," exclaimed Nicomachides, "he will find others to range his troops for him and others to fight for him!"

5. "Well, then," rejoined Socrates, "if he find out and select the best men in military affairs, as he has done in the conduct of his choruses, he will probably attain superiority in this respect also; and it is likely that he will be more willing to spend money for a victory in war on behalf of the whole state, than for a a victory with a chorus in behalf of his single tribe." [3]

6. "Do you say, then, Socrates," said he, "that it is in the power of the same man to manage a chorus well, and to manage an army well?" "I say," said Socrates, "that over whatever a man may preside, he will, if he knows what he needs, and is able to provide it, be a good president, whether he have the direction of a chorus, a family, a city, or an army."

7. "By Jupiter, Socrates," cried Nicomachides, "I should never have expected to hear from you that good managers of a family would also be good generals." "Come, then," proceeded Socrates, "let us consider what are the duties of each of them, that we may understand whether they are the same, or are in any respect different." "By all means," said he.

[1] The χορηγὸς, or chorus-manager, among the Attic writers, is properly he who raised the chorus, and provided it with instruction and everything necessary, at his own expense. *Schneider.* See Böckh, Sub. Œcon. of Athens, vol. i. p. 487.

[2] Χορῶν διδασκαλίας.] He that taught and disciplined the χορὸς, was called χοροῦ διδάσκαλος.

[3] The victory belonged, not to the χορηγὸς, but to his tribe, in the name of which the money was expended. *Schneider.* Attica was divided into ten tribes.

8. "Is it not, then, the duty of both," asked Socrates, "to render those under their command obedient and submissive to them?" "Unquestionably." "Is it not also the duty of both to intrust various employments to such as are fitted to execute them?" "That is also unquestionable." "To punish the bad, and to honor the good, too, belongs, I think, to each of them." "Undoubtedly."

9. "And is it not honorable in both to render those under them well-disposed towards them?" "That also is certain." "And do you think it for the interest of both to gain for themselves allies and auxiliaries or not?" "It assuredly is for their interest." "Is it not proper for both also to be careful of their resources?" "Assuredly." "And is it not proper for both, therefore, to be attentive and industrious in their respective duties?"

10. "All these particulars," said Nicomachides, "are common alike to both, but it is not common to both to fight." "Yet both have doubtless enemies," rejoined Socrates. "That is probably the case," said the other. "Is it not for the interest of both to gain the superiority over those enemies?"

11. "Certainly; but to say nothing on that point, what, I ask, will skill in managing a household avail, if it be necessary to fight?" "It will doubtless in that case, be of the greatest avail," said Socrates; "for a good manager of a house, knowing that nothing is so advantageous or profitable as to get the better of your enemies when you contend with them, nothing so unprofitable and prejudicial as to be defeated, will zealously seek and provide everything that may conduce to victory, will carefully watch and guard against whatever tends to defeat, will vigorously engage if he sees that his force is likely to conquer, and, what is not the least important point, will cautiously avoid engaging if he finds himself insufficiently prepared.

12. Do not, therefore, Nicomachides," he added, "despise men skillful in managing a household; for the conduct of private affairs differs from that of public concerns only in magnitude; in other respects they are

similar; but what is most to be observed is, that neither of them are managed without men, and that private matters are not managed by one species of men, and public matters by another; for those who conduct public business make use of men not at all differing in nature from those whom the managers of private affairs employ; and those who know how to employ them conduct either public or private affairs judiciously, while those who do not know will err in the management of both."

CHAPTER V.

Conversation of Socrates with Pericles the younger on the manner in which the Athenians might be made to recover their ancient spirit and ambition. They ought to be reminded of the deeds of their ancestors, sect. 1–12; and to be taught that indolence has been the cause of their degeneracy, 13. They ought to revive the institutions of their forefathers, or imitate those of the Lacedæmonians, 14; and to pay great attention to military affairs, 15–25. How the territory of Attica might be best secured against invasion, 26–28.

1. CONVERSING, on one occasion, with Pericles,[1] the son of the great Pericles, Socrates said, "I have hopes, Pericles, that under your leadership the city will become more eminent and famous in military affairs, and will get the better of her enemies." "I wish, Socrates," said Pericles, "that what you say may happen; but how such effects are to be produced, I cannot understand." "Are you willing, then," asked Socrates, "that we should have some conversation on these points, and consider how far there is a possibility of effecting what we desire." "I am quite willing," replied Pericles.

2. "Are you aware, then," said Socrates, "that the Athenians are not at all inferior in number to the Bœo-

[1] This is the Pericles, the illegitimate son of the great Pericles, whom the Athenians, when the legitimate sons of the elder Pericles were dead, naturalized, in order to gratify his father. See Plutarch in Pericl. extr. Being made general with Thrasylus and Erasinides, and being involved in the ill-success at Arginusæ, he was condemned to death, Olymp. xciii. 2. *Ernesti.*

tians?" "I am," said Pericles. "And whether do you think that a greater number of efficient and well-informed men could be selected from the Bœotians, or from the Athenians?" "The Athenians do not appear to me to be inferior in this respect." "And which of the two peoples do you consider to be more united among themselves?" "I think that the Athenians are; for many of the Bœotians, being oppressed by the Thebans, entertain hostile feelings toward them. But at Athens I see nothing of the kind."

3. "But the Athenians are, moreover, of all people most eager for honor and most friendly in disposition; qualities which most effectually impel men to face danger in the cause of glory and of their country." "The Athenians are certainly not to be found fault with in these respects." "And assuredly there is no people that can boast of greater or more numerous exploits of their ancestors than the Athenians; a circumstance by which many are prompted and stimulated to cultivate manly courage and to become brave."

4. "All that you say is true, Socrates, but you see that since the slaughter of the thousand occurred at Lebadeia, under Tolmides,[1] and that at Delium under Hippocrates,[2] the reputation of the Athenians has suffered as far as regards the Bœotians, and the spirit of the Bœotians has been raised as far as regards the Athenians, so that the Bœotians, indeed, who formerly did

[1] Lebadeia was a town of central Bœotia, between Haliartus and Chæronea; the whole province is now comprehended under the name of Livadia. From the proximity of these places, it has happened that the battle is sometimes called the battle of Lebadeia, sometimes at Chæronea, sometimes at Coronea. See Thucyd. i. 113; Plutarch, Pericl. c. 18; Agesil. c. 19; Diod. Sic. xii. 6; Plat. Alcib. I. p. 112, E. The battle was fought B. C. 447. The "slaughter" was of a thousand Athenians by the Bœotians. Tolmides was the Athenian general. *Kühner.*

[2] Hippocrates was a general of the Athenians killed by the Bœotians. See Krüger, de Xen. Vit. Questt. Critt. p. 6. Cobet. prosopogr. Xen. p. 49. The battle at Delium was fought B. C. 424; Socrates, as Schneider observes, was present at it, according to Strabo, ix. p. 618, B., and Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Soc. See Thucyd. iv. 93, *seqq.* * * * Delium was a temple of Apollo in Bœotia, near which a little town seems gradually to have arisen; for Strabo and others speak of a πολίχνιον. *Kühner.*

not dare, even on their own soil, to meet the Athenians in the field without the aid of the Spartans and other Peloponnesians, now threaten to invade Attica single-handed; while the Athenians, who formerly, when the Bœotians were unsupported, ravaged Bœotia, are afraid lest the Bœotians should lay waste Attica."

5. "I perceive, indeed," said Socrates, "that such is the case; but the city seems to me now to be more favorably disposed for any good general; for confidence produces in men carelessness, indolence, and disobedience, but fear renders them more attentive, obedient, and orderly.

6. You may form a notion of this from people in a ship; for as long as they fear nothing, they are all in disorder, but as soon as they begin to dread a storm, or the approach of an enemy, they not only do every thing that they are told to do, but are hushed in silence, waiting for the directions to be given, like a band of dancers."[1]

7. "Well, then," said Pericles, "if they would now, assuredly, obey, it would be time for us to discuss how we might incite them to struggle to regain their ancient spirit, glory, and happiness."

8. "If then," said Socrates, "we wished them to claim property of which others were in possession, we should most effectively urge them to lay claim to it, if we proved that it belonged to their fathers, and was their rightful inheritance; and since we wish that they should strive for pre-eminence in valor, we must show them that such pre-eminence was indisputably theirs of old, and that if they now exert themselves to recover it, they will be the most powerful of all people."

9. "How, then, can we convince them of this?" "I think that we may do so, if we remind them that they have heard that their most ancient forefathers, of whom we have any knowledge, were the bravest of men."

10. "Do you allude to the dispute between the gods, of which Cecrops[2] and his assessors had the decision

[1] Ὥσπερ χορευταί.] Who always look to the coryphæus, or chorus leader. *Schneider.*

[2] Cecrops is said to have set as judge between Neptune and

on account of their valor?" "I do allude to that, and to the education and birth of Erechtheus,[1] and the war which occurred in his time with the people of the whole adjoining continent,[2] as well as that which was waged under the Heracleidæ against the Peloponnesians,[3] and all the wars that were carried on under Theseus,[4] in all of which they showed themselves the bravest people of their time.

11. And also, if you please, to what their descendants have since done, who lived not long before our day, not only contending, with their own unassisted strength, against the lords of all Asia and of Europe, as far as Macedonia (who inherited vast power and wealth from their ancestors, and who had themselves performed great achievements), but also distinguished themselves, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians, both by land and sea. They, doubtless, are celebrated as having far surpassed other men of their time." "They are so," said Pericles.

12. "In consequence, though many migrations occurred in Greece, they remained [5] in their own country; and many, when contending for their rights, submitted their claims to their arbitration, while many others,

Minerva when they were contending for the dominion over Attica. The fable is related both by other writers and by Apollodorus, iii. 14. See Heyne, Observat. p. 321, *seqq.*, and the commentators on Ovid. Met. vi. 70. *Schneider.*

[1] Erectheus was the fourth king of Athens. Il. ii. 547:

> Athens the fair, where great Erectheus sway'd,
> That owed his nurture to the blue-ey'd maid,
> But from the teeming furrow took his birth,
> The mighty offspring of the foodful earth. *Pope.*

[2] The continent meant is the country of Thrace, which, in the earliest times, reached to the boundaries of Attica. See Isocrates, Panegyr. c. 19. The war intended is that which was waged by the Athenians against the Thracians and Eleusinians. See Goeller ad Thucyd. ii. 15, and Stallbaum ad Plat. Menex. p. 239, B. *Kühner.*

[3] The war carried on by the descendants of Hercules against Eurystheus and the Peloponnesians. *Kühner.*

[4] He alludes to the wars carried on against the Amazons and Thracians. Herodot. ix. 27; Isocr. Panegyr. c. 19; Plutarch. Thes. c. 27; Aristid. Panath. p. 201, *seqq.*; Lysiæ Epitaph. sect. 4, *seqq.*; Justin ii. 4. *Herbst.*

[5] Hence the Athenians wished to be thought αὐτόχθονες and γηγενεῖς: all their praises, to which Xenophon here alludes, are briefly given by Isocrates, in his Panegyric. *Schneider.*

also, when persecuted by more powerful people, sought refuge with them."

13. "I wonder, indeed, Socrates," said Pericles, "how our city ever degenerated." "I imagine," said Socrates, "that as some other nations[1] have grown indolent through excessive exaltation and power, so likewise the Athenians, after attaining great pre-eminence, grew neglectful of themselves, and consequently became degenerate."

14. "By what means, then," said Pericles, "could they now recover their pristine dignity?" "It appears to me," replied Socrates, "not at all difficult to discover; for I think that if they learn what were the practices of their ancestors, and observe them not less diligently than they, they will become not at all inferior to them; but if they do not take that course, yet, if they imitate those[2] who are now at the head of Greece, adhere to their institutions, and attend to the same duties with diligence equal to theirs, they will stand not at all below them, and, if they use greater exertion, even above them."

15. "You intimate," returned Pericles, "that honor and virtue are far away from our city; for when will the Athenians reverence their elders as the Spartans do, when they begin, even by their own fathers, to show disrespect for older men? Or when will they exercise themselves like them, when they not only are regardless of bodily vigor, but deride those who cultivate it.

16. Or when will they obey the magistrates like them, when they make it their pride to set them at naught? Or when will they be of one mind like them, when, instead of acting in concert for their mutual interests, they inflict injuries on one another, and envy one an-

[1] Ἄγλοι τινές.] Schneider, from a conjecture of Weiske or Heinz, reads ἀσχηταί τινες; for, says he, "ineptè civitati Atheniensium ἄλλοι τινὲς opponuntur." Ἄλλοι τινὲς is however the reading of all the old copies, and is followed by Kühner.

[2] That the Lacedæmonians are meant is plain from what follows. *Schneider.* It is justly observed by Herbst, that Xenophon takes every occasion to praise the constitution of Sparta, and to prefer it to that of Athens, referring to iv. 4. 15; Cyrop. i. 6. 19; Symp. viii. 39; De Rep. Ath. and De Vectigal. *Kühner.*

other more than they envy the rest of mankind? More than any other people, too, do they dispute in their private and public meetings; they institute more lawsuits against one another, and prefer thus to prey upon one another than to unite for their mutual benefit. They conduct their public affairs as if they were those of a foreign state;[1] they contend about the management of them, and rejoice, above all things, in having power to engage in such contests.

17. From such conduct much ignorance and baseness prevail in the republic, and much envy and mutual hatred are engendered in the breasts of the citizens; on which accounts I am constantly in the greatest fear lest some evil should happen to the state too great for it to bear."

18. "Do not by any means suppose, Pericles," rejoined Socrates, "that the Athenians are thus disordered with an incurable depravity. Do you not see how orderly they are in their naval proceedings, how precisely they obey the presidents in the gymnastic games, and how, in the arrangement of the choruses, they submit to the directions of their teachers in a way inferior to none?"

19. "This is indeed surprising," said Pericles, "that men of that class[2] should obey those who are set over them, and that the infantry and cavalry, who are thought to excel the ordinary citizens in worth and valor, should be the least obedient of all the people."

20. "The council of the Areopagus, too," said Socrates, "is it not composed of men of approved character?"[3] "Undoubtedly," replied Pericles. "And do you know of any judges who decide causes, and conduct all their business with more exact conformity to

[1] *Ωσπερ ἀγγοτρτρίοις.*] Negligently; as if they had no concern in them.

[2] *Τοὺς τοιοὺτους.*] Such men as the sailors, rowers, and *ἐπιβάται*, who were either slaves, or of the lower order of the citizens. *Kühner.*

[3] *Δεδοκιμασμένων.*] Those who had discharged their duties as magistrates with integrity and honor, and, on giving in their accounts at the end of their term of office, had been approved by the judgment of the people. *Schneider.*

the laws, or with more honor and justice?" "I find no fault with them," said Pericles. "We must not, therefore, despair," said Socrates, "as if we thought that the Athenians are not inclined to be lovers of order."

21. "Yet in military affairs," observed Pericles, "in which it is most requisite to act with prudence, and order, and obedience, they pay no regard to such duties." "It may be so," returned Socrates, "for perhaps in military affairs men who are greatly deficient in knowledge have the command of them. Do you not observe that of harp-players, choristers, dancers, wrestlers, or pancratiasts, no one ventures to assume the direction who has not the requisite knowledge for it, but that all who take the lead in such matters are able to show from whom they learned the arts in which they are masters; whereas the most of our generals undertake to command without previous study.[1]

22. I do not, however, imagine you to be one of that sort; for I am sensible that you can tell when you began to learn generalship not less certainly than when you began to learn wrestling. I am sure, too, that you have learned, and keep in mind, many of your father's principles of warfare, and that you have collected many others from every quarter whence it was possible to acquire any thing that would add to your skill as a commander.

23. I have no doubt that you take great care that you may not unawares be ignorant of any thing conducive to generalship, and that, if you have ever found yourself deficient in any such matters, you have applied to persons experienced in them, sparing neither presents nor civilities, that you might learn from them what you did not know, and might render them efficient helpers to you."

24. "You make me well aware, Socrates," said Pericles, "that you do not say this from a belief that I have diligently attended to these matters, but from a wish to convince me that he who would be a general

[1] A similar complaint is made by Marius of the Roman generals in Sall. Jug. 85.

must attend to all such studies ; and I indeed agree with you in that opinion."

25. "Have you considered this also, Pericles," asked Socrates, "that on the frontier of our territories lie great mountains,[1] extending down to Bœotia, through which there lead into our country narrow and precipitous defiles ; and that our country is girded by strong mountains,[2] as it lies in the midst of them?" "Certainly," said he.

26. "Have you heard, too, that the Mysians and Pisidians, who occupy extremely strong positions in the country of the Great King,[3] and who are lightly armed, are able to make descents on the king's territory, and do it great damage, while they themselves preserve their liberty?" "This, too, I have heard," said Pericles.

27. "And do you not think that the Athenians," said Socrates, "if equipped with light arms while they are of an age for activity, and occupying the mountains that fence our country, might do great mischief to our enemies, and form a strong bulwark for the inhabitants of our country?" "I think, Socrates," said he, "that all these arrangements would be useful."

28. "If these plans, then," concluded Socrates, "appear satisfactory to you, endeavor, my excellent friend, to act upon them : for whatsoever of them you carry into execution, it will be an honor to yourself and an advantage to the state ; and if you fail in the attempt for want of power, you will neither injure the state nor disgrace yourself."

[1] The frontier of Attica was defended by the mountains Cithæron, Cerastes, and others. *Schneider.*

[2] Parnes, Brilessus, Hymettus, Laurium. *Schneider.* Also Lycabettus, Pentelicum, Corydalus. *Herbst.*

[3] The king of Persia. See, respecting the Pisidians, Anab. iii. 2 23 ; i. 1. 11.

CHAPTER VI.

Socrates, by his usual process of interrogation, leads Glaucon, a young man who was extravagantly desirous of a post in the government, to confess that he was entirely destitute of the knowledge necessary for the office to which he aspired. He then shows that, unless a ruler has acquired an exact knowledge of state affairs, he can do no good to his country or credit to himself.

1. WHEN Glaucon,[1] the son of Ariston, attempted to harangue the people, from a desire, though he was not yet twenty years of age,[2] to have a share in the government of the state, no one of his relatives, or other friends, could prevent him from getting himself dragged down from the tribunal, and making himself ridiculous; but Socrates, who had a friendly feeling toward him on account of Charmides[3] the son of Glaucon, as well as on account of Plato,[4] succeeded in prevailing on him, by his sole dissuasion, to relinquish his purpose.

2. Meeting him by chance, he first stopped him by addressing him as follows, that he might be willing to listen to him: "Glaucon," said he, "have you formed an intention to govern the state for us?" "I have, Socrates," replied Glaucon. "By Jupiter," rejoined Socrates, "it is an honorable office, if any other among men be so; for it is certain that, if you attain your object, you will be able yourself to secure whatever

[1] This Glaucon was the brother of Plato the philosopher. See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 66. On the other Glaucon, see iii. 7, 1. *Kühner.*

[2] Young men at Athens were allowed to assume the right of citizens, and take part in the government, on attaining their twenty-second year. *Sauppe.* See Schoemann de Comit. Athen. p. 76, 105.

[3] He is mentioned, iii. 7. 1.

[4] The philosopher, of whom Gellius (xiv. 13) denies that any mention is made in the writings of Xenophon. But Muretus has referred to this passage for a refutation of Gellius, Var. Lect. v. 14. *Schneider.* This question about the supposed enmity between Plato and Xenophon is learnedly and acutely considered by Boeckh in his treatise on the subject. Cobet, too, in his Prosopogr. Xen. p. 28, thinks that the belief of their rivalry rests on no good foundation, and ought to be rejected. *Kühner.*

you may desire, and will be in a condition to benefit your friends; you will raise your father's house, and increase the power of your country; you will be celebrated, first of all in your own city, and afterward throughout Greece, and perhaps also, like Themistocles, among the Barbarians, and, wherever you may be, you will be an object of general admiration."

3. Glaucon, hearing this, was highly elated, and cheerfully staid to listen. Socrates next proceeded to say, "But it is plain, Glaucon, that if you wish to be honored, you must benefit the state." "Certainly," answered Glaucon. "Then, in the name of the gods," said Socrates, "do not hide from us how you intend to act, but inform us with what proceeding you will begin to benefit the state?"

4. But as Glaucon was silent, as if just considering how he should begin, Socrates said, "As, if you wished to aggrandize the family of a friend, you would endeavor to make it richer, tell me whether you will in like manner also endeavor to make the state richer?" "Assuredly," said he.

5. "Would it then be richer, if its revenues were increased?" "That is at least probable," said Glaucon. "Tell me then," proceeded Socrates, "from what the revenues of the state arise, and what is their amount; for you have doubtless considered, in order that if any of them fall short, you may make up the deficiency, and that if any of them fail, you may procure fresh supplies." "These matters, by Jupiter," replied Glaucon, "I have not considered."

6. "Well then," said Socrates, "if you have omitted to consider this point, tell me at least the annual expenditure of the state; for you undoubtedly mean to retrench whatever is superfluous in it." "Indeed," replied Glaucon, "I have not yet had time to turn my attention to that subject." "We will therefore," said Socrates, "put off making our state richer for the present; for how is it possible for him who is ignorant of its expenditure and its income to manage those matters?"

7. "But, Socrates," observed Glaucon, "it is possible

to enrich the state at the expense of our enemies." "Extremely possible, indeed," replied Socrates, "if we be stronger than they; but if we be weaker, we may lose all that we have." "What you say is true," said Glaucon.

8. "Accordingly, said Socrates, "he who deliberates with whom he shall go to war, ought to know the force both of his own country and of the enemy, so that, if that of his own country be superior to that of the enemy, he may advise it to enter upon the war, but, if inferior, may persuade it to be cautious of doing so." "You say rightly," said Glaucon.

9. "In the first place, then," proceeded Socrates, "tell us the strength of the country by land and sea, and next that of the enemy." "But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Glaucon, "I should not be able to tell you on the moment, and at a word." "Well, then, if you have it written down," said Socrates, "bring it, for I should be extremely glad to hear what it is." "But to say the truth," replied Glaucon, "I have not yet written it down."

10. "We will therefore put off considering about war for the present," said Socrates, "for it is very likely that, on account of the magnitude of those subjects, and as you are just commencing your administration, you have not yet examined into them. But to the defense of the country, I am quite sure that you have directed your attention, and that you know how many garrisons are in advantageous positions, and how many not so, what number of men would be sufficient to maintain them, and what number would be insufficient, and that you will advise your countrymen to make the garrisons in advantageous positions stronger, and to remove the useless ones."

11. "By Jove," replied Glaucon, "I shall recommend them to remove them all, as they keep guard so negligently, that the property is secretly carried off out of the country." "Yet, if we remove the garrisons," said Socrates, "do you not think that liberty will be given to any body that pleases to pillage? But," added he, "have you gone personally, and examined as to this

fact, or how do you know that the garrisons conduct themselves with such negligence?" "I form my conjectures," said he. "Well then," inquired Socrates, "shall we settle about these matters also, when we no longer rest upon conjecture, but have obtained certain knowledge?" "Perhaps that," said Glaucon, "will be the better course."

12. "To the silver mines, however," continued Socrates, "I know that you have not gone, so as to have the means of telling us why a smaller revenue is derived from them than came in some time ago." "I have not gone thither," said he. "Indeed the place," said Socrates, "is said to be unhealthy, so that, when it is necessary to bring it under consideration, this will be a sufficient excuse for you." "You jest with me,"[1] said Glaucon.

13. "I am sure, however," proceeded Socrates, "that you have not neglected to consider, but have calculated, how long the corn, which is produced in the country, will suffice to maintain the city, and how much it requires for the year, in order that the city may not suffer from scarcity[2] unknown to you, but that, from your own knowledge, you may be able, by giving your advice concerning the necessaries of life, to support the city, and preserve it." "You propose a vast field for me," observed Glaucon, "if it will be necessary for me to attend to such subjects."

14. "Nevertheless," proceeded Socrates, "a man can not order his house properly, unless he ascertains all that it requires, and takes care to supply it with every thing necessary; but since the city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and since it is difficult to provide for so many at once, how is it that you have not tried to aid one first of all, suppose that of your

[1] Σκώπτομαι.] "I am jested with." This is the reading of five manuscripts; one gives σκέφομαι, which has been adopted by Ernesti, Schneider, and several other editors.

[2] Ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο γε λάθῃ αέ ποτε ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς γενομένη.] That is κατὰ τοῦτο. One manuscript exhibits τουτκῦ, which has been adopted by most editors. But Zeune refers to Cyrop. ii. 2. 1, and vi. 3. 1, for the examples of similar accusatives with ἐνδεής.

uncle,[1] for it stands in need of help? If you be able to assist that one, you may proceed to assist more; but if you be unable to benefit one, how will you be able to benefit many? Just as it is plain that, if a man can not carry the weight of a talent, he need not attempt to carry a greater weight."

15. "But I would improve my uncle's house," said Glaucon, "if he would but be persuaded by me." "And then," resumed Socrates, "when you can not persuade your uncle, do you expect to make all the Athenians, together with your uncle, yield to your arguments?

16. Take care, Glaucon, lest, while you are eager to acquire glory, you meet with the reverse of it. Do you not see how dangerous it is for a person to speak of, or undertake, what he does not understand? Contemplate, among other men, such as you know to be characters that plainly talk of, and attempt to do, what they do not know, and consider whether they appear to you, by such conduct, to obtain more applause or censure, whether they seem to be more admired or despised?

17. Contemplate, again, those who have some understanding of what they say and do, and you will find, I think, in all transactions, that such as are praised and admired are of the number of those who have most knowledge, and that those who incur censure and neglect are among those that have least.

18. If therefore you desire to gain esteem and reputation in your country, endeavor to succeed in gaining a knowledge of what you wish to do; for if, when you excel others in this qualification, you proceed to manage the affairs of the state, I shall not wonder if you very easily obtain what you desire."

[1] Charmides. See iii. 7. 1. *Kühner.*

CHAPTER VII.

Socrates exhorts Charmides, a man of ability, and acquainted with public affairs, to take part in the government, that he may not be charged with indolence, sect. 1-4. As Charmides distrusts his abilities for public speaking, Socrates encourages him by various observations, 5-9.

1. OBSERVING that Charmides,[1] the son of Glaucon, a man of worth, and of far more ability than those who then ruled the state, hesitated to address the people, or to take part in the government of the city, he said to him, "Tell me, Charmides, if any man, who was able to win the crown in the public games,[2] and, by that means, to gain honor for himself, and make his birth-place more celebrated in Greece, should nevertheless refuse to become a combatant, what sort of person would you consider him to be?" "I should certainly think him indolent and wanting in spirit," replied Charmides.

2. "And if any one were able," continued Socrates, "by taking part in public affairs, to improve the condition of his country, and thus to attain honor for himself, but should yet shrink from doing so, might not he be justly regarded as wanting in spirit?" "Perhaps so," said Charmides; "but why do you ask me that question?" "Because," replied Socrates, "I think that you yourself, though possessed of sufficient ability, yet shrink from engaging even in those affairs in which it is your duty as a citizen to take a share."

3. "But in what transaction have you discovered my ability," said Charmides, "that you bring this charge against me?" "In those conferences," answered

[1] On Charmides, the son of Glaucon, a young man of great beauty and modesty, see Stallbaum's Prolegomena to Plato's Dialogue named from him; and Cobet in Prosop. p. 46. *Kühner.* The reader may find more about him in Xenophon's Symposium. "By Plato, in his Theages, t. i. p. 128, D., he is called ὁ καλός. He was one of the ten leaders at the Piræeus in the war with Thrasybulus against the Thirty Tyrants, in which he was killed. See Perizon. ad. Ælian, V. H. viii. 1." *Sturz.*

[2] Τοὺς στεφανίτας ἀγῶνας νικᾶν.] "To conquer in the crowned games," the games in which a crown was given as a prize.

Socrates, "in which you meet those who are engaged in the government of the state; for when they consult you on any point, I observe that you give them excellent advice, and that, when they are in any way in the wrong, you offer judicious objections."

4. "But it is not the same thing, Socrates," said he, "to converse with people in private, and to try one's powers at a public assembly." "Yet," said Socrates, "he that is able to count, can count with no less exactness before a multitude than alone, and those who can play the harp best in solitude are also the best performers on it in company."

5. "But do you not see," said Charmides, "that bashfulness and timidity are naturally inherent in mankind, and affect us far more before a multitude than in private conversations?" "But I am prompted to remind you," answered Socrates, "that while you neither feel bashfulness before the most intelligent, nor timid before the most powerful, it is in the presence of the most foolish and weak that you are ashamed to speak.

6. And is it the fullers among them, or the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the copper-smiths, or the ship-merchants,[1] or those who barter in the market, and meditate what they may buy for little and sell for more, that you are ashamed to address? For it is of all such characters that the assembly is composed.

7. How then do you think that your conduct differs from that of a wrestler, who, being superior to well-practiced opponents, should yet fear the unpracticed? For is not this the case with you, that though you converse at your ease with those who have attained eminence in state affairs, and of whom some undervalue you, and though you are far superior to many who make it their business to address the people, you yet shrink from uttering your sentiments before men who have never thought of political affairs, and who have shown no disrespect for your talents, from an apprehension that you may be laughed at?"

[1] Ἐμπόρους.] The ἔμποροι were merchants who traded by sea, and are opposed to "those who barter in the forum," mentioned immediately afterward. See Schneider ad Cyrop. iv. 5, 42. *Kühner.*

8. "And do not the people in the assembly," asked Charmides, "appear to you often to laugh at those who speak with great judgment?" "Yes," said Socrates, "and so do the other sort of people;[1] and therefore I wonder at you, that you so easily silence one class of persons when they do so, and yet think that you shall not be able to deal with another?

9. Be not ignorant of yourself,[2] my friend, and do not commit the error which the majority of men commit; for most persons, though they are eager to look into the affairs of others, give no thought to the examination of their own. Do not you, then, neglect this duty, but strive more and more to cultivate your own powers; and do not be regardless of the affairs of your country, if any department of them can be improved by your means; for, if they are in a good condition, not only the rest of your countrymen, but your own friends and yourself, will reap the greatest benefit."

CHAPTER VIII.

Socrates meets the captious question of Aristippus about goodness and beauty in such a manner as to show that nothing is good or bad in itself, but only with reference to some objects, sect. 1–3; and that nothing is beautiful or otherwise in itself, but that the beautiful must be considered with regard to the useful, 4–7. His remarks on buildings, to the same effect, 8–10.

1. WHEN Aristippus attempted to confute Socrates, as he himself had previously[3] been confuted by him, Socrates, wishing to benefit those who were with him, gave his answers, not like those who are on their guard lest their words be perverted,[4] but like those who are

[1] Οἱ ἕτεροι.] Meaning those, says Kühner, with whom he is mentioned as discoursing in sect. 3.

[2] Ernesti refers to a passage in Cicero ad Quintum Fratrem, iii. 6, in which he seems to have had Xenophon in his mind: *Cessator esse noli; et illud γνῶθι σεαυτὸν noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solùm esse dictum, verùm etiam ut bona nostra nôrimus.*

[3] Book ii. c. 1.

[4] Not being at all afraid lest he should give any answer which might, from some ambiguity in it, be wrested to mean, apparently,

persuaded that they ought[1] above all things to do what is right.

2. What Aristippus had asked him, was, "whether he knew any thing good," in order that if he should say any such thing as food, or drink, or money, or health, or strength, or courage, he might prove that it was sometimes an evil. But Socrates, reflecting that if anything troubles us, we want something to relieve us from it, replied, as it seemed best to do,[2] "Do you ask me whether I know any thing good for a fever?"

3. "I do not." "Any thing good for soreness of the eyes?" "No." "For hunger?" "No, nor for hunger either." "Well then," concluded Socrates, "if you ask me whether I know any thing good that is good for nothing, I neither know any thing, nor wish to know."

4. Aristippus again asking him if he knew any thing beautiful, he replied, "Many things." "Are they then," inquired Aristippus, "all like each other?" "Some of them," answered Socrates, "are as unlike one another as it is possible for them to be." "How then," said he, "can what is beautiful be unlike what is beautiful?" "Because, assuredly," replied Socrates, "one man, who is beautifully formed for wrestling, is unlike another who is beautifully formed for running; and a shield, which is beautifully formed for defense, is as unlike as possible to a dart, which is beautifully formed for being forcibly and swiftly hurled."

5. "You answer me," said Aristippus, "in the same manner as when I asked you whether you knew any thing good." "And do you imagine," said Socrates, "that the good is one thing, and the beautiful another? Do you not know that with reference to the same ob-

what he did not intend, or of which his adversary might take advantage to entrap him. See Aristot. Pol. i. 2. 17. Schneider and Kühner acquiesce in this sense of the word ἐπαλλάττειν.

[1] With the word πράττειν in the text the word δεῖν seems to be wanting.

[2] Ἀπεκρίνατο ὥσπερκαὶ ποιεῖν κράτιστον.] It is well known that the word ποιεῖν, like the Latin *facere*, and the German *thun*, is often made to do duty for another verb. See Passow's Gr. Lex. v. ποιεῖν, and my note on Cic. Tusc. Quæst. iv. 14. 31. *Kühner.*

jects all things are both beautiful and good? Virtue, for instance, is not good with regard to some things and beautiful with regard to others; and persons, in the same way, are called beautiful and good with reference to the same objects; and human bodies, too, with reference to the same objects, appear beautiful and good; and in like manner all other things, whatever men use, are considered beautiful and good with reference to the objects for which they are serviceable."

6. "Can a dung-basket, then," said Aristippus, "be a beautiful thing?" "Yes, by Jupiter," returned Socrates, "and a golden shield may be an ugly thing, if the one be beautifully formed for its particular uses, and the other ill formed?"

7. "Do you say then, that the same things may be both beautiful and ugly?" "Yes, undoubtedly, and also that they may be good and bad; for oftentimes what is good for hunger is bad for fever, and what is good for a fever is bad for hunger; oftentimes what is beautiful in regard to running is the reverse in regard to wrestling, and what is beautiful in regard to wrestling is the reverse in regard to running; for whatever is good is also beautiful, in regard to purposes for which it is well adapted, and whatever is bad is the reverse of beautiful, in regard to purposes for which it is ill adapted."

8. When Socrates said, too, that the same houses that were beautiful were also useful, he appeared to me to instruct us what sort of houses we ought to build. He reasoned on the subject thus. "Should not he, who purposes to have a house such as it ought to be contrive that it may be most pleasant, and at the same time most useful, to live in?"

9. This being admitted, he said "Is it not then pleasant to have it cool in summer, and warm in winter?" When his hearers had assented to this, he said, "In houses, then, that look to the south, does not the sun, in the winter, shine into the porticoes, while in the summer, it passes over our heads, and above the roof,

and casts a shade? If it is well, therefore, that houses should thus be made,[1] ought we not to build the parts toward the south higher, that the sun in winter may not be shut out, and the parts towards the north lower, that the cold winds may not fall violently on them?[2]

10. To sum up the matter briefly, that would be the most pleasant and the most beautiful residence, in which the owner, at all seasons, would find the most satisfactory retreat, and deposit what belongs to him with the greatest safety."

Paintings, and colored decorations of the walls,[3] deprive us, he thought, of more pleasure than they give.

[1] That is, so as to be cool in summer and warm in winter.

[2] Of this passage no satisfactory explanation has yet been given. Kühner contents himself with adducing, without any remark, the comment of Lange: "As far as the summer is concerned, the position of a house (in Greece) need not be considered, whether it looks to the south or any other quarter of the heaven; for it must be shady in the hottest season of the year, when, indeed, the sun sends down its rays almost perpendicularly, and makes a shade in whatever position the house may be. (Umbrosa tamen sit fervidissimo anni tempore, sole nimirum radios suos rectis lineis deorsum mittente, et in quovis domûs situ umbram efficiente). In building a house (in Greece), therefore, it is necessary to take thought only for the winter, that at that season of the year the house may be as warm as possible. To effect this object, let one row of buildings (una domorum series) face the south, and the other the north, in such a way, that those looking toward the south may be higher than those looking in the opposite direction; for thus the higher will enjoy the sun in winter, and the lower, facing the north, will be defended from the winds blowing from that quarter." (The part near *umbrosa tamen sit* seems to be defective, or incorrect in some way.) But to me the text seems capable of explanation only on the supposition that Socrates is speaking with reference to the porticoes or colonnades merely, as we can easily conceive why he should recommend porticoes toward the south to be made high, in order to admit the sun in winter (the summer sun, as Lange remarks, being not at all regarded), and those toward the north to be made low, in order to exclude, in some degree, the keen north winds. Thus Columella, R. R. i. 6. 2, says, *Ambulationes meridiano æquinoctiali subjectæ sint, ut hieme plurimum solis et æstate minimum recipiant;* a passage which Schneider says is not to be compared with this of Xenophon; but it might not be very difficult to prove the contrary.

[3] Ποικιλίαι.] Ralph Rochet, cited by G. Hermann in Opusc. vol. v. p. 221, thinks that by ποικιλίαι are to be understood those colored ornaments on walls which are called ποικίλματα by Xenophon, Œcon. ix. 2, and by Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 298, A. *Kühner:* who gives the following reason for the disapprobation which Socrates

The most suitable ground for temples and altars,[1] he said, was such as was most open to view, and least trodden by the public; for that it was pleasant for people to pray as they looked on them, and pleasant to approach them in purity.[2]

CHAPTER IX.

Various definitions of *fortitude*, *prudence* and *temperance*, *madness*, *envy*, *idleness*, *command*, *happiness*, given by Socrates. *Fortitude* is not equal in all men; it may be increased by exercise, sect. 1–3. *Prudence* and *temperance* not distinct from each other, 4. Justice, as well as other virtues, is wisdom, 5. The opposite to prudence is *madness*; ignorance distinct from madness, 6, 7. *Envy* is uneasiness of mind at the contemplation of the happiness of others, 8. *Idleness* is forbearance from useful occupation, 9. *Command* is exercised, not by those who bear the name, merely, of kings and rulers, but by those who know how to command, 10–13. The best object of human life is *to act well*; the difference between *acting well* and *acting fortunately*, 14, 15.

1. BEING asked, again, whether *Fortitude* was a quality acquired by education, or bestowed by nature, "I think," said he, "that as one body is by nature stronger for enduring toil than another body, so one

expresses of them: "That those ornaments might not be injured by the rays of the sun, the parts of the house in which they were, were so constructed as not to face the sun; and thus the inmates, in winter, were deprived of the heat of the sun (tali modo homines hiberno tempore solis calore privabantur), and exposed to the cold winds from the north."

[1] Altars and temples, and especially temples, were surrounded with a wall, within which was an area, the view across which was intercepted by a thick grove or some considerable number of trees. Of these obstructions to the view, Socrates disapproves, wishing the site of the temple to be ἐμφανεστάτη, fully open to the sight, as if the worshippers would then fancy that they saw as it were the deity before them, and would suppose that their prayers would thus be better received by him. *Weiske.* Others suppose that Socrates merely wished that temples and altars should be built on high grounds; an opinion which is equally defensible. *Kühner.*

[2] That is, as Schutz suggests, that they might not have to go through a crowd, in which they might encounter polluted persons, and be defiled by them.

mind may be by nature more courageous in meeting dangers than another mind; for I see that men who are brought up under the same laws and institutions differ greatly from each other in courage.

2. "I am of opinion, however, that every natural disposition may be improved, as to fortitude, by training and exercise; for it is evident that the Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bucklers and spears and fight with the Lacedæmonians; and it is certain that the Lacedæmonians would not like to fight the Thracians with small shields and javelins, or the Scythians with bows.

3. "In other things, also, I see that men differ equally from one another by nature, and make great improvements by practice; from which it is evident that it concerns all, as well the naturally ingenious as the naturally dull, to learn and study those arts in which they desire to become worthy of commendation."

4. *Prudence* and *Temperance*[1] he did not distinguish, for he deemed that he who knew what was honorable and good, and how to practice it, and who knew what was dishonorable, and how to avoid it, was both prudent and temperate. Being also asked whether he thought that those who knew what they ought to do, but did the contrary, were prudent and temperate, he replied, "No more than I think the [openly] imprudent and intemperate to be so;[2] for I consider that all [prudent and temperate] persons choose from what is possible what they judge for their interest, and do it; and I therefore deem those who do not act [thus] judiciously to be neither prudent nor temperate."

5. He said, too, that justice, and every other virtue,

[1] Σοφίαν καὶ σπφροσύνην οὼ διώριζεν.] Σοφία, wisdom or prudence, is as Kühner remarks, right judgment about what ought to be done; σωφθοσύνη is temperance, self-control, or self-regulation, in acting. The word σοφία is used in another sense in iv. 6. 7. "This subject, in conformity with the opinion of Socrates, is discussed in Plato's Charmides, ubi pariter *temperantia scientiâ* contineri demonstratur." See Stallbaum on that Dialogue, p. 81, seqq. *Kühner.*

[2] Ii, qui sciunt quidem bona, sed contraria faciunt, nihilo magis sapientes et temperantes sunt quàm ii qui sunt insipientes et intemperantes. *Kühner.* The words in brackets are supplied as being necessary to the translation.

was [a part of] prudence, for that every thing just, and every thing done agreeably to virtue, was honorable and good; that those who could discern those things, would never prefer any thing else to them; that those who could not discern them, would never be able to do them, but would even go wrong if they attempted to do them; and that the prudent, accordingly, did what was honorable and good, but that the imprudent could not do it, but went wrong even if they attempted to do it; and that since, therefore, all just actions, and all actions that are honorable and good, are done in agreement with virtue, it is manifest that justice, and every other virtue, is [comprehended in] prudence.

6. The opposite to prudence, he said, was *Madness*;[1] he did not, however, regard ignorance as madness; though for a man to be ignorant of himself, and to fancy and believe that he knew what did he not know, he considered to be something closely bordering on madness. The multitude, he observed, do not say that those are mad who make mistakes in matters of which most people are ignorant, but call those only mad who make mistakes in affairs with which most people are acquainted.

7. For if a man should think himself so tall as to stoop when going through the gates in the city wall, or so strong as to try to lift up houses, or attempt any thing else that is plainly impossible to all men, they say that he is mad; but those who make mistakes in small matters are not thought by the multitude to be

[1] Μανία, madness or insanity, is, according to the definition of Socrates, the contrary to wisdom or prudence, σοφία. Madness is, therefore, ignorance of the virtues of justice, temperance, and fortitude; for prudence is manifested in the knowledge of these virtues. But the source and foundation, as it were, of prudence, is the knowledge of one's self. He, therefore, that is destitute of this knowledge of himself is bordering on madness. The multitude, however, do not, like Socrates, consider ignorance of virtue to be madness, but apply that term only to gross ignorance or misconduct with regard to other matters. *Kühner.*

"Aristotle is praised for naming Fortitude first of the cardinal virtues, as that without which no other virtue can steadily be practiced; but he might, with equal propriety, have placed Prudence and Justice before it, since, *without Prudence* Fortitude *is mad*; without Justice, it is mischievous. *Johnson, Life of Pope.*

mad; but just as they call "strong desire" "love," so they call "great disorder of intellect" "madness."

8. Considering what *Envy* was, he decided it to be a certain uneasiness, not such as arises, however, at the ill success of friends, nor such as is felt at the good success of enemies, but those only, he said, were envious who were annoyed at the good success of their friends. When some expressed surprise that any one who had a friendly feeling for another should feel uneasy at his good fortune, he reminded them that many are so disposed toward others as to be incapable of neglecting them if they are unfortunate, but would relieve them in ill fortune, though they are uneasy at their good fortune. This feeling, he said, could never arise in the breast of a sensible man, but that the foolish were constantly affected with it.

9. Considering what *Idleness* was, he said that he found most men did something; for that dice-players and buffoons did something; but he said that all such persons were idle, for it was in their power to go and do something better; he observed that a man was not idle, however, in passing from a better employment to a worse, but that, if he did so, he, as he [previously] had occupation, acted in that respect viciously.

10. *Kings* and *Commanders*, he said, were not those, who held scepters merely, or those elected by the multitude, or those who gained authority by lot, or those who attained it by violence or deceit, but those who knew how to command.

11. For when some admitted that it was the part of a commander to enjoin what another should do, and the part of him who was commanded, to obey, he showed that in a ship the skillful man is the commander, and that the owner and all the other people in the ship were obedient to the man of knowledge; that, in agriculture, those who had farms, in sickness, those who were ill, in bodily exercises, those who practiced them, and indeed all other people, who had any business requiring care, personally took the management of it if they thought that they understood it, but if not, that they were not only ready to obey men of knowl-

edge who were present, but even sent for such as were absent, in order that, by yielding to their directions, they might do what was proper. In spinning, too, he pointed out that women commanded men, as the one knew how to spin, and the other did not know.

12. But if any one remarked in reply to these observations, that a tyrant is at liberty not to obey judicious advisers, he would say, "And how is he at liberty not to obey, when a penalty hangs over him that does not obey a wise monitor? for in whatever affair a person does not obey a prudent adviser, he will doubtless err, and, by erring, will incur a penalty."

13. If any one also observed that a tyrant might put to death a wise counselor, "And do you think," he would say, "that he who puts to death the best of his allies will go unpunished, or that he will be exposed only to casual punishment? Whether do you suppose that a man who acts thus would live in safety, or would be likely, rather, by such conduct, to bring immediate destruction on himself?"

14. When some one asked him what object of study he thought best for a man, he replied, "good conduct." When he asked him again whether he thought "good fortune" an object of study, he answered, "'Fortune' and 'Conduct' I think entirely opposed; for, for a person to light on any thing that he wants without seeking it, I consider to be 'good fortune,' but to achieve any thing successfully by learning and study, I regard as 'good conduct;' and those who make this their object of study appear to me to do well."

15. The best men, and those most beloved by the gods, he observed, were those who, in agriculture, performed their agricultural duties well, those who, in medicine, performed their medical duties well, those who, in political offices, performed their public duties well; but he who did nothing well, he said, was neither useful for any purpose, nor acceptable to the gods.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates was desirous to benefit artisans by discoursing with them on the principles of their several arts. Of painting, sect. 1. Of representing perfect beauty, 2. Of expressing the affections of the mind, 3–5. Of statuary, 6–8. In what the excellence of a corselet consists, 9–15.

1. WHENEVER he conversed with any of those who were engaged in arts or trades, and who wrought at them for gain, he proved of service to them. Visiting Parrhasius [1] the painter one day, and entering into conversation with him, he said, "Pray, Parrhasius, is not painting the representation of visible objects? At least you represent substances, imitating them by means of color, whether they be concave, or convex, dark or light, hard or soft, rough or smooth, fresh or old." "What you say is true," said Parrhasius.

2. "And when you would represent beautiful figures, do you, since it is not easy to find one person with every part perfect, select, out of many, the most beautiful parts of each, and thus represent figures beautiful in every part?" "We do so," said he.

3. "And do you also," said Socrates, "give imitations of the disposition of the mind, as it may be most persuasive, most agreeable, most friendly, most full of regret, or most amiable? Or is this inimitable?" "How can that be imitated, Socrates," said he, "which has neither proportion, nor color, nor any of the qualities which you just now mentioned, and is not even a visible object?" [2]

4. "Is it not often observable in a man that he regards others with a friendly or unfriendly look?" "I think so," said he. "Is this then possible to be copied in the eyes?" "Assuredly." "And at the good or ill fortune

[1] It is to be remembered that this celebrated painter, when Socrates held this conversation with him, was then young, and that it was not till after the death of Socrates, Olymp. xcv. 1, that he acquired a great name in his art. *Kühner.*

[2] Ὁρατόν.] Not an object which you can represent by its shape, as a tree, or a house.

of people's friends, do those who are affected at it, and those who are not, appear to you to have the same sort of look?" "No, indeed; for they look cheerful at their good, and sad at their evil, fortune." "Is it possible, then, to imitate these looks?" "Unquestionably."

5. "Surely, also, nobleness and generosity of disposition, meanness and illiberality, modesty and intelligence, insolence and stupidity, show themselves both in the looks, and gesture of men, whether they stand or move." "What you say is just." "Can these peculiarities be imitated?" "Certainly." "Whether, then," said Socrates, "do you think that people look with more pleasure on paintings in which beautiful, and good, and lovely characters are exhibited, or those in which the deformed, and evil, and detestable are represented?" "There is a very great difference indeed, Socrates," replied Parrhasius.[1]

6. Going once, too. into the workshop of Cleito,[2] the statuary, and beginning to converse with him, he said, "I see and understand, Cleito, that you make figures of various kinds, runners and wrestlers, pugilists and pancratiasts, but how do you put into your statues that which most wins the minds of the beholders through the eye, the life-like appearance?"

7. As Cleito hesitated, and did not immediately answer, Socrates proceeded to ask, "Do you make your statues appear more life-like by assimilating your work to the figures of the living?" "Certainly," said he. "Do you not then make your figures appear more like reality, and more striking, by imitating the parts of the body, that are drawn up or drawn down, compressed or spread out, stretched or relaxed, by the gesture?" "Undoubtedly," said Cleito. "And the representation of the passions of men engaged in any act, does it not excite a certain pleasure in the spectators?" "It is natural, at least, that it should be so," said he.

[1] The admonition which Socrates wished to convey to Parrhasius was, as Schneider thinks, that he should exercise his pencil in representing rather what was fair and lovely than what was deformed and repulsive.

[2] He is nowhere else mentioned. *Kühner.*

"Must you not, then, copy the menacing looks of combatants? And must you not imitate the countenance of conquerors, as they look joyful?" "Assuredly," said he. "A statuary, therefore," concluded Socrates, "must express the workings of the mind by the form."

9. Entering the shop of Pistias,[1] a corselet-maker, and Pistias having shown him some well-made corselets, Socrates observed, "By Juno, Pistias, this is an excellent invention, that the corselets should cover[2] those parts of a man's body that need protection, and yet should not hinder him from using his hands.

10. But tell me, Pistias," he added, "why do you sell your corselets at a higher price than other makers, though you neither make them stronger nor of more costly materials?" "Because, Socrates," said he, "I make them better proportioned." "And do you make this proportion appear in the measure or weight of your corselets, that you set a higher price on them? For I suppose that you do not make them all equal or similar, if you make them to fit different persons." "Indeed," replied he, "I do make them to fit, for there would be no use in a corselet without that quality."

11. "Are not then," said Socrates, "the bodies of some men well-proportioned, and those of others ill proportioned?" "Certainly," said Pistias. "How, then," asked Socrates, "do you make a well-proportioned corselet fit an ill-proportioned body?" "As I make it fit," answered Pistias; "for one that fits is well proportioned."

12. "You seem to me," said Socrates, "to speak of proportion considered not independently, but with respect to the wearer, as if you should say of a shield, or a cloak, that it is well proportioned to him whom it suits; and such appears to be the case with regard to other things, according to what you say.

13. But, perhaps, there may be some other considerable advantage attendant on being made to fit." Tell

[1] He seems to be the same that is called Πίστων in Athenæus, iv. 20 *Sturz.*

[2] Τῷ——σκεπάζειν τὸν θώρακα] "In that the corselet should cover," etc. Many editions have τὸ, with which must be understood διά.

me, Socrates," said he, "if you know any." "Those corselets which fit," answered Socrates, "are less oppressive by their weight, than those which do not fit, though they be both of equal weight; while those which do not fit, are, either from hanging wholly on the shoulders, or from pressing heavily on some other part of the body, inconvenient and uneasy; but those which fit, as they distribute their weight partly over the collar-bone[1] and shoulder, partly over the upper part of the arm, and partly over the breast, back, and stomach, appear almost like, not a burden to be borne, but a natural appendage."

14. "You have hit upon the very quality," said Pistias, "for which I consider my manufacture deserving of the very highest price; some, however, prefer purchasing ornamented and gilded corselets." "Yet if on this account," said Socrates, "they purchase such as do not fit, they appear to me to purchase an ornamented and gilded annoyance. But," added he, "since the body does not continue always in the same position, but is at one time bent, and at another straight, how can a corselet, which is exactly fitted to it, suit it?" "It cannot by any means," said Pistias. "You mean, therefore," said Socrates, "that it is not those which are exactly fitted to the body that suit, but those that do not gall in the wearing." "You say what is clearly the case, Socrates," replied he, "and exactly comprehend the matter."

CHAPTER XI.

The visit of Socrates to Theodota, and his discourse with her, sect. 1–9. He tells her that true friends are not acquired without the manifestation of kind and good feelings, 9–12. He reminds her that in gratifying the appetites we must guard against satiety, 13, 14. His jests on taking leave of her, 15–18.

1. THERE being at one time a beautiful woman in the city, whose name was Theodota,[2] a woman ready to

[1] Ὑπο τῶν κλειδῶν, κ. τ. λ.] The preposition ὑπὸ is used because the idea of *being borne* must be kept in the mind. *Kühner.*

[2] This passage is cited by Athenæus, v. p. 200, F. Theodota was

form a connection with any one that made advances to her, and somebody in company with Socrates making mention of her, and saying that her beauty was beyond description, and that painters went to her to take her portrait, to whom she showed as much of her person as she could with propriety, "We ought then to go and see her," remarked Socrates, "for it is not possible to comprehend by hearing that which surpasses description." "You cannot be too quick in following me, then," said he who had mentioned her.

2. Going, accordingly, to the house of Theodota, and finding her standing to a painter, they contemplated her figure; and when the painter had left off, Socrates said, "My friends, whether ought we to feel obliged to Theodota for having shown us her beauty, or she to us for having viewed it with admiration? If the exhibition be rather of advantage to her ought not she to feel grateful to us, or if the sight has given rather more pleasure to us, ought not we to feel grateful to her?"

3. Somebody saying that he spoke reasonably, he added, "She, then, for the present, gains praise from us, and, when we have spoken of her to others, will gain profit in addition; but as for us, we now desire to embrace what we have seen, and shall go away excited, and long for her after we are away from her; the natural consequence of which is that we shall be her adorers, and that she will be worshiped as our mistress." "If this be the case, indeed," said Theodota, "I must feel gratitude to you for coming to see me."

4. Soon after, Socrates, seeing her most expensively attired, and her mother with her in a dress and adornment above the common, with several handsome female attendants, not unbecomingly appareled, and her house richly furnished in other respects, said to her, "Tell me, Theodota, have you an estate?" "Not I, indeed," replied she. "But perhaps you have a house

afterward the mistress of Alcibiades, and covered his body with her garment when he was killed, and burned it, Athen. xiii. p. 574, F.; Corn. Nep. Vit. Alcib. Libanius mentions her among the most remarkable courtesans of Greece, tom. i. p. 582. In Ælian, V. H., xiii. 32, mention is made of Callisto, a courtesan, with whom Socrates conversed. *Schneider.*

that brings you an income?" "Nor a house either," said she. "Have you then any slaves that practice handicrafts?"[1] "No, nor any slaves." "How then," said Socrates, "do you procure subsistence?" "If any one becomes my friend," she replied, "and is willing to benefit me, he is my means of subsistence."

5. "By Juno, Theodota," rejoined Socrates, "and he is an excellent acquisition to you; and it is much better to have a flock of friends than of sheep, oxen, and goats. But," added he, "do you leave it to chance whether a friend, like a fly, shall wing his way to you, or do you use any contrivance to attract them?"

6. "And how," said she, "can I find a contrivance for such a purpose?" "Much more readily," said he, "than spiders can; for you know how they try to get subsistence; they weave fine nets, and feed upon whatever falls into them."

7. "And do you advise me, too," said she, "to weave a net?" "Yes," said he, "for you ought not to think that you will catch friends, the most valuable prey that can be taken, without art. Do you not see how many arts hunters use to catch hares,[2] an animal of but little worth?

8. As the hares feed in the night, they procure dogs for hunting by night, with which they chase them; as they conceal themselves in the day, they provide other dogs, which, perceiving by the smell the way that they have gone from their feeding place to their forms, trace them out; and as they are swift of foot, so as soon to escape from view by running, they procure also other dogs, of great speed, that they may be caught by pursuit; and because some of them escape even from these dogs, they stretch nets across the paths by which they flee, that they may fall into them and be entangled."

9. "By what art of this kind, then," said she, "can I catch friends?" "If," said he, "instead of a dog, you got somebody to track and discover the lovers of beauty,

[1] χειροτέχναι.] These were slaves trained to mechanical occupations, the owners of whom derived considerable income from their labors.

[2] Cyrop. i. 6. 40.

and the wealthy, and who, when he has found them, will contrive to drive them into your nets." "And what nets have I?" said she.

10. "You have one at least," he replied, "and one that closely embraces its prey, your person; and in it you have a mind, by which you understand how you may gratify a person by looking at him, and what you may say to cheer him, and learn that you ought to receive with transport him who shows concern for you, and to shut out him who is insolent, to attend carefully on a friend when he is ill, to rejoice greatly with him when he has succeeded in anything honorable, and to cherish affection in your whole soul for the man who sincerely cares for you. To love I am sure that you know, not only tenderly, but with true kindness of heart; and your friends try to please you, I know, because you conciliate them, not with words merely, but by your behavior toward them." "Indeed," replied Theodota, "I use none of these schemes."

11. "Yet," said Socrates, "it is of great importance to deal with a man according to his disposition, and with judgment; for by force you can neither gain nor keep a friend, but by serving and pleasing him the animal[1] is easily taken and attached to you." "What you say is true," said she.

12. "It becomes you, therefore," proceeded Socrates, "in the first place, to request of your lovers only such favors as they will perform with least cost to themselves; and you must then make a return by obliging them in a similar way;[2] for thus they will become most sincerely attached to you, and will love you longest, and benefit you most.

13. But you will please them most if you grant them favors only when they solicit them; for you see that even the most savory meats, if a person offer them to another before he has an appetite for them, appear to him distasteful; and in the satisfied they excite even

[1] Τὸ θηριον.] A word suitable to the illustrations which Socrates had previously given.

[2] That is, as freely as they oblige you; *not* at the least possible cost.

loathing; but if one offers food to another after having raised an appetite in him, it seems, though it be of a very ordinary kind, extremely agreeable."

14. "How then can I," said she, "excite such an appetite in any one of those that visit me?" "If, when they are satiated," said he, "you, in the first place, neither offer yourself to them, nor remind them of you, until, coming to an end of their satiety, they again feel a desire for you; and, when they do feel such desire, remind them of your fondness by the most modest address, and by showing yourself willing to gratify them, holding back at the same time, until they are filled with impatient longing; for it is far better to grant the same favors at such a time, than before they had an appetite for them."

15. "Why do not you, then, Socrates," said she, "become my helper in securing friends?" "I will indeed," said he, "if you can persuade me." "And how then," said she, "can I persuade you?" "You yourself will seek and find means to do so, if you should at all need me." "Come often to see me, then," said she.

16. Then Socrates, joking upon his own easy life, said, "But, Theodota, it is not easy for me to find leisure; for my own numerous occupations, private and public,[1] allow me no rest; and I have friends[2] also, who will not suffer me to leave them day or night, learning from me love-charms and incantations.

17. "Do you then know such arts, too, Socrates?" said Theodota. "Through what other influence do you suppose that Apollodorus[3] here, and Antisthenes,[4] never leave me! and through what other influence do you suppose that Cebes[5] and Simmias[5] came to me

[1] This mention of public employments is to be taken as a joke, as Weiske observes; for Socrates took no part in public employments, as is stated in i. 6. 15.

[2] Φίλαι.] He uses the feminine gender in jest, as if he had his φίλαι as Theodota had her φίλοι.

[3] He was a great admirer of Socrates, and constant attendant on him. Apol. Soc. c. 28. Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 63.

[4] Founder of the Cynics; he passed much of his time with Socrates: Sympos. iv. 44; Mem. ii. 5. 1. Both these men appear to have attended him in his visit to Theodota.

[5] Mentioned i. 2. 48.

from Thebes? Be assured, that such effects were not produced without many love-charms, incantations, and magic wheels."[1]

18. "Lend me, then, your magic wheel," said she, "that I may set it a going,[2] first of all, against yourself." "But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Socrates, "I do not wish that I should be drawn to you, but that you should come to me." "I will come then," said she, "only take care to let me in." "I will let you in," replied he, "if another more acceptable than you be not within."[3]

CHAPTER XII.

Socrates shows the benefit of gymnastic exercises, as well on the health of the mind as on that of the body, sect. 1-4. The advantages of health and vigor, 5-8.

1. NOTICING that Epigenes, one of his followers, was both very young and weak in body, he said to him, "How very unlike an athlete[4] you are in frame, Epigenes!" "I am not an athlete, Socrates," replied he. "You are not less of an athlete," rejoined Socrates, "than those who are going to contend at the Olympic games. Does the struggle for life with the enemy,

[1] Ἰύγγων.] The ἰύξ is a small bird that builds in hollow trees, and feeds on insects: it is called in Latin *torquilla*, in French *torcou*, in German *wendehals*, and in English *wry-neck*, from the incessant motion of its head. From this peculiarity the ancients believed that it had some magic power, and used it in incantations. They used to tie the bird to a wheel with four spokes, which they whirled round rapidly, chanting, at the same time, certain charms. Hence the wheel itself came to be called ἰυγξ. See Pind. Pyth. iv. 380; Æsch. Pers. 993; Theocr. ii. 17. *Schneider.*

[2] Ἕλκω.] The expression ἕλκειν ἰύγγα ἐπί τινα was a common one, says Schneider. "Ἕλκειν is used for *torquere*, in speaking of the magic wheel. So *tortus rhombus*, Ov. Amor. i. 8. 7; and *retro solvere turbinem*, Hor. Ep. xvii. 7." *Sturz.*

[3] Aptly and wittily said; for the excuse of the ἑταῖραι in shutting out their gallants was ἔνδον ἕτερος. Lucian, Dialog. Meretr. xii. p. 310; viii. p. 300. *Ruhnken.*

[4] Ὡς ἰδιωτικῶς—τὸ σῶμα ἔχεις.] *Quàm non athleticè corpore constitutus es!* Ἰδιώτης, one untrained in gymnastic exercises, was opposed to ἀσκητής, one trained in them. See iii. 7. 7.

which the Athenians will demand of you when circumstances require, seem to you to be a trifling contest?

2. Yet, in the dangers of war, not a few, through weakness of body, either lose their lives, or save them with dishonor; many, from the same cause, are taken alive, and, as prisoners of war, endure for the rest of their lives, if such should be their fate, the bitterest slavery; or, falling into the most grievous hardships, and paying for their ransom sometimes more than they possess, pass the remainder of their existence in want of necessaries, and in the endurance of affliction; and many, too, incur infamy, being thought to be cowards merely from the imbecility of their bodily frame.

3. Do you think lightly of such penalties attached to weakness of body, or do you expect that you will endure such calamities with ease? I believe that what one must bear who attends to the health of his body, is far lighter and more pleasant than such afflictions. Or do you suppose that an ill condition of body is more salutary and advantageous than a good condition? Or do you despise the benefits secured by a good state of the body?

4. Yet the lot which falls to those who have their bodies in good condition is exactly the reverse of that which falls to those who have them in ill condition; for those who have their bodies in a good state are healthy and strong; and many, from being possessed of this advantage, save themselves with honor amid the struggles of war, and escape every peril; many, also, assist their friends and benefit their country, and, for such services, are thought worthy of favor, acquire great glory, and attain the highest dignities; and, on these accounts, pass the rest of their lives with greater pleasure and honor, and bequeath finer fortunes [1] to their children.

5. Nor, because the city does not require warlike exercises publicly,[2] ought we, on that account, to neg-

[1] Ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸν βίον.] Supplies or incomes for living; means of life.

[2] Xenophon, in recording this censure on the Athenians, intends tacitly to praise the Lacedæmonians. See iii. 5. 15. *Weiske.* There

lect them privately, but rather to practise them the more ;[1] for be well assured that neither in any other contest, nor in any affair whatever, will you at all come off the worse because your body is better trained than that of other men ; since the body must bear its part in whatever men do ; and in all the services required from the body, it is of the utmost importance to have it in the best possible condition.

6. For even in that in which you think that there is least exercise for the body, namely, thinking, who does not know that many fail greatly from ill-health? and loss of memory, despondency, irritability, and madness, often, from ill-health of body, attack the mind with such force as to drive out all previous knowledge.

7. But to those who have their bodies in good condition, there is the utmost freedom from anxiety, and no danger of suffering any such calamity from weakness of constitution ; while it is likely, rather, that a healthy state of body will avail to produce consequences the reverse of those which result from an unhealthy state of it ; and, indeed, to secure consequences the reverse of what we have stated, what would a man in his senses not undergo?

8. It is disgraceful, too, for a person to grow old in self-neglect, before he knows what he would become by rendering himself well-formed and vigorous in body ; but this a man who neglects himself cannot know ; for such advantages are not wont to come spontaneously.

were at Athens, says Schneider, as in other states of Greece, ὁπλομάχοι, men who trained others in the exercise of arms ; but no such exercise was publicly required by law as at Lacedæmon.

[1] Μηδὲν ἧττον.] "Not less."

CHAPTER XIII.

veral brief sayings of Socrates. We should not be offended at rudeness of manner more than at personal defects, sect. 1. Fasting the best remedy for loathing of food. 2. We should not be too nice as to food or drink, 3. He that punishes his slave, should consider whether he himself deserves like punishment. 4. Admonitions to travellers, 5. It is disgraceful to him who has been trained in the gymnasium to be outdone by a slave in enduring toil, 6.

1. A PERSON being angry, because, on saluting another, he was not saluted in return, "It is an odd thing," id Socrates to him, "that if you had met a man ill-nditioned in body you would not have been angry, it to have met a man rudely disposed in mind pro-kes you."

2. Another person saying that he ate without pleas-re, "Acumenus,"[1] said Socrates, "prescribes an ex-llent remedy for that disease." The other asking, What sort of remedy?" "To abstain from eating," id Socrates; "for he says that, after abstaining, you ill live with more pleasure, less expense, and better ealth."

3. Another saying that the water which he had to rink at his house was warm, "When you wish to the in warm water, then," said Socrates, "it will be ady for you." "But it is too cold to bathe in," said e other. "Are your slaves, then," asked Socrates, inconvenienced by drinking or bathing in it?" No, by Jupiter," replied he; "for I have often won-red how cheerfully they use it for both those pur-ses." "And is the water in your house," said Soc-tes, "or that in the temple of Æsculapius,[2] the warmer r drinking?" "That at the temple of Æsculapius," plied he. "And which is the colder for bathing in,

[1] A physician of the time of Socrates, and one of his friends. e Plato, Phædr. p. 227, A., p. 268, A. B.; Symp. p. 176; Cobet, osopogr. Xen. p. 50.

[2] At Athens, Pausanias, Attic. c. 21, mentions that it was situate the way from the theatre to the Acropolis, and that there was a untain belonging to it; but says nothing of the nature of the ater. *Schneider.*

that at your house, or that in the temple of Amphiaraus?"[1] "That in the temple of Amphiaraus," said he. "Consider, then," said Socrates, "that you seem to be harder to please than your slaves or the sick."

4. Another person beating his attendant severely, Socrates asked him why he was so angry at the slave. "Because," said he, "he is very gluttonous and very stupid, very covetous and very idle." "And have you ever reflected," rejoined Socrates, "which of the two deserves the greater number of stripes, you or your slave?"

5. A person being afraid of the journey to Olympia, "Why," said Socrates to him, "do you fear the journey? Do you not walk about at home almost all day? And, if you set out thither, you will walk and dine, walk and sup, and go to rest. Do you not know that if you were to extend in a straight line the walks which you take in five or six days, you would easily go from Athens to Olympia? But it will be better for you to start a day too soon than a day too late; for to be obliged to extend your days' journeys beyond a moderate length is disagreeable; but to spend one day more on the road gives great ease; and it is better, therefore, to hasten to start than to hurry on the way."

6. Another saying that he was utterly wearied with a long journey, Socrates asked him whether he carried any burden. "No, by Jupiter," said he, "I did not, except my cloak." "And did you travel alone," said Socrates, "or did an attendant accompany you?" "An attendant was with me." "Was he empty-handed, or did he carry anything?" "He carried, certainly, the bedding[2] and other utensils." "And how did he get over the journey?" "He appeared to me to come off better than myself?" "If you, then, had been obliged to carry his burden, how do you imagine that you would have fared?" "Very ill, by Jupiter; or rather, I should not have been able to carry it at all." "And how can you think that it becomes a man trained to exercise to be so much less able to bear fatigue than a slave?"

[1] Between Potniæ and Thebes.

[2] Which slaves used to carry in a bag. See note on Anab. v. 4. 13.

CHAPTER XIV.

Table-talk of Socrates in praise of frugality. In contributions to feasts, one guest should not strive to surpass another in the quality or quantity of what he contributes, sect. 1. He may be called ὀψοφάγος, *flesh-eater*, who eats flesh alone, or with very little bread, 2–4. He that eats of many dishes at once acts foolishly in various ways, 5, 6. He may be truly said εὐωχεισθαι, *to banquet*, who lives on plain and wholesome food, 7.

1. When, among a number of persons who had met together to sup, some brought little meat, and others a great quantity, Socrates desired the attendant either to set the smallest dish on the table for common participation, or to distribute a portion of it to each. They, accordingly, who had brought a great deal, were ashamed not to partake of what was put on table for the company in general, and not, at the same time, to put their own on table in return. They therefore offered their own dishes for the participation of the company; and when they had no greater share than those who brought but little, they ceased to buy meat at great cost.

2. Observing one of those at table with him taking no bread, but eating meat by itself, and a discussion having arisen at the same time about names, for what cause any particular name was given, "Can we tell," said Socrates, "for what cause a man should be called ὀψωάγος?[1] For everybody eats flesh with his bread when he has it; but I do not suppose that people are called ὀψωάγοι on that account." "I should think not," said one of the company.

3. "But," said Socrates, "if a person should eat meat by itself without bread, not for the purpose of training,[2] but of gratifying his appetite, whether would he seem to be an ὀψωάγος or not?" "Scarcely any other would more justly seem so," said he. "And he that eats a great deal of meat with very little bread," said another, of the company, "what should he be called?" "To me,"

[1] *Flesh-eater.* From ὄψον, whatever was eaten with bread, and φαγεῖν, to eat.

[2] Ἀσκήσεως.] A word used to denote the *training* of the athletæ, who ate a great deal of flesh to strengthen them. See i. 2. 4; iii. 7. 7. *Kühner.*

replied Socrates, "it appears that he would justly be called ὀψοφάγος, and when other men pray to the gods for abundance of corn, he may pray for abundance of flesh."

4. When Socrates said this, the young man, thinking that the words were directed at him, did not indeed leave off eating meat, but took some bread with it. Socrates, observing him do so, said, "Notice this young man, you that sit near him, whether he takes bread to his meat, or meat to his bread."

5. Seeing another of the company taste of several dishes with the same piece of bread, "Can any cookery be more extravagant," said he, "or more adapted to spoil dishes, than that which he practices who eats of several at the same time, putting all manner of sauces into his mouth at once? For as he mixes together more ingredients than the cooks, he makes what he eats more expensive; and as he mixes what they forbear to mix as being incongruous, he, if they do right, is in the wrong, and renders their art ineffectual.

6. And how can it be otherwise than ridiculous," he added, "for a man to provide himself with cooks of the greatest skill, and then, though he pretends to no knowledge of their art, to undo what has been done by them? But there is another evil attendant on him who is accustomed to eat of several dishes at once; for, if he has not several sorts of meat before him, he thinks himself stinted, missing the variety to which he has been used. But he who is accustomed to make one piece of bread, and one piece of meat, go together, will be able to partake contentedly of one dish when several are just at hand."

7. He observed also that εὐωχεῖσθαι, "to fare well,"[1] was in the language of the Athenians called ἐσθίειν, "to eat;" and that the εὖ, "well," was added to denote that we should eat such food as would disorder neither mind nor body, and such as would not be difficult to be procured; so that he applied εὐωχεῖσθαι, "to fare well," to those who fared temperately.

[1] Εὐωχέω, quasi εὐοχέω, from εὖ and ὀχὴ, support, nourishment, from ἔχω: a derivation for which Kühner refers to Eustath. ad Il. ii. p. 212. 37: Ἀχαιοὶ τὴν τροφὴν ὀχὴν λέγτυρι.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates liked the society of young men ; how he judged of them ; his desire that they should be well educated, sect. 1, 2. The more powerful the mind in youth, the more likely it is, if ill trained, to run into vice, 3, 4. Happiness does not depend on riches, but on knowledge, and on being useful to our fellow-creatures, and gaining their esteem, 5.

1. So serviceable was Socrates to others, in every kind of transaction, and by every possible means, that to any one who reflects on his usefulness (even though he possess but moderate discernment), it is manifest that nothing was of greater benefit than to associate with Socrates, and to converse with him, on any occasion, or on any subject whatever ; since even the remembrance of him, when he is no longer with us, benefits in no small degree those who are accustomed to enjoy his society, and heard him with approbation ; for he sought to improve his associates not less in his humerous than in his serious conversation.

2. He would often say that he loved some particular person ; but he was evidently enamored, not of those formed by nature to be beautiful, but of those naturally inclined to virtue. He judged of the goodness of people's abilities from their quickness in learning the things to which they gave their attention, from their remembrance of what they learned, and from their desire for all those branches of knowledge by means of which it is possible to manage a family or an estate well, and to govern men and their affairs with success ; for he thought that such characters, when instructed, would not only be happy themselves, and regulate their own families judiciously, but would be able to render other men, and other communities beside their own happy.

3. He did not however make advances to all in the

same manner. Those who thought that they had good natural abilities, but despised instruction, he endeavored to convince that minds which show most natural power have most need of education, pointing out to them that horses of the best breed, which are high-spirited and obstinate, become, if they are broken in when young, most useful and valuable, but if they are left unbroken, remain quite unmanageable and worthless; and that hounds of the best blood, able to endure toil, and eager to attack beasts, prove, if they are well trained, most serviceable for the chase, and every way excellent, but, if untrained, are useless, rabid, and disobedient.

4. In like manner he showed that men of the best natural endowments, possessed of the greatest strength of mind, and most energetic in executing what they undertake, became, if well disciplined and instructed in what they ought to do, most estimable characters, and most beneficent to society (as they then performed most numerous and important services), but that, if uninstructed, and left in ignorance, they proved utterly worthless and mischievous; for that, not knowing what line of conduct they ought to pursue, they often entered upon evil courses, and, being haughty and impetuous, were difficult to be restrained or turned from their purpose, and thus occasioned very many and great evils.

5. But those who prided themselves on their wealth, and thought that they required no education, but imagined that their riches would suffice to effect whatever they desired, and to gain them honor from mankind, he tried to reduce to reason by saying that the man was a fool who thought that he could distinguish the good and the evil in life without instruction; and that he also was a fool who, though he could not distinguish them, thought that he would procure whatever he wished, and effect whatever was for his interest, by means of his wealth. He also said that the man was void of sense who, not being qualified to pursue what was for his good, fancied that he would be prosperous in the world, and that everything necessary for his comfort was fully, or at least sufficiently, provided for

him; and that he was equally void of sense who, though he knew nothing, thought that he would seem good for something because of his riches, and, though evidently despicable, would gain esteem through their influence.

CHAPTER II.

No dependence to be placed on natural abilities without education. Socrates proceeds to show Euthydemus, a self-conceited young man, that in every art it is proper to have recourse to instructors, sect. 1, 2. He shows the folly of a man who should pretend to have learned everything of himself, 3–5. The necessity of instruction in the art of government, 6, 7. By a long series of interrogations Socrates reduces Euthydemus to acknowledge his ignorance and incompetence, 8–23. The value of self-knowledge, 24–30. Further instructions given to Euthydemus, 30–40.

1. [1] I WILL now show how Socrates addressed himself to such as thought that they had attained the highest degree of knowledge, and prided themselves on their ability. Hearing that Euthydemus,[2] surnamed the Handsome, had collected many writings[3] of the most celebrated poets and sophists, and imagined that by that means he was outstripping his contemporaries in accomplishments, and had great hopes that he would excel them all in talent for speaking and acting, and finding, by his first inquiries about him, that he had not yet engaged in public affairs on account of his youth,[4] but that, when he wished to do any business,[5] he usually sat in a bridle-maker's shop near the Forum, he went himself to it, accompanied by some of his hearers.

[1] Schneider observes that this second chapter is but a continuation of the first, and ought not to be separated from it.

[2] The same that is mentioned i. 2. 29.

[3] Γράμματα.] They seem to be the same as συγγράμματα, or συγγεγραμμένα, moral precepts, reflections, and examples, extracted from different writers. See Bekker, Anecd, i. p. 31; and Bornemannad Cyrop. viii. 4. 16. *Kühner.*

[4] Being under twenty years of age. See iii. 6. 1.

[5] Τί—διαπράξασθαι.] He seems to have appointed the bridle-maker's shop as a place for meeting his friends, and for waiting for them, if they went away to do any business for him.

2. And as somebody asked, first of all "whether it was from his intercourse with some of the wise men, or from his own natural talents, that Themistocles attained such a pre-eminence above his fellow-citizens, that the republic looked to him whenever it wanted the service of a man of ability," Socrates, wishing to excite the attention of Euthydemus, said that "it was absurd to believe that men could not become skilled in the lowest mechanical arts without competent instructors, and to imagine that ability to govern a state, the most important of all arts, might spring up in men by the unassisted efforts of nature."

3. On another occasion, when Euthydemus was one of the company, and Socrates saw him leaving it, from apprehension lest he should seem to admire him for his wisdom, he observed, "It is evident, my friends, from the studies that he pursues, that Euthydemus here, when he comes of age, and the government give liberty of discussion [1] on any point, will not refrain from offering his counsel; and I imagine that he has already framed an exordium for his public oration, taking precaution that he may not be thought to have learned anything from anybody; and it is pretty certain, therefore, that when he begins to speak, he will make his opening thus:

4. "I, O men of Athens, have never learned anything from any person, nor, though I heard of some that were skilled in speaking and acting, have I sought to converse with them; nor have I been anxious that any one of the learned should become my master; but I have done the exact contrary; for I have constantly avoided not only learning anything from any one, but even the appearance of learning anything; nevertheless I will offer you such advice as may occur to me without premeditation."

5. "So it might be proper for a person to commence

[1] When the public crier called the people to an assembly, he gave notice that liberty would be granted to those who wished to speak on the subject of discussion: as in Demosth. de Cor. c. 53: τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται; and Aristoph. Acharn. 45. *Schneider.* Schoemann de Comitiis, ii. p. 104.

a speech who desired to obtain a medical appointment[1] from the government: 'I, O men of Athens, have never learned the medical art from any one, nor have been desirous that any physician should be my instructor; for I have constantly been on my guard, not only against learning anything of the art from any one, but even against appearing to have learned anything; nevertheless confer on me this medical appointment; for I will endeavor to learn by making experiments upon you.'" At this mode of opening a speech all who were present burst out into laughter.

6. As Euthydemus had now evidently begun to attend to what Socrates was saying, but was cautious of speaking himself, as thinking by his silence to clothe himself with reputation for modesty, Socrates, wishing to cure him of that fancy, said, "It is indeed strange that those who desire to play on the lyre, or on the flute, or to ride, or to become expert in any such accomplishment, should endeavor to practice, as constantly as possible, that in which they desire to excel, and not by themselves merely, but with the aid of such as are considered eminent in those attainments, attempting and undergoing every thing, so as to do nothing without their sanction, as supposing that they can by no other means attain reputation; but that of those who wish to become able to speak and act in affairs of government, some think that they will be suddenly qualified to achieve their object without preparation or study, and by their own unassisted efforts.

7. "Yet these pursuits are manifestly more difficult of attainment than those, inasmuch as of the very many who attempt them a much smaller number succeed in them; and it is evident, therefore, that those

[1] Ἰατρικὸν ἔργον.] Weiske supposes that there were two classes of medical men; some freemen, and others slaves; and that the better sort were appointed by the people at their assemblies, receiving a salary from the public treasury.

[2] To learn by making experiments on their patients medical men do not profess, yet it is what they secretly practise. *Discunt periculis nostris, et experimenta per mortes agunt*, as Pliny says, H. N. xxix. 1. *Schneider.*

who pursue the one are required to submit to longer and more diligent study than those who pursue the other."

8. Socrates used at first to make such remarks, while Euthydemus merely listened; but when he observed that he stayed, while he conversed, with more willingness, and hearkened to him with more attention, he at last came to the bridle-maker's shop unattended. As Euthydemus sat down beside him, he said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really, as I hear, collected many of the writings[1] of men who are said to have been wise." "I have indeed, Socrates," replied he, "and I am still collecting, intending to persevere till I get as many as I possibly can."

9. "By Juno," rejoined Socrates, "I feel admiration for you, because you have not preferred acquiring treasures of silver and gold rather than of wisdom; for it is plain you consider that silver and gold are unable to make men better, but that the thoughts of wise men enrich their possessors with virtue." Euthydemus was delighted to hear this commendation, believing that he was thought by Socrates to have sought wisdom in the right course.

10. Socrates, observing that he was gratified with the praise, said, "And, in what particular art do you wish to become skilful, that you collect these writings?" As Euthydemus continued silent, considering what reply he should make, Socrates again asked, "Do you wish to become a physician? for there are many writings of physicians." "Not I, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus. "Do you wish to become an architect, then? for a man of knowledge is needed for that art also."[2] "No, indeed," answered he. "Do you wish to become a good geometrician, like Theodorus?"[3] "Nor a geometrician either," said he. "Do you wish

[1] Γράμματα.] See note on sect. 1.

[2] Γνωμονικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ.] "There is need of a man of knowledge also for this art." Τοῦτο for κατὰ τοῦτο, for it cannot, as Kühner observes, be a nominative.

[3] Theodorus of Cyrene, the preceptor of Socrates in geometry, mentioned in the Theætetus of Plato. Comp. iv. 7, 3. *Schneider.* See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 32.

then to become an astronomer?" said Socrates. As Euthydemus said, "No," to this, "Do you wish then," added Socrates "to become a rhapsodist,"[1] for they say that you are in possession of all the poems of Homer?" "No, indeed," said he, "for I know that the rhapsodists, though eminently knowing in the poems of Homer, are, as men, extremely foolish."

11. "You are perhaps desirous, then," proceeded Socrates, "of attaining that talent by which men become skilled in governing states, in managing households, able to command, and qualified to benefit other men as well as themselves." "I indeed greatly desire," said he, "Socrates, to acquire that talent." "By Jupiter," returned Socrates, "you aspire to a most honorable accomplishment, and a most exalted art, for it is the art of kings, and is called the royal art. But," added he, "have you ever considered whether it is possible for a man who is not just to be eminent in that art?" "I have certainly," replied he: "and it is not possible for a man to be even a good citizen without justice."

12. "Have you, yourself, then, made yourself master of that virtue?" "I think," said he, "Socrates, that I shall be found not less just than any other man." "Are there then works of just men, as there are works of artisans?" "There are, doubtless," replied he. "Then," said Socrates, "as artisans are able to show their works, would not just men be able also to tell their works?" "And why should not I," asked Euthydemus, "be able to tell the works of justice: as also indeed those of injustice; for we may see and hear of no small number of them every day?"

13. "Are you willing then," said Socrates, "that we should make a *delta* on this side, and an *alpha*[2] on

[1] The rhapsodists, ῥαψῳδοί, were men who publicly recited epic verses, especially those of Homer. "The judgment here passed on the rhapsodists has reference to the period of Socrates only, not to preceding times, in which they were held in great honor. See Bornemann ad Symp. iii. 6. There is an elegant discussion on the rhapsodists by G. H. Bodius, in a work of much learning, entitled Gesch. der Heller. Dichtkunst. vol. i. p. 351, seqq. See Stallbaum ad Plato, Ion. p 285, F. A.; Wolf. Prolegom. in Hom. p. 99, seqq.; and Gr. Guil. Nitzsch in Quæst. Hom. P. iv. p. 13." *Kühner.*

[2] *Delta* for δίκαιος, "just;" *alpha* for ἄδικος, "unjust."

that, and then that we should put whatever seems to us to be a work of justice under the delta, and whatever seems to be a work of injustice under the *alpha?*" "If you think that we need those letters," said Euthydemus, "make them."

14. Socrates, having made the letters as he proposed, asked, "Does falsehood then exist among mankind?" "It does, assuredly," replied he. "Under which head shall we place it?" "Under injustice, certainly." "Does deceit also exist?" "Unquestionably." "Under which head shall we place that?" "Evidently under injustice." "Does mischievousness exist?" "Undoubtedly." "And the enslaving of men?" "That, too, prevails." "And shall neither of these things be placed by us, under justice, Euthydemus?" "It would be strange if they should be," said he.

15. "But," said Socrates, "if a man being chosen to lead an army, should reduce to slavery an unjust and hostile people, should we say that he committed injustice?" "No, certainly," replied he. "Should we not rather say that he acted justly?" "Indisputably." "And if, in the course of the war with them, he should practice deceit?" "That also would be just," said he. "And if he should steal and carry off their property, would he not do what was just?" "Certainly," said Euthydemus; but I thought at first that you asked these questions only with reference to our friends." "Then," said Socrates, "all that we have placed under the head of injustice, we must also place under that of justice?" "It seems so," replied Euthydemus.

16. "Do you agree, then," continued Socrates, "that, having so placed them, we should make a new distinction, that it is just to do such things with regard to enemies, but unjust to do them with regard to friends, and that toward his friends our general should be as guileless as possible?" "By all means," replied Euthydemus.

17. "Well, then," said Socrates, "if a general, seeing his army dispirited, should tell them, inventing a falsehood, that auxiliaries were coming, and should, by that invention, check the despondency of his troops, under

which head should we place such an act of deceit?" "It appears to me," said Euthydemus, "that we must place it under justice." "And if a father, when his son requires medicine, and refuses to take it, should deceive him, and give him the medicine as ordinary food, and, by adopting such deception, should restore him to health, under which head must we place such an act of deceit?" "It appears to me that we must put it under the same head." "And if a person, when his friend was in despondency, should, through fear that he might kill himself, steal or take away his sword, or any other weapon, under which head must we place that act?" "That, assuredly, we must place under justice."

18. "You say, then," said Socrates, "that not even toward our friends must we act on all occasions without deceit?" "We must not, indeed," said he, "for I retract what I said before, if I may be permitted to do so." "It is indeed much better that you should be permitted," said Socrates, "than that you should not place actions on the right side.

19. But of those who deceive their friends in order to injure them (that we may not leave even this point unconsidered), which of the two is the more unjust, he who does so intentionally or he who does so involuntarily?" "Indeed, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "I no longer put confidence in the answers which I give; for all that I said before appears to me now to be quite different from what I then thought; however, let me venture to say [1] that he who deceives intentionally is more unjust than he who deceives involuntarily?"

20. "Does it appear to you, then, that there is a way of learning and knowing what is just, as there is of learning and knowing how to read and write?" "I think there is." "And which should you consider the better scholar, him who should purposely write or read incorrectly, or him who should do so unawares?" "Him who should do so purposely, for, whenever he pleased, he would be able to do both correctly." "He, therefore, that purposely writes incorrectly may be a

[1] Εἰρήσθω μοι.] "Let it have been said by me," or "Let me say."

good scholar, but he who does so involuntarily is destitute of scholarship?" "How can it be otherwise?" "And whether does he who lies and deceives intentionally know what is just, or he who does so unawares?" "Doubtless he who does so intentionally." "You, therefore, say that he who knows how to write and read is a better scholar than he who does not know?" "Yes." "And that he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know?" "I seem to say so; but I appear to myself to say this I know not how."

21. "But what would you think of the man, who, wishing to tell the truth, should never give the same account of the same thing, but, in speaking of the same road, should say at one time that it led toward the east, and at another toward the west, and, in stating the result of the same calculation, should sometimes assert it to be greater and sometimes less, what, I say, would you think of such a man?" "It would be quite clear that he knew nothing of what he thought he knew."[1]

22. "Do you know any persons called slave-like."[2] "I do." "Whether for their knowledge or their ignorance?" "For their ignorance, certainly." "Is it then for their ignorance of working in brass that they receive this appellation?" "Not at all." Is it for their ignorance of the art of building?" "Nor for that." "Or for their ignorance of shoemaking?" "Not on any one of these accounts; for the contrary is the case, as most of those who know such trades are servile." "Is this, then, an appellation of those who are ignorant of what is honorable, and good, and just?" "It appears so to me."

23. "It therefore becomes us to exert ourselves in every way to avoid being like slaves." "But, by the gods, Socrates," rejoined Euthydemus, "I firmly be-

[1] This is the conclusion to which Socrates wished to bring Euthydemus with regard to his own knowledge of justice; and to exhort him, at the same time, to gain a knowledge of it, "as he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know," sect. 20.

[2] Ἀνδραποδώδεις.] Slave-like, ignorant, low-minded, not possessed of any qualities to raise them above the level of slaves. Compare i. 1. 16; and sect. 39 of this chapter.

lieved that I was pursuing that course of study, by which I should, as I expected, be made fully acquainted with all that was proper to be known by a man striving after honor and virtue; but now, how dispirited must you think I feel, when I say that, with all my previous labor, I am not even able to answer a question about what I ought most of all to know, and am acquainted with no other course which I may pursue to become better."

24. Socrates then said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever gone to Delphi?" "Yes, twice," replied he. "And did you observe what is written somewhere on the temple wall, KNOW THYSELF?" "I did." "And did you take no thought of that inscription, or did you attend to it, and try to examine yourself, to ascertain what sort of character you are?" "I did not indeed try, for I thought that I knew very well already, since I should hardly know any thing else if I did not know myself."

25. "But whether does he seem to you to know himself, who knows his own name merely, or he who (like people buying horses, who do not think that they know the horse that they want to know, until they have ascertained whether he is tractable or unruly, whether he is strong or weak, swift or slow, and how he is as to other points which are serviceable or disadvantageous in the use of a horse, so he,) having ascertained with regard to himself how he is adapted for the service of mankind, knows his own abilities?" "It appears to me, I must confess, that he who does not know his own abilities, does not know himself."

26. "But is it not evident," said Socrates, "that men enjoy a great number of blessings in consequence of knowing themselves, and incur a great number of evils, through being deceived in themselves? For they who know themselves know what is suitable for them, and distinguish between what they can do and what they can not; and, by doing what they know how to do, procure for themselves what they need, and are prosperous, and by abstaining from what they do not know, live blamelessly, and avoid being unfortunate.

By this knowledge of themselves, too, they can form an opinion of other men, and, by their experience of the rest of mankind,[1] obtain for themselves what is good, and guard against what is evil.

27. But they who do not know themselves, but are deceived in their own powers, are in similar case with regard to other men,[2] and other human affairs, and neither understand what they require, nor what they are doing, nor the characters of those with whom they connect themselves, but, being in error as to all these particulars, they fail to obtain what is good, and fall into evil.

28. They, on the other hand, who understand what they take in hand, succeed in what they attempt, and become esteemed and honored; those who resemble them in character willingly form connections with them; those who are unsuccessful in life desire to be assisted with their advice,[3] and to prefer them to themselves; they place in them their hopes of good, and love them, on all these accounts, beyond all other men.

29. But those, again, who do not know what they are doing, who make an unhappy choice in life, and are unsuccessful in what they attempt, not only incur losses and sufferings in their own affairs, but become, in consequence, disreputable and ridiculous, and drag out their lives in contempt and dishonor. Among states, too, you see that such as, from ignorance of their own strength, go to war with others that are more powerful, are, some of them, utterly overthrown, and others reduced from freedom to slavery."

30. "Be assured, therefore," replied Euthydemus, "that I feel convinced we must consider self-knowledge of the highest value; but as to the way in which we

[1] Διὰ τῆς τῶν ἄγλων χρείας.] Χρεία is here "dealing with," "intercourse," by which knowledge and experience may be obtained. Compare οἷς χρῶνται in the following section.

[2] As they have no right knowledge of themselves, they have no right knowledge of other men, or of human affairs.

[3] Ἐπιθυμοῦσι τοὺτους ὑπερ αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι.] "Desire that these persons should deliberate (or consider about matters) for them."

must begin[1] to seek self-knowledge, I look to you for information, if you will kindly impart it to me."

31. "Well, then," said Socrates, "you doubtless fully understand what sort of things are good, and what sort are evil." "Yes, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus, "for if I did not understand such things, I should be in a worse condition than slaves are." "Come then," said Socrates, "tell me what they are." "That is not difficult," said he, "for, in the first place, health I consider to be a good, and sickness an evil, and, in the next, looking to the causes of each of them, as drink, food, and employments, I esteem such as conduce to health to be good, and such as lead to sickness to be evil."

32. "Consequently," said Socrates, "health and sickness themselves, when they are the causes of any good, will be good, and when they are the causes of any evil, will be evil." "But when," exclaimed Euthydemus, "can health be the cause of evil, and sickness of good?" "When, for example," said Socrates, "some portion of a community, from being in good health, take part in a disgraceful expedition by land, or a ruinous voyage by sea, or in any other such matters, which are sufficiently common, and lose their lives, while others, who are left behind from ill-health, are saved." "What you say is true," said Euthydemus, "but you see that some men share in successful enterprises from being in health, while others from being in sickness, are left out of them." "Whether then," said Socrates, are those things which are sometimes beneficial, and sometimes injurious, goods, rather, or evils?" "Nothing, by Jupiter, is to be settled with regard to them[2] by considering thus.

33. But as to wisdom, Socrates, it is indisputably a good thing; for what business will not one who is wise

[1] Ὁπόθεν χρὴ ἄρζασθαι.] "Whence (from what point) we must begin."

[2] Οὐδὲν——φαίνεται.] "Nothing appears" or is shown: nothing can be settled with regard to them; they can not be called positively good things, or positive evils, as they seem sometimes one and sometimes the other: but as to wisdom, that is indisputably a good, etc.

conduct better than one who is untaught?" "Have you not heard, then, of Dædalus," said Socrates. "how he was made prisoner by Minos and compelled to serve him as a slave; how he was cut off, at once, from his country and from liberty, and how, when he endeavored to escape with his son, he lost the child, and was unable to save himself, but was carried away among barbarians, and made a second time a slave?" "Such a story is told, indeed," said Euthydemus. "Have you not heard, too, of the sufferings of Palamedes? for every body says that it was for his wisdom he was envied and put to death by Ulysses." "That, too, is said," replied Euthydemus. "And how many other men do you think have been carried off to the king[1] on account of their wisdom, and made slaves there?"

34. "But as to happiness, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "that at least appears to be an indisputable good." "Yes, Euthydemus," replied Socrates, "if we make it consist in things that are themselves indisputably good."[2] "But what," said he, "among things constituting happiness can be a doubtful good?" "Nothing," answered Socrates, "unless we join with it beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or any other such thing."

35. "But we must assuredly join them with it," said Euthydemus; "for how can a person be happy without them?" "We shall then join with it, by Jupiter," said Socrates, "things from which many grievous calamities happen to mankind: for many, on account of their beauty, are ruined by those who are maddened with passion[3] for their youthful attractions; many, through confidence in their strength, have entered upon undertakings too great for it, and involved themselves in no small disasters; many, in consequence of their wealth, have become enervated, been plotted against, and destroyed; and many, from the glory and power that

[1] The king of Persia; iii. 5. 26.

[2] Εἴ γε μή τις αὐτό—ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων ἀγαθῶν συντιθείη.] "If one does not make it up of things doubtfully (or disputably) good."

[3] Παρακεκινηκότων.] Παρακινεῖν put intransitively signifies *mente excuti*, to be disturbed in mind, to be distracted or mad. See Plato Rep. vii. p. 517, D., Phædr. p. 249, and Stallbaum's note. *Kühner.*

they have acquired in their country, have suffered the greatest calamities."

36. "Well, then," said Euthydemus, "if I do not say what is right when I praise happiness, I confess that I do not know what we ought to pray for to the gods."

"These points, however," proceeded Socrates, "you have perhaps not sufficiently considered, from too confident a belief that you were already well acquainted with them; but since you intend to be at the head of a democratic government, you doubtless know what a democracy is." "Assuredly," said he.

37. "Do you think it possible for a person to know what a democracy is, without knowing what the *Demos* is?" "No, indeed." "And what do you conceive the *Demos* to be?" "I conceive it to be the poorer class of citizens." "Do you know, then, which are the poor?" "How can I help knowing?" "You know then which are the rich?" "Just as well as I know which are the poor." "Which sort of persons then do you call poor, and which sort rich?" "Those who have not sufficient means to pay for the necessaries of life,[1] I regard as poor; those who have more than sufficient, I consider rich." "Have you ever observed, then, that to some who have very small means, those means are not only sufficient, but that they even save from them, while, to many, very large fortunes are not sufficient?" "I have indeed," said Euthydemus, "(for you very properly put me in mind of it), since I have known some princes, who, from poverty, have been driven to commit injustice like the very poorest people."

39. "Then," said Socrates, "if such be the case, we must rank such princes among the *Demos*, and those that have but little, we must rank, if they be good managers, among the rich?" "My own want of knowledge,[2] indeed," said Euthydemus, "obliges me to admit even this; and I am considering whether it would not be best for me to be silent; for I seem to know absolutely nothing."

[1] Μὴ ἱκανά ἔχοντας εἰς ἃ δεῖ τελεῖν.] I take τελεῖν in the sense of *paying*, as in ii. 9. 1, ii. 10, 6, and *satisfaciendum*. Kühner. ἃ δει is *ad vitæ necessitatibus*

[2] Φαυλότης.] *Inscitia*. Sturz.

He went away, accordingly, in great dejection, holding himself in contempt, and thinking that he was in reality no better than a slave.

40. Of those who were thus addressed by Socrates, many came to him no more; and these he regarded as too dull to be improved. But Euthydemus, on the contrary, conceived that he could by no other means become an estimable character than by associating with Socrates as much as possible; and he in consequence never quitted him, unless some necessary business obliged him to do so. He also imitated many of his habits.

When Socrates saw that he was thus disposed, he no longer puzzled him with questions, but explained to him, in the simplest and clearest manner, what he thought that he ought to know, and what it would be best for him to study.

CHAPTER III.

The necessity of temperance or self-control, and of right notions concerning the gods, sect. 1, 2. The gods have a providential care for mankind, 3–9. Other animals are formed by the gods for the use of man, 10. In addition to the senses common to man with the inferior animals, the gods have given him reason and speech, 11, 12. Though we do not see the gods, we are convinced of their existence from their works, 13, 14. We ought, therefore, to pay them honor according to our means, 15–18.

1. SOCRATES was never in haste that his followers should become skillful in speaking, in action, or in invention,[1] but, previous to such accomplishments, he thought it proper that a love of self-control should be instilled into them; for he considered that those who had acquired those qualifications were, if devoid of self-control, only better fitted to commit injustice and to do mischief.

[1] Λεκτικοὺς καὶ πρακτικοὺς καὶ μεχανικοὺς.] How Socrates rendered his hearers λεκτικοὺς, is shown in c. 5; how διαλεκτικοὺς, in c. 6; how μηχανικοὺς, in c. 7. Μηχανικοὶ may be Englished "fertile in expedients."

2. In the first place, therefore, he endeavored to impress his associates with right feelings toward the gods. Some, who were present with him when he conversed with others on this subject, have given an account of his discourses; but I myself was with him when he held a conversation with Euthydemus to the following effect.

3. "Tell me," said he, "Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to consider how carefully the gods have provided for men every thing that they require?" "It has indeed never occurred to me," replied he. "You know at least," proceeded Socrates, "that we stand in need, first of all, of light, with which the gods supply us." "Yes, by Jupiter," answered Euthydemus, "for if we had no light, we should be, as to the use of our eyes, like the blind." "But, as we require rest, they afford us night, the most suitable season for repose." "That is assuredly," said Euthydemus, "a subject for thankfulness."

4. "Then because the sun, being luminous, shows us the hours of the day, and every thing else, while the night, being dark, prevents us from making such distinctions in it,[1] have they not caused the stars to shine in the night, which show us the night-watches, and under the direction of which we perform many things that we require?" "So it is," said he. "The moon, too, makes plain to us not only the divisions of the night, but also of the month." "Assuredly," said he.

5. "But that, since we require food, they should raise it for us from the earth, and appoint suitable seasons for the purpose, which prepare for us, in abundance and every variety, not only things which we need, but also things from which we derive pleasure, what do you think of such gifts?" "They certainly indicate love for man."

6. "And that they should supply us with water, an element of such value to us, that it causes to spring up,

[1] Ἀσαφεστέρα ἐστίν.] Schneider interprets, "nihil patitur oculis distinguere." *Kühner* observes that the adjective will not bear this active sense, and interprets, "Nox propter tenebras obscurior est, quàm ut ejus singulæ partes discerni possint."

and unites with the earth and the seasons in bringing to maturity, every thing useful for us, and assists also to nourish ourselves, and, being mixed with all our food, renders it easier of digestion, more serviceable, and more pleasant; and that, as we require water in great quantities, they should supply us with it in such profusion, what do you think of such a gift?" "That also," said he, "shows thought for us."

7. "That they should also give us fire, a protection against cold and darkness, an auxiliary in every art and in every thing that men prepare for their use (for, in a word, men produce nothing, among the various things necessary to life, without the aid of fire), what do you think of such a gift?" "That likewise," said he, gives eminent proof of regard for man."

8. [1] ["That they should diffuse the air also around us every where in such abundance, as not only to preserve and support life, but to enable us to cross the seas by means of it, and to get provisions by sailing hither and thither among foreign lands, is not this a boon inexpressibly valuable?" "It is indeed inexpressibly so," replied he.] "That the sun, too, when it turns toward us in the winter, should approach to mature some things, and to dry up others[2] whose season for ripening has passed away; and that, having effected these objects, he should not come nearer to us, but turn back, as if taking care lest he should hurt us by giving us more heat than is necessary; and that when again, in his departure, he arrives at the point at which it becomes evident that, if he were to go beyond it, we should be frozen by the cold, he should again turn toward us, and approach us, and revolve in that precise part of the heaven in which he may be of most advantage to us, what do you think of things so regulated?" "By Jupiter," replied Euthydemus, "they appear to be appointed solely for the sake of man."

[1] The passage in brackets is found only in one manuscript. Weiske and Schneider admitted it into their texts. Kühner condemns it as spurious, justly observing that the language of it "glossatoris manum apertè prodit."

[2] As hay, and standing corn.

9. "Again, that the sun, because it is certain that we could not endure such heat or cold if it should come upon us suddenly, should approach us so gradually, and retire from us so gradually, that we are brought imperceptibly to the greatest extremes of both, what do you think of that appointment?" "I am reflecting, indeed," said Euthydemus, "whether the gods can have any other business than to take care of man; only this thought embarrasses me, that other animals partake in these benefits."

10. "But is not this also evident," said Socrates, "that these animals are produced and nourished for the sake of man? For what other animal derives so many benefits from goats, sheep, horses, oxen, asses, and other such creatures, as man? To me it appears that he gains more advantages from them than from the fruits of the earth; at least he is fed and enriched not less from the one than from the other; and a great portion of mankind do not use the productions of the earth for food, but live by herds of cattle, supported by their milk, and cheese, and flesh; and all men tame and train the useful sort of animals, and use their services for war and other purposes." "I agree with what you say on that point," said Euthydemus, "for I see some animals, much stronger than we, rendered so subservient to men that they use them for whatever they please."

11. "But that, since there are numberless beautiful and useful objects in the world, greatly differing from one another, the gods should have bestowed on men senses adapted to each of them, by means of which we enjoy every advantage from them: that they should have implanted understanding in us, by means of which we reason about what we perceive by the senses, and, assisted by the memory, learn how far every thing is beneficial, and contrive many plans by which we enjoy good and avoid evil.

12. And that they should have given us the faculty of speech, by means of which we convey information to one another, and mutually impart whatever is good, and participate in it, enact laws, and enjoy constitutional government, what think you of such blessings?"

"The gods certainly appear, Socrates, to exercise the greatest care for man in every way." "And that, since we are unable to foresee what is for our advantage with regard to the future, they should assist us in that respect, communicating what will happen to those who inquire of them by divination, and instructing them how their actions may be most for their benefit, what thoughts does that produce in you?" "The gods seem to show you, Socrates," rejoined he, "more favor than other men, since they indicate to you, without being asked, what you ought to do, and what not to do."

13. "And that I speak the truth,[1] you yourself also well know, if you do not expect to see the bodily forms of the gods, but will be content, as you behold their works, to worship and honor them. Reflect, too, that the gods themselves give us this intimation;[2] for the other deities[3] that give us blessings, do not bestow any of them by coming manifestly before our sight; and he that orders and holds together the whole universe, in which are all things beautiful and good, and who preserves it always unimpaired, undisordered, and undecaying, obeying his will swifter than thought and without irregularity, is himself manifested only in the performance of his mighty works, but is invisible to us while he regulates them.

14. Consider also that the sun, which appears manifest to all, does not allow men to contemplate him too curiously, but, if any one tries to gaze on him steadfastly, deprives him of his sight. The instruments of the deities you will likewise find imperceptible; for the thunder-bolt, for instance, though it is plain that it is sent from above, and works its will with everything with which it comes in contact, is yet never seen either

[1] In saying that the gods assist and admonish us.

[2] That we must not expect, when we consult the gods, to see their shapes. *Kühner.*

[3] Socrates, and those who followed him, Plato, the Stoics, and Cicero, were advocates of the opinion that, besides the one supreme God, there were others, far inferior to him, but immortal, and of great power and endowments, whom the supreme God employed, as his ministers, in the government of the world; a subject which I have discussed at some length in a treatise *de M. T. Ciceronis in philosophiam meritis*, Hamb. 1825. *Kühner.*

approaching, or striking, or retreating; the winds, too, are themselves invisible, though their effects are evident to us, and we perceive their course. The soul of man, moreover, which partakes of the divine nature if anything else in man does, rules, it is evident, within us, but is itself unseen. Meditating on these facts, therefore, it behooves you not to despise the unseen gods, but, estimating their power from what is done by them, to reverence what is divine."

15. "I feel clearly persuaded, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "that I shall never fail, in the slightest degree, in respect for the divine power, but I am dejected at the thought that no one among mankind, as it seems to me, can ever requite the favors of the gods with due gratitude."

16. "But be not dejected at that reflection, Euthydemus," said Socrates, "for you know that the deity at Delphi, whenever any one consults him how he may propitiate the gods, answers, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF YOUR COUNTRY;[1] and it is the law, indeed, everywhere, that every man should propitiate the gods with offerings according to his ability: and how, therefore, can any man honor the gods better or more piously, than by acting as they themselves direct?

17. It behooves us, however, not to do less than we are able, for, when any one acts thus, he plainly shows that he does not honor the gods. But it becomes him who fails in no respect, to honor the gods according to his means, to be of good courage, and to hope for the greatest blessings; for no one can reasonably hope for greater blessings from others than from those who are able to benefit him most; nor on any other grounds than by propitiating them; and how can he propitiate them better than by obeying them to the utmost of his power?"

18. By uttering such sentiments, and by acting according to them himself, he rendered those who conversed with him more pious and prudent.

[1] See. i. 3. 2.

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates inculcated a love of justice into his followers. He gave them an example of adherence to justice in his own life, sect. 1–4. He commences a conversation with Hippias, a sophist, 4–9. It is better to be just than merely to talk of justice, 10. 11; it is a part of justice to obey the laws; what a law is, 12–14; who are the best magistrates in states, 15; a general observance of the laws maintains concord, 16–18; there are certain unwritten laws, which it is not possible to transgress without incurring punishment, 19–24; to observe the divine laws is to be just, 25.

1. CONCERNING justice, too, he did not conceal what sentiments he entertained, but made them manifest even by his actions, for he conducted himself, in his private capacity, justly and beneficently toward all men, and, as a citizen, he obeyed the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, both in the city and on military expeditions, so that he was distinguished above other men for his observance of order.

2. When he was president in the public assembly, he would not permit the people to give a vote contrary to law, but opposed himself, in defence of the laws, to such a storm of rage on the part of the populace as I think that no other man could have withstood.[1]

3. When the Thirty Tyrants commanded him to do anything contrary to the laws, he refused to obey them; for both when they forbade him to converse with the young, and when they ordered him, and some others of the citizens, to lead a certain[2] person away to death, he alone did not obey, because the order was given contrary to the laws.

4. When he was accused by Meletus,[3] and others were accustomed, before the tribunal, to speak so as to gain the favor of the judges, and to flatter them, and

[1] See i. 1. 18.

[2] Leon, a native of Salamis, but an enrolled citizen of Athens, who had gone of his own accord into exile at Salamis that he might not be put to death by the Tyrants, in their greediness for wealth. Stallbaum ad Plat. Apol. p. 32, C. See Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 39; Andocid. de Myster. p. 46; Diop. Laert. ii. 24. *Kühner.*

[3] See note on i. 1. 1. He is generally called Melitus.

supplicate them, in violation of the laws,[1] and many persons, by such practices, had often been acquitted by the judges, he refused, on his trial, to comply with any practices opposed to the laws, and though he might easily have been acquitted by his judges, if he had but in a slight degree adopted any of those customs, he chose rather to die abiding by the laws than to save his life by transgressing them.

5. He held conversations to this effect with others on several occasions, and I know that he once had a dialogue of the following kind, concerning justice, with Hippias of Elis;[2] for Hippias, on his return to Athens after an absence of some time, happened to come in the way of Socrates as he was observing to some people how surprising it was that, if a man wished to have another taught to be a shoemaker, or a carpenter, or a worker in brass, or a rider, he was at no loss whither he should send him to effect his object;[3] [nay, that every place, as some say, was full of persons who would make a horse or an ox observant of right for any one that desired;] while as to justice, if any one wished either to learn it himself, or to have his son or his slave taught it, he did not know, whither he should go to obtain his desire.

6. Hippias, hearing this remark, said, as if jesting with him, "What! are you still saying the same things, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?" "Yes," said Socrates, "and what is more wonderful, I am not only still saying the same things, but am saying them on the same subjects; but you, perhaps, from being possessed of such variety of knowledge, never

[1] It was forbidden at Athens to attempt to move the feelings of the judges. Quintil. vi. 1. Pollux de Areopagit. viii. 117.

[2] A famous sophist of that time, well known from the Dialogues of Plato; see Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 36; Quintil. xii. 11. 21; Borneman ad Sympos. iv. 62. Of the vanity and arrogance of the man, see Stallbaum ad Plat. Hipp. Maj. p. 148.

[3] The works in brackets are condemned by Ruhnken and Valckenaer as spurious. Bornemann and Kühner attempt to defend them. They certainly disturb the course of the argument so much and are so useless, that I can not think them Xenophon's. "Observant of right," in the translation answers to δικαίους, "just," a word on which the writer plays.

say the same things on the same subjects." "Certainly," replied Hippias, "I do always try to say something new."

7. "About matters of which you have certain knowledge, then," said Socrates, "as, for instance, about the letters of the alphabet, if any one were to ask you how many and what letters are in the word 'Socrates,' would you try to say sometimes one thing, and sometimes another? or to people who might ask you about numbers, as whether twice five are ten, would you not give the same answer at one time as at another?" "About such matters, Socrates," replied Hippius, "I, like you, always say the same thing; but concerning justice I think that I have certainly something to say now which neither you nor any other person can refute."

8. "By Juno," returned Socrates, "it is a great good that you say you have discovered, since the judges will now cease from giving contradictory sentences, the citizens will cease from disputing about what is just, from going to law, and from quarreling, and communities will cease from contending about their rights and going to war; and I know not how I can part with you till I have learned so important a benefit from its discoverer."

9. "You shall not hear it, by Jupiter," rejoined Hippias, "until you yourself declare what you think justice to be; for it is enough that you laugh at others,[1] questioning and confuting every body, while you yourself are unwilling to give a reason to any body, or to declare your opinion on any subject."

10. "What then, Hippias," said Socrates, "have you not perceived that I never cease declaring my opinion as to what I conceive to be just?" "And what is this opinion of yours?" said Hippias. "If I make it known to you, not by words merely, but by actions, do not deeds seem to you to be a stronger evidence than words?" "Much stronger, by Jupiter," said Hippias, "for many who say what is just do what is unjust, but

[1] "Satis est quod ceteros omnes rides;—me verô non ridebis." *Kühner.*

a man who does what is just can not be himself unjust."

11. "Have you ever then found me bearing false witness, or giving malicious information, or plunging my friends or the state into quarrels, or doing any thing else that is unjust?" "I have not." "And do you not think it justice to refrain from injustice?" "You are plainly, now," said Hippias, "endeavoring to avoid expressing an opinion as to what you think just; for what you say is, not what the just do, but what they do not do."

12. "But I thought," rejoined Socrates, "that to be unwilling to do injustice was a sufficient proof of justice. If this, however, does not satisfy you, consider whether what I next say will please you better; for I assert that what is in conformity with the laws is just." "Do you say, Socrates, that to be conformable to the laws, and to be just, is the same thing?" "I do, indeed."

13. "I am puzzled; for I do not understand what you call conformable to law, or what you call just." "Do you know the laws of the state?" said Socrates. "I do," said the other. "And what do you consider them to be?" "What the citizens in concert have enacted as to what we ought to do, and what we ought to avoid doing." "Would not he, therefore, asked Socrates, "be an observer of the laws who should conduct himself in the community agreeably to those enactments, and he be a violater of the laws who transgresses them?" "Undoubtedly," said Hippias. "Would not he, then, do what is just who obeys the laws, and he do what is unjust who disobeys them?" "Certainly." "Is not he, then, just who does what is just, and he unjust who does what is unjust?" "How can it be otherwise?" "He, therefore, that conforms to the laws is just," added Socrates, "and he who violates the laws, unjust."

14. "But," objected Hippias, "how can any one imagine the laws, or obedience to them, to be a matter of absolute importance, when the very persons who make them often reject and alter them?" "That ob-

jection is of no consequence," said Socrates, "for states, which have commenced war, often make peace again." "Undoubtedly they do." said Hippias. "What difference will there be in your conduct, then, think you,[1] if you throw contempt on those who obey the laws, because the laws may be changed, and if you blame those who act properly in war, because peace may be made? Do you condemn those who vigorously support their country in war?" "I do not indeed," replied Hippias.

15. "Have you ever heard it said of Lycurgus the Lacedæmonian, then," said Socrates, "that he would not have made Sparta at all different from other states, if he had not established in it, beyond others, a spirit of obedience to the laws? Do you not know, too, that of magistrates in states, those are thought the best who are most efficient in producing obedience to the laws, and that the state in which the citizens pay most respect to the laws, is in the best condition in peace, and invincible in war?

16. The greatest blessing to states, moreover, is concord; and the senates and principal men in them often exhort the citizens to unanimity; and every where throughout Greece it is a law that the citizens shall take an oath to observe concord, an oath which they every where do take; but I conceive that this is done, not that the citizens may approve of the same choruses, or that they may praise the same flute-players, or that they may prefer the same poets,[2] or that they may take delight in the same spectacles, but that they may obey the laws; for while the citizens adhere to these, states will be eminently powerful and happy; but without such unanimity, no state can be well governed, nor any family well regulated.

17. As an individual citizen, too, how could any person render himself less liable to penalties from the government, or more likely to have honors bestowed upon him, than by being obedient to the laws? How

[1] Διάφορον οὖν τι οἴει ποιεῖν —ἢ—.] "Do you think, therefore, that you do any thing different—than—,"

[2] The same scenic poets.

else would he incur fewer defeats in the courts of justice, or how more certainly obtain sentence in his favor? To whom would any one believe that he could more safely confide his money, or his sons or daughters? Whom would the whole community deem more trustworthy than him who respects the laws? From whom would parents, or relatives, or domestics, or friends, or citizens, or strangers, more certainly obtain their rights? To whom would the enemy sooner trust in cessations of arms, or in making a truce, or articles of peace? To whom would people more willingly become allies than to the observer of the laws, and to whom would the allies more willingly trust the leadership, or command of a fortress, or of a city? From whom would any one expect to meet with gratitude, on doing him a kindness, sooner than from the observer of the laws? Or whom would any one rather serve than him from whom he expects to receive a return? To whom would any one more desire to be a friend, or less desire to be an enemy, than such a man? With whom would any one be less inclined to go to war, than with him to whom he would most wish to be a friend, and least of all an enemy, and to whom the greatest part of mankind would wish to be friends and allies, and but a small number to be antagonists and enemies?

18. I, therefore, Hippias, pronounce that to obey the laws and to be just is the same; if you hold an opinion to the contrary, tell me." "Indeed, Socrates," rejoined Hippias, "I do not know that I entertain any sentiments opposed to what you have said of justice."

19. "But are you aware, Hippias," continued Socrates, "that there are unwritten laws?" "You mean those," said Hippias, "that are in force about the same points, every where." "Can you affirm, then, that men made those laws?" "How could they," said Hippias, "when they could not all meet together, and do not all speak the same language?" "Whom, then, do you suppose to have made these laws?" "I believe," said he, "that it was the gods who made these laws for men, for among all men the first law is to venerate the gods."

20. "Is it not also a law every where to honor parents?"

"It is so." "Is it not a law, too, that parents shall not intermarry with their children, nor children with their parents?" "This does not, as yet, Socrates, appear to me to be a law of the gods?" "Why?" "Because I find that some nations transgress it."

21. "Many others, too, they transgress," said Socrates; "but those who violates the laws made by the gods incur punishment which it is by no means possible for man to escape, as many transgressors of the laws made by men escape punishment, some by concealment, others by open violence.

22. "And what sort of punishment, Socrates," said he, "can not parents escape who intermarry with their children, and children who intermarry with their parents?" "The greatest of all punishments, by Jupiter," replied Socrates, "for what greater penalty can those who beget children incur, than to have bad children?"

23. "How then," said Hippias, "do they necessarily have bad children when nothing hinders but that they may be good themselves, and have children by good partners?" "Because," returned Socrates, "it is not only necessary that those who have children by each other should be good, but that they should be in full bodily vigor.[1] Or do you suppose that the seed of those who are at the height of maturity is similar to that of those who have not yet reached maturity, or to that of those who are far past it?" "By Jupiter," replied Hippias, "it is not at all likely that it should be similar." "Which of the two then is the better?" "Doubtless that of those at full maturity." "That of those who are not at full maturity, then, is not sufficiently energetic." "Probably not." "Accordingly they ought not to have children?" "No." "Do not those, there-

[1] Mirari libet Socratis commentum, qui in conjugiis talibus nihil culpandum invenit præter ætatis disparitatem. Illud potius disquirendum, annon in hominibus nullâ pravâ educatione corruptis sit in ipsis affectibus insita fuga quædam commixtionis cum parentibus et ex se natis, quippe cum ab eâ etiam quædam animantia naturaliter abhorreant. Hugo Grotius de J. B. et P. ii. 5, 12, 4—5, et 2, 3, cum annott. Puffendorf. et Osiand. *Herbst.* Parentum et liberorum officia mutua plus ait Weiskius valere ad reprobanda connubia talia quàm annorum inæqualitatem. *Kühner.*

fore, who have children under such circumstances, have them as they ought not?" "So it appears to me." "What other persons, therefore, will have bad children, if not these?" "Well," said Hippias, "I agree with you on this point also."

24. "Is it not every where a law, also," said Socrates, "that men should do good to those who do good to them?" "It is a law," answered Hippias, "but it is transgressed." "Do not those therefore who transgress it incur punishment," continued Socrates, "by being deprived of good friends, and being compelled to have recourse to those who hate them? Are not such as do service to those who seek it of them good friends to themselves, and are not those who make no return to such as serve them hated by them for their ingratitude; and yet, because it is for their advantage to have their support, do they not pay the greatest court to them?" "Indeed, Socrates," replied Hippias, "all these things seem to suit the character of the gods; for that the laws themselves should carry with them punishments for those who transgress them, appears to me to be the appointment of a lawgiver superior to man."

25. "Whether, therefore, Hippias," added Socrates, "do you consider that the gods appoint as laws, what is agreeable to justice, or what is at variance with justice?" "Not what is at variance with justice, certainly," said Hippias, "for scarcely would any other make laws in conformity with justice, if a god were not to do so." "It is the pleasure of the gods, therefore, Hippias," concluded Socrates, "that what is in conformity with justice should also be in conformity with the laws."[1]

26. By uttering such sentiments, and acting in agreement with them, he rendered those who conversed with him more observant of justice.

[1] Lange has given a judicious summary of these arguments. The gods give just laws; what is in conformity with these laws, is νόμιμον; therefore every thing νόμιμον in the divine laws is just. Thus the gods in this definition (τὸ νόμιμον δικαιόν εἶναι, sect. 12), agree with men, or with me, says Socrates. A sound argument, if human laws be what they ought to be, that is, in conformity with the divine laws, or the laws of nature.

CHAPTER V.

Socrates rendered his followers better qualified for public life. The necessity of temperance, sect. 1, 2; the evils of intemperance, 3-7; the benefits arising from temperance, 8-10; the conduct of the temperance man, 11, 12.

1. I WILL now relate how he rendered his followers better qualified for the management of public business. Thinking it expedient that temperance should be observed by him who would succeed in any thing honorable, he first made it evident to those who conversed with him, that he practiced this virtue beyond all other men, and then, by his discourse, he exhorted his followers, above everything, to the observance of temperance. He continued always, therefore, to make allusions to whatever was conducive to virtue; and I know that he once held a conversation on temperance with Euthydemus to the following effect:

2. "Tell me," said he, "Euthydemus, do you regard liberty as an excellent and honorable possession for an individual or a community?" "The most excellent and honorable that can be," replied he.

3. "Do you consider him, then, who is held under control by the pleasures of the body, and is rendered unable, by their influence, to do what is best for him, to be free?" "By no means," replied Euthydemus. "Perhaps, then, to have the power of doing what is best seems to you to be freedom, but to be under influences which will hinder you from doing it, you consider to be want of freedom?" "Assuredly," said he.

4. "Do not the intemperate appear to you, then, to be absolutely without freedom?" "Yes, by Jupiter, and naturally so." "And whether do the intemperate appear to you to be merely prevented from doing what is best, or to be forced, also, to do what is most dishonorable?" "They appear to me," replied Euthydmus, "to be not less forced to do the one than they are hindered from doing the other."

5. "And what sort of masters do you consider those to be, who hinder men from doing what is best, and

force them to do what is worst? "The very worst possible, by Jupiter," replied he. "And what sort of slavery do you consider to be the worst?" "That," said he, "under the worst masters?" "Do not then the intemperate," said Socrates, "endure the very worst of slavery!" "It appears so to me," answered Euthydemus.

6. "And does not intemperance seem to you, by banishing from men prudence, the greatest good, to drive them into the very opposite evil? Does it not appear to you to hinder them from attending to useful things, and learning them, by drawing them away to pleasure, and frequently, by captivating those who have a perception of good and evil, to make them choose the worse instead of the better?" "Such is the case," said he.

7. "And whom can we suppose, Euthydemus, to have less participation in self-control than the intemperate man? for assuredly the acts of self-control and of intemperance are the very opposite to each other." "I assent to this also," said he. "And do you think that any thing is a greater hinderance to attention to what is becoming, than intemperance?" "I do not." "And do you imagine that there is any greater evil to man, than that which makes him prefer the noxious to the beneficial, which prompts him to pursue the one and to neglect the other, and which forces him to pursue a contrary course of conduct to that of the wise?" "There is none," said Euthydemus.

8. "Is it not natural, then," said Socrates, "that temperance should be the cause of producing in men effects contrary to those which intemperance produces?" "Undoubtedly," said Euthydemus. "Is it not natural, therefore, also, that what produces those contrary effects should be best for man?" "It is natural," said he. "Is it not consequently natural, then, Euthydemus, that temperance should be best for man?" "It is so, Socrates," said he.

9. "And have you ever reflected upon this, Euthydemus?" "What?" "That even to those pleasures, to which alone intemperance seems to lead men, it can

not lead them, but that temperance produces greater pleasure than any thing else?" "How?" said he. "Because intemperance, by not allowing men to withstand hunger, thirst, or the desire of sensual gratification, or want of sleep (through which privations alone is it possible for them to eat, and drink, and gratify other natural appetites, and go to rest and sleep with pleasure, waiting and restraining themselves until the inclinations may be most happily indulged), hinders them from having any due enjoyment in acts most necessary and most habitual; but temperance, which alone enables men to endure the privations which I have mentioned, alone enables them to find delight in the gratifications to which I have alluded." "What you say," observed Euthydemus, "is indisputably true."

10. "From learning what is honorable and good, moreover, and from the study of those accomplishments by which a man may ably govern himself, judiciously regulate his household, become useful to his friends and the state, and gain the mastery over his enemies (from which studies arise not only the greatest advantages, but also the greatest pleasures), the temperate have enjoyment while they practice them, but the intemperate have no share in any of them; for to whom can we say that it less belongs to participate in such advantages, than to him who has the least power to pursue them, being wholly occupied in attention to present pleasures?"

11. "You seem to me, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "to say that the man who is under the influence of bodily pleasures, has no participation in any one virtue." "For what difference is there, Euthydemus," said he, between an intemperate man and the most ignorant brute? How will he, who has no regard to what is best, but seeks only to enjoy what is most seductive by any means in his power, differ from the most senseless cattle? To the temperate alone it belongs to consider what is best in human pursuits, to distinguish those pursuits, according to experience and reason, into their several classes, and then to choose the good and refrain from the evil."

12. Thus it was, he said, that men became most virtuous and happy, and most skillful in reasoning; and he observed that the expression διαλέγεσθαι, "to reason," had its origin in people's practice of meeting together to reason on matters, and distinguishing them, διαλέγοντας, according to their several kinds. It was the duty of every one, therefore, he thought, to make himself ready in this art, and to study it with the greatest diligence; for that men, by the aid of it, became most accomplished, most able to guide others, and most acute in discussion.

CHAPTER VI.

The value of skill in argument and definition, sect. 1. Definition of PIETY, 2–4; of JUSTICE, 5, 6; of WISDOM, 7; of GOODNESS and BEAUTY 8, 9; of COURAGE, 10, 11. Some other definitions, 12. Remarks on the Socratic method of argument, 13–15.

1. I WILL now endeavor to show that Socrates rendered those who associated with him more skilful in argument. For he thought that those who knew the nature of things severally, would be able to explain them to others; but as to those who did not know, he said that it was not surprising that they fell into error themselves, and led others into it. He therefore never ceased to reason with his associates about the nature of things.[1] To go through all the terms that he defined, and to show how he definited them, would be a long task; but I will give as many instances as I think will suffice to show the nature of his reasoning.

2. In the first place, then, he reasoned of PIETY, in some such way as this. "Tell me," said he, "Euthydemus, what sort of feeling do you consider piety to be?" "The most noble of all feelings," replied he. "Can you tell me, then, who is a pious man?" "The man, I think, who honors the gods." "Is it allowable to pay honor to the gods in any way that one pleases?"

[1] Τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων.] *Quid res quælibet esset*; "what each thing was;" what was the nature of each thing.

"No: there are certain laws in conformity with which we must pay our honors to them."

3. "He, then, who knows these laws, will know how he must honor the gods?" "I think so." "He therefore who knows how to pay honor to the gods, will not think that he ought to pay it otherwise than as he knows?" "Doubtless not." "But does any one pay honors to the gods otherwise than as he thinks that he ought to pay them?" "I think not."

4. "He therefore who knows what is agreeable to the laws with regard to the gods, will honor the gods in agreement with the laws?" "Certainly." "Does not he, then, who honors the gods agreeably to the laws honor them as he ought?" How can he do otherwise?" "And he who honors them as he ought, is pious?" "Certainly." "He therefore who knows what is agreeable to the laws with regard to the gods, may be justly defined by us as a pious man?" "So it appears to me," said Euthydemus.

5. "But is it allowable for a person to conduct himself toward other men in whatever way he pleases?" "No: but with respect to men also, he who knows what is in conformity with the laws, and how men ought, according to them, to conduct themselves toward each other, will be an observer of the laws." "Do not those, then, who conduct themselves toward each other according to what is in conformity with the laws, conduct themselves toward each other as they ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Do not those, therefore, who conduct themselves toward each other as they ought, conduct themselves well?" "Certainly." "Do not those, then, that conduct themselves well toward each other, act properly in transactions between man and man?" "Surely." "Do not those, then, who obey the laws, do what is just?" "Undoubtedly."

6. "And do you know what sort of actions are called just?" "Those which the laws sanction." "Those, therefore, who do what the laws sanction, do what is just and what they ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Those who do just things, therefore, are

just?" "I think so." "Do you think that any persons yield obedience to the laws who do not know what the laws sanction?" "I do not." "And do you think that any who know what they ought to do, think that they ought not to do it?" "I do not think so." "And do you know any persons that do other things than those which they think they ought to do?" "I do not." "Those, therefore, who know what is agreeable to the laws in regard to men, do what is just?" "Certainly." "And are not those who do what is just, just men?" "Who else can be so?" "Shall we not define rightly, therefore," concluded Socrates, "if we define those to be just who know what is agreeable to the laws in regard to men?" "It appears so to me," said Euthydemus.

7. "And what shall we say that WISDOM is? Tell me, whether do men seem to you to be wise, in things which they know, or in things which they do not know?" "In what they know, certainly; for how can a man be wise in things of which he knows nothing?" "Those, then, who are wise, are wise by their knowledge?" "By what else can a man be wise, if not by his knowledge?" "Do you think wisdom, then, to be anything else than that by which men are wise?" "I do not." "Is knowledge, then, wisdom?" "It appears so to me." "Does it appear to you, however that it is possible for a man to know all things that are?" "No, by Jupiter; not even as I think, a comparatively small portion of them." "It is not therefore possible for a man to be wise in all things?" "No, indeed." "Every man is wise, therefore, in that only of which he has a knowledge?" "So it seems to me."

8. "Shall we thus, too, Euthydemus," said he, "inquire what is GOOD?" "How?" said Euthydemus. "Does the same thing appear to you to be beneficial to every body?" "No." "And does not that which is beneficial to one person appear to you to be sometimes hurtful to another?" "Assuredly." "Would you say, then, that any thing is good that is not beneficial?" "I would not." "What is beneficial, therefore, is good,

to whomsoever it is beneficial?" "It appears so to me," said Euthydemus.

9. "And can we define the BEAUTIFUL in any other way than if you term whatever is beautiful, whether a person, or a vase, or any thing else whatsoever, beautiful for whatever purpose you know that it is beautiful?"[1] "No, indeed," said Euthydemus. "For whatever purpose, then, any thing may be useful, for that purpose it is beautiful to use it?" "Certainly." "And is any thing beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use it?" "For no other purpose," replied he. "What is useful is beautiful, therefore, for that purpose for which it is beautiful?" "So I think," said he.

10. "As to COURAGE, Euthydemus," said Socrates, "do you think it is to be numbered among excellent things?" "I think it one of the most excellent," replied Euthydemus. "But you do not think courage a thing of use for small occasions." "No, by Jupiter, but for the very greatest." "Does it appear to you to be useful, with regard to formidable and dangerous things, to be ignorant of their character?" "By no means." "They, therefore, who do not fear such things, because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?" "Certainly not; for, in that case, many madmen and even cowards would be courageous." "And what do you say of those who fear things that are not formidable?" "Still less, by Jupiter, should they be called courageous." "Those, then, that are *good* with reference to formidable and dangerous things, you consider to be courageous, and those that are *bad*, cowardly?" "Certainly."

11. "But do you think that any other persons are *good*, with reference to terrible and dangerous circumstances, except those who are able to conduct themselves well under them?" "No, those only," said he.

[1] I have translated this apparently corrupt passage according to the interpretation of it proposed by Lange, a friend of Kühner's: Num possumus pulchrum aliter [intellige *ac bonum*, iii. 8, ubi demonstratum est καλὸν, ἀγαθὸν, et χρήσιμον idem esse.] definire, an pulchrum vocas, si quid pulchrum est [εἰ ἔστιν] vel corpus, vel vas, vel aliud quid, quod ad quamcunque rem (πρὸς πάντα) pulchrum est?

"And you think those *bad* with regard to them, who are of such a character to conduct themselves badly under them?" "Whom else can I think so?" "Do not each, then, conduct themselves under them as they think they ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Do those, therefore, who do not conduct themselves properly under them, know how they ought to conduct themselves under them?" "Doubtless not." "Those then who know how they ought to conduct themselves under them, can do so?" "And they alone." "Do those, therefore, who do not fail under such circumstances, conduct themselves badly under them?" "I think not." "Those then who do conduct themselves badly under them, do fail?" "It seems so." "Those, therefore, who know how to conduct themselves well in terrible and dangerous circumstances are courageous, and those who fail to do so are cowards?" "They at least appear so to me," said Euthydemus.

12. Monarchy and tyranny he considered to be both forms of government, but conceived that they differed greatly from one another; for a government over men with their own consent, and in conformity with the laws of free states, he regarded as a monarchy; but a government over men against their will, and not according to the law of free states, but just as the ruler pleased, a tyranny; and wherever magistrates were appointed from among those who complied with the injunctions of the laws, he considered the government to be an aristocracy; wherever they were appointed according to their wealth, a plutocracy; and wherever they were appointed from among the whole people, a democracy.

13. Whenever any person contradicted him on any point, who had nothing definite to say, and who perhaps asserted, without proof, that some person, whom he mentioned, was wiser, or better skilled in political affairs, or possessed of greater courage, or worthier in some such respect, [than some other whom Socrates had mentioned], he would recall the whole argument, in some such way as the following, to the primary proposition:

14. "Do you say that he whom you commend, is *a better citizen* than he whom I commend?" "I do say so." "Why should we then not consider, in the first place, what is the duty of a *good citizen?*" "Let us do so." "Would not he then be superior in the management of the public money who should make the state richer?" "Undoubtedly." "And he in war who should make it victorious over its enemies?" "Assuredly." "And in an embassy he who should make friends of foes?" "Doubtless." "And he in addressing the people who should check dissension and inspire them with unanimity?" "I think so." When the discussion was thus brought back to fundamental principles, the truth was made evident to those who had opposed him.

15. When he himself went through any subject in argument, he proceeded upon propositions of which the truth was generally acknowledged, thinking that a sure foundation was thus formed for his reasoning. Accordingly, whenever he spoke, he, of all men that I have known, most readily prevailed on his hearers to assent to his arguments; and he used to say that Homer[1] had attributed to Ulysses the character of *a sure orator*, as being able to form his reasoning on points acknowledged by all mankind.

CHAPTER VII.

How Socrates rendered his followers μηχανικοὺς, ingenious and adapted for business; his frankness and sincerity, 1. How far he thought that Geometry should be studied, 2, 3. How far he recommended that Astronomy should be pursued, 4–7. Vain investigations to be avoided, 8. Regard to be paid to health, 9. Counsel to be asked of the gods, 10.

1. THAT Socrates expressed his sentiments with sincerity to those who conversed with him, is, I think, manifest from what I have said. I will now proceed to show how much it was his care that his followers

[1] Odyss. viii. 171: Ὁ δὲ ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύει: a passage noticed by Dionys. Hal. de Arte Rhet. xi. 8.

should be competently qualified for employments suited to their powers. Of all men that I have known, he was the most anxious to discover in what occupation each of those who attended him was likely to prove skillful; and of all that it becomes a man of honor and virtue to know, he taught them himself, whatever he knew, with the utmost cheerfulness; and what he had not sufficient knowledge to teach, he took them to those who knew, to learn.

2. He taught them also how far it was proper that a well-educated man should be versed in any department of knowledge.[1] Geometry, for instance, he said that a man should study until he should be capable, if occasion required, to take or give land correctly by measurement; or to divide it or portion it out for cultivation;[2] and this, he observed, it was so easy to learn, that he who gave any attention at all to mensuration, might find how large the whole earth was, and perfectly understand how it was measured.

3. But of pursuing the study of geometry to diagrams hard to understand, he disapproved; for he said that he could not see of what profit they were,[3] though he himself was by no means unskilled in them; but he remarked that they were enough to consume a man's whole life, and hinder him from attaining many other valuable branches of knowledge.

[1] Πράγματος.] "Negotii ex doctrinâ et scientiâ pendentis." *Schneider.*

[2] Ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι.] "Ad opus faciendum agri portionem assignare." *Ernesti.*

[3] Socrates did not altogether condemn the study of geometry and astronomy, but disapproved of the general practice of the philosophers of his own age, who devoted themselves wholly to difficult questions concerning the figure of the earth, etc., to the entire neglect of moral philosophy. Plato, Phæd. c. 46, agrees with Xenophon; and, indeed, an immoderate pursuit of such studies was altogether alien from the affairs of common life and morality, to which alone Socrates gave his serious attention. *Zeune.* In the infancy of the mechanic arts, and amid the foolish practices of the philosophers, who endeavored to apply geometry and astronomy to subjects too high for the human intellect, we cannot wonder at the determination of Socrates, who preferred improving the morals of men. Those who are ignorant of those sciences in the present day repeat the objections of Socrates as to their inutility. *Schneider.*

4. He recommended his followers to learn astronomy also, but only so far as to be able to know the hour of the night, the month, and the season of the year, with a view to traveling by land or sea, or distinguishing the night-watches; and to be competent, by knowing the divisions of the above-mentioned times, to profit by the signs for whatever other things are done at a certain period of the night, or month, or year. These particulars, he said, were easily learned from men who hunted by night, from pilots, and from many others whose business it was to know them.

5. But to continue the study of astronomy so far as to distinguish the bodies which do not move in the same circle with the heavens[1] the planets, and the irregular stars,[2] and to weary ourselves in inquiring into their distances from the earth, the periods of their revolutions, and the causes of all these things, was what he greatly discountenanced; for he saw, he said, no profit in these studies either,[3] though he had himself given attention to them; since they also, he remarked, were enough to wear out the life of a man, and prevent him from attending to many profitable pursuits.

6. Concerning celestial matters in general, he dissuaded every man from becoming a speculator how the divine power contrives to manage them; for he did not think that such points were discoverable by man, nor did he believe that those acted dutifully toward the gods who inquired into things which they did not wish to make known. He observed, too, that a man who was anxious about such investigations, was in danger of losing his senses, not less than Anaxagoras, who prided himself highly on explaining the plans of the gods, lost his.

7. For Anaxagoras, when he said that fire and the sun were of the same nature, did not reflect that people

[1] Τὰ μὴ ἐν μιᾷ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα.] Edwards refers to Diog. Laert. vii. 144, where it is said that some of the heavenly bodies are carried round with the heaven, without changing their place, while others have motions peculiar to themselves.

[2] Ἀστραθμητους ἀστέρας. Schneider, Bornemann, and Kühner, agree in understanding *comets*.

[3] Any more than in difficult geometrical investigations.

can easily look upon fire, but can not turn their gaze to the sun, and that men, if exposed to the rays of the sun, have complexions of a darker shade, but not if exposed to fire; he omitted to consider, too, that of the productions of the earth, none can come fairly to maturity without the rays of the sun, while, if warmed by the heat of fire, they all perish; and when he said that the sun was a heated stone, he forgot that a stone placed in the fire does not shine, or last long, but that the sun continues perpetually the most luminous of all bodies.

8. He advised his followers also to learn computations,[1] but in these, as in other things, he exhorted them to avoid useless labor; as far as it was of any profit, he investigated everything himself, and went through it with his associates.

9. He earnestly recommended those who conversed with him to take care of their health, both by learning whatever they could respecting it from men of experience, and by attending to it, each for himself, throughout his whole life, studying what food or drink, or what exercise, was most suitable for him, and how he might act in regard to them so as to enjoy the best health; for he said it would be difficult for a person who thus attended to himself to find a physician that would tell better than himself what was conducive to his health.

10. But if any one desired to attain to what was beyond human wisdom, he advised him to study divination; for he said that he who knew by what signs the gods give indications to men respecting human affairs, would never fail of obtaining counsel from the gods.

[1] Δογίσμους.] Computations or calculations. "Artem calculatoriam." *Schneider.* How λογιστικὴ differed from ἀριθμητικὴ is shown by Plato, Gorg. c. 13.

CHAPTER VIII.

Socrates, though condemned to death, was not convicted of falsehood with regard to his DÆMON. His resolution to die. His innocence inspires him with courage. He thinks it good to die, and escape the evils of old age. Summary of the arguments of the Memorabilia.

1. BUT if any one thinks that he was convicted of falsehood with regard to his DÆMON, because sentence of death was pronounced on him by the judges although he said that the dæmon admonished him what he ought and what he ought not to do, let him consider, in the first place, that he was already so advanced in years,[1] that he must have ended his life, if not then, at least not long after; and, in the next, that he relinquished only the most burdensome part of life, in which all feel their powers of intellect diminished, while, instead of enduring this, he acquired great glory by proving the firmness of his mind, pleading his cause above all men, with the greatest regard to truth, ingenuousness, and justice, and bearing his sentence at once with the utmost resignation and the utmost fortitude.

2. It is indeed acknowledged that no man, of all that are remembered, ever endured death with greater glory; for he was obliged to live thirty days after his sentence, because the Delian festival[2] happened in that month, and the law allowed no one to be publicly put to death until the sacred deputation should return from Delos; and during that time he was seen by all his friends living in no other way than at any preceding period; and, let it be observed, throughout all the former part of his life he had been admired beyond all men for the cheerfulness and tranquillity with which he lived.

3.[3] How could any one have died more nobly than

[1] He was seventy years old, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 44, and Maxim. Tyr. ix. 8.

[2] Δήλια.] A procession, instituted by Theseus, which the Athenians made annually to Delos, and which is to be distinguished from the *greater Delia*, or panegyris, in that island. See Smith's Dict. of G. and R. Ant., art. Delia.

[3] Bornemann thinks that portion of this chapter between the be-

thus? Or what death could be more honorable than that which any man might most honorably undergo? Or what death could be happier than the most honorable? Or what death more acceptable to the gods than the most happy?

4. I will also relate what I heard[1] respecting him from Hermogenes,[2] the son of Hipponicus, who said that after Meletus had laid the accusation against him, he heard him speaking on any subject rather than that of his trial, and remarked to him that he ought to consider what defense he should make, but that he said at first, "Do I not appear to you to have passed my whole life meditating on that subject?"[3] and then, when he asked him "How so?" he said that "he had gone through life doing nothing but considering what was just and what unjust, doing what was just and abstaining from what was unjust, which he conceived to be the best meditation for his defence."

5. Hermogenes said again, "Do you not see, Socrates, that the judges at Athens have already put to death many innocent persons, from being offended at their language and have allowed many that were guilty to escape?" "But, by Jupiter, Hermogenes," replied he, "when I was proceeding, a while ago, to study my address to the judges, the dæmon testified disapprobation." "You say what is strange," rejoined Hermogenes. "And do you think it strange," inquired Socrates, "that it should seem better to the divinity that I should now close my life? Do you not know, that, down to the present time, I would not admit to any man that he has lived either better or with more pleasure than myself? for I consider that those live best who study best to become as good as possible; and that those live with most pleasure who feel the most assurance that they are daily growing better and better.

ginning of sect 3, and ἐμοὶ μὲν δή in sect. 11, spurious and made up from the Apology. Weiske is of a contrary opinion.

[1] Xenophon himself was then with Cyrus in Asia. *Schneider.*

[2] The same that is mentioned in ii. 10. See Cobet, Prosopogr. Xen. p. 64.

[3] Τοῦτο μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι.] "In hac re (defensione mei) meditanda totam vivam transegisse." *Kühner.*

7. This assurance I have felt to the present day, to be the case with respect to myself; and associating with other men, and comparing myself with others, I have always retained this opinion respecting myself; and not only I, but my friends also, maintain a similar feeling with regard to me, not because they love me (for those who love others may be thus affected toward the objects of their love), but because they think that while they associated with me they became greatly advanced in virtue.

8. If I shall live a longer period, perhaps I shall be destined to sustain the evils of old age, to find my sight and hearing weakened, to feel my intellect impaired, to become less apt to learn, and more forgetful, and, in fine, to grow inferior to others in all those qualities in which I was once superior to them. If I should be insensible to this deterioration, life would not be worth retaining; and, if I should feel it, how could I live otherwise than with less profit, and with less comfort?

9. If I am to die unjustly, my death will be a disgrace to those who unjustly kill me; for if injustice is a disgrace, must it not be a disgrace to do anything unjustly? But what disgrace will it be to me, that others could not decide or act justly with regard to me?

10. Of the men who have lived before me, I see that the estimation left among posterity with regard to such as have done wrong, and such as have suffered wrong, is by no means similar; and I know that I also, if I now die, shall obtain from mankind far different consideration from that which they will pay to those who take my life; for I know that they will always bear witness to me that I have never wronged any man, or rendered any man less virtuous, but that I have always endeavored to make those better who conversed with me." Such discourse he held with Hermogenes, and with others.

11. Of those who knew what sort of man Socrates was, such as were lovers of virtue, continue to regret him above all other men, even to the present day, as having contributed in the highest degree to their advancement in goodness. To me, being such as I have

described him, so pious that he did nothing without the sanction of the gods; so just, that he wronged no man even in the most trifling affair, but was of service, in the most important matters, to those who enjoyed his society; so temperate, that he never preferred pleasure to virtue; so wise, that he never erred in distinguishing better from worse, needing no counsel from others, but being sufficient in himself to discriminate between them; so able to explain and settle such questions by argument; and so capable of discerning the character of others, of confuting those who were in error, and of exhorting them to virtue and honor, he seemed to be such as the best and happiest of men would be. But if any one disapproves of my opinion, let him compare the conduct of others with that of Socrates, and determine accordingly.

The Hamilton, Locke and Clark
SERIES OF
Interlinear Translations

Have long been the Standard and are now the *Best Translated* and *Most Complete* Series of Interlinears published.

12mo., well bound in Half Leather.

Price reduced to $1.50 each. Postpaid to any address.

Latin Interlinear Translations:

VIRGIL—By Hart and Osborne.
CÆSAR—By Hamilton and Clark.
HORACE—By Stirling, Nuttall and Clark.
CICERO—By Hamilton and Clark.
SALLUST—By Hamilton and Clark.
OVID—By George W. Heilig.
JUVENAL—By Hamilton and Clark.
LIVY—By Hamilton and Clark.
CORNELIUS NEPOS—By Hamilton and Underwood.

Greek Interlinear Translations:

HOMER'S ILIAD—By Thomas Clark.
XENOPHON'S ANABASIS—By Hamilton and Clark.
GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN—By George W. Heilig.

S. Austin Allibone, the distinguished author, writes:

"There is a growing disapprobation, both in Great Britain and America, of the disproportionate length of time devoted by the youthful student to the acquisition of the dead languages: and therefore nothing will tend so effectually to the preservation of the Greek and Latin grammars as their judicious union (the fruit of an intelligent compromise) with the Interlinear Classics."

DAVID McKAY, Publisher, Philadelphia.

Formerly published by Charles De Silver & Sons.

888
Xe25m

16917

AUTHOR

Xenophon

TITLE

The memorabilia of Socrates

DATE DUE | BORROWER'S NAME

OCT 17 '67

888
Xe25m

16917

THE MASTER'S COLLEGE
888 Xe25m MAIN
Xenophon/The memorabilia of Socrates; li
3 3540 00114 6758